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Showing contexts for: kone elevators in State Of Kerala vs Sri.P.C. Kurian on 21 February, 2019Matching Fragments
6. Sri.Sreekumar, learned Counsel for the assessee, however, relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kone Elevator India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. [(2014) 22 KTR 371 (SC)].
7. Sri.Shamsudheen sought to distinguish Kone Elevator India Pvt. Ltd.[(2014) 22 KTR 371 (SC)] on the ground that the issue therein was installation of a lift requiring very skilled operations and involves fitting of various components, both mechanical and electrical as also fabrication work. The complex work involved would commend an interpretation of that being a works contract, where transfer is not in the form of goods. However, in the present case it is essentially a transfer in the form of goods, as can be seen from B.Narasamma.
8. As was argued, EDRSF Association specifically looked at a contract which provided for fabrication and installation of rolling shutters. It was found that this involves transfer of rolling shutter, which is a specified goods and, hence, the dealers engaged in such contracts are not entitled to the rate of tax provided under the compounding scheme. In fact, the aforesaid decision followed the decision of the Hon'ble supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kone Elevators (India) Ltd. [(2005) 3 SCC 389], which was later overruled by a Larger Bench in 2014, which decision is cited first, above. Sri.Shamsudheen though, would point out that the Division Bench despite having applied Kone Elevators (India) Ltd. [(2005) 3 SCC 389], also found that in the case of a rolling shutter the goods which are fixed is only a rolling shutter and the side panels and its head containing rolling rod.
10. Kone Elevator India Pvt. Ltd.[(2014) 22 KTR 371 (SC)] specifically looked into this aspect and held so in paragraph 66:
"66. Coming back to Kone Elevators (2005) 140 STC 22 (SC); (2005) 4 RC 318, it is perceivable that the three-Judge Bench has referred to the statutory provisions of the 1957 Act and thereafter referred to the decision in Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (2000) 119 STC 533 (SC); (2000) 6 SCC 579; (2000) 8 KTR 433 (SC), and has further taken note of the customers' obligation to do the civil construction and the time schedule for delivery and thereafter proceeded to state about the major component facet and how the skill and labour employed for converting the main components into the end product was only incidental and arrived at the conclusion that it was a contract for sale. The principal logic applied, i.e., the incidental facet of labour and service, according to us, is not correct. It may be noted here that in all the cases that have been brought before us, there is a composite contract for the purchase and installation of the lift. The price quoted is a composite one for both.
As has been held by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (1969) 24 STC 535 (Bom), various technical aspects go into the installation of the lift. There has to be a safety device. In certain States, it is controlled by the legislative enactment and the rules. In certain States, it is not, but the fact remains that a lift is installed on certain norms and parameters keeping in view numerous factors. The installation requires considerable skill and experience. The labour and service element is obvious. What has been taken note of in Kone Elevators (2005) 4 RC 318, is that the company had brochures for various types of lifts and one is required to place order, regard being had to the building, and also make certain preparatory work. But it is not in dispute that the preparatory work has to be done taking into consideration as to how the lift is going to be attached to the building. The nature of the contracts clearly exposit that they are contracts for supply and installation of the lift where labour and service element is involved. Individually manufactured goods such as lift car, motors, ropes, rails, etc. are the components of the lift which are eventually installed at the site for the lift to operate in the building. In constitutional terms, it is transfer either in goods or some other form. In fact, after the goods are assembled and installed with skill and labour at the site, it becomes a permanent fixture of the building. Involvement of the skill has been elaborately dealt with by the High Court of Bombay in Otis Elevator (1969) 24 STC 525 (Bom) and the factual position is undisputable and irrespective of whether installation is regulated by statutory law or not, the result would be the same. We may hasten to add that this position is stated in respect of a composite contract which requires the contractor to install a lift in a building. It is necessary to state here that if there are two contracts, namely, purchase of the components of the lift from a dealer, it would be a contract for sale and similarly, if separate contract is entered into for installation, that would be a contract for labour and service. But, a pregnant one, once there is a composite contract for supply and installation, it has to be treated as a works contract, for it is not a sale of goods/chattel simpliciter. It is not chattel sold as chattel or, for that matter, a chattel being attached to another chattel. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to term it as a contract for sale on the bedrock that the components are brought to the site, i.e., building, and prepared for delivery. The conclusion, as has been reached in Kone Elevators (2005) 140 STC 22 (SC); (2005) 4 RC 318, is based on the bedrock of incidental service for delivery. It would not be legally correct to make such a distinction in respect of lift, for the contract itself profoundly speaks of obligation to supply goods and materials as well as installation of the lift which obviously conveys performance of labour and service. Hence, the fundamental characteristics of works contract are satisfied. Thus analysed, we conclude and hold that the decision rendered in Kone Elevators (2005) 140 STC 22 (SC); (2005) 4 RC 318 does not correctly lay down the law and it is, accordingly, overruled". We are of the opinion that the above dictum squarely applies to the facts of the present case also.