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Crl.R.P.Nos.492 & 493 Of 2017 judgment of the Apex Court will preclude the learned Magistrate from exercising the statutory powers conferred as per Sec.470 of the Cr.P.C r/w Sec.142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act for considering the question of condonation of delay beyond the said 30 days time limit in respect of the complaints which were re-presented beyond the said 30 days time limit so long as such complaints were re-presented on or before coming into force of the amended provisions of the N.I Act on 15.6.2015. But the Division Bench in Binoy K.Mathew's case (supra) has also held that in view of the subsequent amendment brought about to Sec.142A of the Act, resort to the provisions contained in Sec.470 Cr.P.C r/w proviso to clause (b) of Sec.142(1) may not be really necessary in such cases in view of the provisions contained in Sec.142A which contained the non obstante clause thereto which covers the pending cases before any court whether filed before it or transferred to it before the commencement of the ordinance and that such cases shall be transferred to the court having jurisdiction under Sec.142(2) of the N.I.Act as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times. Further that the amended provisions are clarificatory in nature, clarifying the territorial jurisdiction for trying the cases for dishonour of cheques as indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Amendment Bill. 

"19. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the complaints involved in these Crl. R.P.s were filed in courts which had jurisdiction, going by sub-section (2) of S.142 of the N.I. Act inserted by the Ordinance No.6 of 2015. The Ordinance is in force. The ordinance promulgated under Article 123 of the Constitution of India shall have the same force and effect as an act of Parliament. The Ordinance has not ceased to operate as provided in sub clause (a) of Clause (2) of Article 123 of the Constitution of India, nor was it withdrawn as provided in sub clause (b) therein. If so, the complaints would have been maintainable before the courts where they were filed, going by the submission made by the counsel. The non obstante clause in S.142A of the N.I. Act, as inserted by the Ordinance, covers cases pending before any court, whether filed before it or transferred to it, before the commencement of the Ordinance and such cases shall be transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of S.142 of the N.I. Act as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times. Ordinance No.6 of 2015 is clarificatory in nature, clarifying the territorial jurisdiction for trying the cases for dishonour of  ::6::

Crl.R.P.Nos.492 & 493 Of 2017 cheques as indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Amendment Bill. Sub-section (1) of S.142A of the N.I. Act would make the position clear that it is clarificatory in nature. If so, it is not necessary to direct the courts which passed the impugned orders to entertain the complaints and consider the applications for condonation of delay. It would be sufficient if the petitioners are permitted to present the complaints before the courts where they were originally filed.

6. The present cases are those which are covered by the legal position laid down by this Court in Crl.M.C.No.2079/2016 dated 16.1.2017. Therefore, the petitioners have rightly approached the competent trial court for condoning the delay in re-presenting their complaints which were re-filed much after 15.6.2015. The learned Magistrate has dismissed the delay condonation application in view of  ::8::

Crl.R.P.Nos.492 & 493 Of 2017 the grounds stated in para 5 of the impugned order, which has been quoted hereinabove. But one crucial and relevant aspect of the matter which flows from the legal principles laid down by the Division Bench in Binoy K.Mathew's case (supra) as well as the subsequent order of this Court in Crl.M.C.No.2079/2016 appears to have escaped the considered attention of the trial court. Presumably, this could have occurred as the complainant would not have brought those aspects to the notice of the learned Magistrate. The said aspect of the mater is that going by the fine tuned legal principles laid down by the Division Bench in Binoy K.Mathew's case (supra) in respect of all complaints which were not re- filed immediately after 30 days' time limit but were re-filed later but prior to the coming into force of the ordinance with effect from 15.6.2015 their Lordships in the aforecited judgment held that in view of the subsequent amendment brought about to Sec.142A of the Act, resort to the provisions contained in Sec.470 Cr.P.C r/w proviso to clause (b) of Sec.142(1) may not be really necessary in such cases in view of the provisions contained in Sec.142A and such complainants should be permitted to re-present their complaints before the competent criminal court, etc. In other words, so long as such complaints which were not filed within the 30 days time limit but which were re-filed or  ::9::