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The appellant is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. It was established with the main object of creating atmosphere for adult education which includes imparting education for women in rural parts of the State of Rajasthan. The respondent was appointed temporarily as Programme Assistant in district IDARAS (Information Development And Resource Agency) by letter dated November 9, 1987. Her appointment was for a period of three months on a consolidated salary of Rs. 1200/- per month. Her appointment was extended for a further period of six months from March 1, 1988. By letter dated March 11, 1989 the respondent was informed that her services were not upto the mark and deficiencies in her service were pointed out after evaluation of her work. The respondent was told the need for her for putting serious efforts and to learn the sponsored subject. She was given one more opportunity to show improvement in her work and period of her services was again extended from January 30 to April 30, 1989. By letter dated May 1, 1989 the respondent was told that her services were not required and these were terminated. She was given one moths' notice. Her employment thus ceased on May 31, 1989.

Respondent in her writ petition filed against the order terminating her services as temporary programme Assistant was challenged principally on the ground that the order was passed without complying with the provision of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Notice being issued to the appellant to show cause as to why the writ petition he not admitted and disposed of it was submitted by the appellant that writ petition was not maintainable as the appellant was not a `State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and that it was also not an `industry' coming within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned single Judge who allowed the writ petition held that the appellant was a State and that in any case before terminating her services the respondent should have been given an opportunity to explain her conduct. He observed that "even if Article 311 is not applicable, services of the petitioner could not have been terminated or dispensed with, without giving a reasonable opportunity as is required by the fundamental principles of natural justice. An employee cannot be condemned unheard, without giving an opportunity to show cause and that was not done in the present case".