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9) Mr. Khandeparkar would further submit that the Declaration dated 1 October 2004, the Deeds of Apartment dated 4 November 2004 6 November 2004, 10 November 2004 and 6 October 2005 and Deeds of Transfer dated 1 February 2005 are registered instruments. He would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Shri ______________________________________________________________________________ Friday, 17 October, 2025 Neeta SawanT Int.appln-1949-2025-FC Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others Versus. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another in support of his contention that when a document is registered, the date of registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In support of the same contention, he also relies on the judgment of the Apex Court judgment in Uma Devi and Others Versus Anand Kumar and Others 2. Mr. Khandeparkar would further submit that the period of limitation began running from the dates of execution of Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer and that the same has not been interdicted by any event recognized in Part-III of the Limitation Act. Referring to the provisions of Order VII Rule 6 of the Code, Mr. Khandeparkar would submit that if exemption from limitation law is claimed, the Plaint must show the grounds upon which such exemption from normal limitation period is claimed. He would rely on judgment in Santosh Devi Versus Sunder 3. That in the present case, the Plaint does not contain any averment as to how any of the exemptions under Part- III of the Limitation Act are applicable to the present case where the limitation started running from the dates of execution of Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer. Mr. Khandeparkar would submit that the Suit is hopelessly barred by limitation and that the Defendants cannot be made to undergo the ordeal of trial. He would submit that Plaintiffs always had knowledge about execution of Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer and have strategically filed the present Suit with a view to stall redevelopment of the building. That Plaintiffs are now owner of only one unit in the building which is rented out to Commissioner of Police. That since Plaintiffs are opposed to redevelopment of the building and since they cannot go against the majority wish of other apartment owners, the present Suit is filed with malafide objective of stalling the redevelopment 2024 SCC Online 3844 2025 (5) SCC 198 2025 SCC Online SC 1808 ______________________________________________________________________________ Friday, 17 October, 2025 Neeta SawanT Int.appln-1949-2025-FC process. He would accordingly pray for rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

10) The application is opposed by Mr. Kumbhat, the learned counsel appearing for the Plaintiffs. He would submit that the Suit is filed for setting aside Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer and that therefore the same is governed by the provisions of Article 59 of the Limitation Act. That under Article 59, the period of limitation starts running only from the date of acquisition of knowledge of execution of impugned instrument. That in the present case, Plaint specifically contains an averment that Plaintiffs acquired knowledge of execution of Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer for the first time in January 2024. That therefore the Suit is filed within the period of 3 years from the date of acquisition of such knowledge and that the same is therefore perfectly within limitation. He would submit that it is well settled position that while deciding Application under Order VII Rule 11, only averments in the Plaint are required to be taken into consideration. That therefore as of now, the Court must consider specific averment in para-35 of the Plaint in which Plaintiff has averred acquisition of knowledge of execution of the impugned Deeds for the first time in January 2024.

12) Mr. Kumbhat would further submit that in Suit governed by Article 59 of the Limitation Act, that the date of knowledge about execution of impugned instrument is important. That it is Plaintiff 's case that the father has alienated the property on the misrepresentation that he was the sole owner. That the Suit is not for enforcement of a right in joint family property for being governed by Article 109 of the Limitation Act. According to the Plaintiffs, the entire act of execution of Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer are void as the same are performed on a misrepresentation that the father was the sole owner. That Article 109 of the Limitation Act applies only when joint family property is alienated by Karta of the family. That father has not executed the impugned instrument in his capacity as Karta. That therefore the Suit would be governed by the provisions of Article 59 of the Limitation Act. That the argument of possession being handed over on the date of execution of Deeds of Apartment is fallacious as Defendant Nos.2 to 31 were already tenants in occupation of their respective premises and that therefore there was no question of handing over possession of any of the units. In support of his contention that suit can be filed challenging an instrument of transfer of property within ______________________________________________________________________________ Friday, 17 October, 2025 Neeta SawanT Int.appln-1949-2025-FC three years of acquisition of knowledge of execution of instrument, Mr. Kumbhat would rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Abdul Rahim and Others Versus. S.K. Abdul Zabar and Others4. He would rely upon judgment of this Court in Vijay Shridhar Ghare Versus. Ashok Narayan Shinde5 in support of his contention that Articles 109 and 110 of the Limitation Act come into play only when suit is filed for enforcement of right by a member of joint family. That in the present case, Plaintiffs are aggrieved by the redevelopment process undertaken by Defendant Nos.1 to 31 by relying upon Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer which are ex-facie void. That the Suit is not for enforcement of share in the suit property and that therefore provisions of Articles 109 and 110 of the Limitation Act have no application to the present case. He would also rely upon judgment of the Apex Court in Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Versus. Regency Mahavir Properties and Others. 6 He would submit that the issue of limitation would otherwise be a mixed question of law and fact and cannot be decided at this stage of the suit, before leading evidence. He would submit that the issue of limitation can be framed and decided by the Court while deciding the Suit. He would therefore pray for rejection of the Application.

18) Thus, for cancellation or setting aside of an instrument, the Suit needs to be filed within a period of 3 years from the facts entitling the Plaintiffs to have the instrument cancelled or set aside, first become known to him. According to the Plaintiffs, challenge to the Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer is nothing but a prayer for cancellation or setting aside an instrument within the meaning of Article 59 of the Limitation Act. Plaintiffs further claim that in para-35 of the Plaint, they have disclosed the date of acquisition of knowledge of execution of the impugned Declaration, Deeds of Apartment and Deeds of Transfer in January 2024. Para-35 of the Plaint reads thus :-