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Showing contexts for: sec 467 ipc in Ashwani Lochan Aggarwal vs State on 8 December, 2006Matching Fragments
5. On 21.9.2006 an application for judicial remand for 14 days was moved. It was allowed. Then followed the remand applications of 5.10.2006 and 19.10.2006. Which were also for 14 days each. They were also allowed by the learned ACMM. All these applications had reference to the offences under Sections 120B/468/471/420 IPC. But, in the next remand application of 2.11.2006, which, if allowed, would take the custody period beyond 60 days, the commission of a fresh offence under Section 467 IPC (forgery of valuable security, will, etc.) was alleged against the petitioner. Now, there is no dispute that in respect of the offence under Section 467 IPC the period prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code is 90 days. This is because, the punishment prescribed for the offence under Section 467 IPC is imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, as also the liability to fine. As the offence is capable of being punished with life imprisonment, Clause (a)(i) of the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code would apply. And, consequently the relevant period would be 90 days.
6. Mr A.K. Panda, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, made a two-fold submission. Firstly, he submitted, the alleged offence under Section 467 IPC was introduced when the end of 60 days period was fast approaching and the completion of the investigation was nowhere in sight. It was introduced only to scuttle the petitioner's right to bail on default which would accrue to him on 10.11.2006, on the completion of 60 days of remand. By introducing Section 467 IPC on the same set of facts, the investigating agency has, according to Mr Panda, enlarged the period from 60 days to 90 days in a mala fide manner which is impermissible in law. Mr Panda's second submission was that the allegations even if taken at face value do not disclose any offence under Section 467 IPC. He submitted that the allegation against the petitioner as contained in the report dated 14.11.2006 on the bail application before the learned ACMM requires to be seen. The allegation is as under:
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx During the course of investigation it was found that Section 467 IPC is also made out against the accused persons and accordingly the section was added on 26.10.06. In the last JC Remand of the accused dated 2.11.06 the Section 467 IPC is also duly mentioned...
So, Mr Panda submitted, Section 467 IPC was introduced on 26.10.2006 on the allegation that fake mark-sheets were prepared and utilised by the accused including the petitioner. He then referred to the Supreme Court decision in Shriniwas Pandit Dharamadhikari v. State of Maharashtra to submit that forged certificates for getting admission to an university would not bring the offence under Section 467 IPC. In that case, the Supreme Court held thus:
1. A forged Migration Certificate of the Board of Secondary Education, M.P. (Bhopal). [ Exhibit - A].
2. A forged Mark-Sheet of the Intermediate Arts Examination held by the Board in the year 1968. [Exhibit - B].
So, it was submitted by Mr Panda, the Supreme Court found that the forged Migration Certificate and the forged Mark-Sheet used for securing admission to an university could not be described as valuable securities within the meaning of Section 30 IPC. That being the case, he contended that, in the present case also fake and forged mark-sheets are in issue. The Supreme Court having held forged mark-sheets not to be valuable securities, the case would not fall under Section 467 IPC. This is so because Section 467 IPC has reference to a forged document which purports to be (1) a valuable security or a will or an authority to adopt a son; or (2) a forged document which purports to give authority to any person (i) to make or transfer any valuable security, or (ii) to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or (iii) to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security; or (3) any forged document purporting to be (i) an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or (ii) an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security. The documents other than valuable security referred to above are clearly not in issue in the present case. Thus, as per the contention on behalf of the petitioner, unless the fake / forged mark-sheets involved in the present case can be brought with the meaning of valuable security which is defined in Section 30 IPC, no case under Section 467 IPC can be made out against the petitioner. And, because the Supreme Court held that a mark-sheet is not a valuable security, there is no question of invoking Section 467 IPC against the petitioner. Therefore, the relevant period would remain 60 days. It was thus contended that the said period of 60 days having already expired and the investigation not having been completed, the petitioner ought to be released on bail forthwith.