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Where a person by allowing his cart to proceed Unattended along a road runs over a boy who is sleeping on the road, he cannot be convicted under this Section (i.e., Section 279, I.P.C), but must be convicted under Section 337 or Section 338, I.P.C. - ('Government of Bombay v. Malkaji - Rat. Un. Cr. C. 198 (D)', though there is authority to the contrary also - 'Queen Empress v. Bali-Rat. Un Cr. C. 396 (E).
I have gone through both these cases. The first case i. e., - 'Government of Bombay v, Malkaji (D)', is a case of 1884, and the appeal was decided by Kendall and Birdwood JJ. It was decided that where a person by allowing his cart to proceed unattended along a road runs over a boy who is sleeping on the road, he cannot be convicted under Section 279, I.P.C., but must be convicted under Section 337 or Section 338, I.P.C.
Section 279 makes rash driving or riding on a public road punishable if such rash driving or riding endangers human life or is likely to cause hurt or injury to another person. Where the rash' or negligent driving actually results in grievous hurt being caused to any person, an offence under Section 338 is committed, and accused can be convicted under Section 338, but not both under Sections 279 and 338, I.P.C.
In my opinion, this head-note is misleading, as will be apparent from a perusal of the order which is a brief one and which I reproduce below, The only question is whether in these circumstances he should have been sentenced under both (Sections 279 and 338. The former Section makes rash driving or riding on a public road punishable if such driving or riding endangers human life or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Where the rash or negligent driving actually results in grievous hurt being caused to any person, an offence under Section 333 is committed.

12. In both the Patna and Tra.-Co. cases, there is no discussion of the question whether the offences under Sections 279 and 337 or Section 338, I.P.C. are distinct and whether an accused tan be convicted for both these offences; but the convictions pre clearly based on the assumption that an offence under Section 279, I.P.C. is distinct from that under Section 337 or Section 338, I.P.C. That, in my opinion, will also be manifest from the wording of Sections 279, 337 and 338 which are reproduced below:

16. The following answer to the reference may, therefore, be sent to the Division Bench:

An offence under Section 279, I.P.C. is distinct from an offence under Section 337 or Section 338, I.P.C. and, therefore, a person convicted of an offence under Section 337 or Section 338, I.P.C. can also be convicted for an offence under Section 279, I, P.C. If, however, the two offences are committed in the same transaction, Section 71, I. P. C will govern the assessment of punishment. The case reported in - 'Madh.-B. LR 1952 Cr. 302 (A)' does not lay down correct law on this point.