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Section 7 (iv) (c), Court-fees Act, contemplates a suit in which the declaratory decree is the main, basic relief and the "further relief" is asked for only as incidental to it. The two reliefs must be asked for as One joint and indivisible relief so that if the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, refuses to pass a declaratory decree, the claim for "further relief" also will fall with it. It is only in cases in which the "further relief" is asked for on this footing that the suit will come under Sub-clause (c) of Clause (iv) of Section 7, Court-fees Act, and not otherwise.

46. For, purposes of Section 42 01 the Act, it is not essential that the "further relief should be asked for as an incident to the declaratory decree. Even if the "further relief" is asked for as a separate relief, the requirements of the Proviso to Section 42. Specific Relief Act, will be satisfied, and, the suit will not be liable to be dismissed under that Proviso on the ground of its failing to include a prayer for "further relief."

47. Therefore, though "consequential relief, within the meaning of Section 7 (iv) (c), Court-fees Act, will be "further relief" for the purposes of Section 42 of the Act also, but, what would be "further relief, within ths meaning of Section 42 of the Act, will not necessarily be "consequential relief" within the meaning of Section 7 (iv) (c), Court-fees Act, for the simple reason, that in order to come under Sub-clause (c) of Clause (iv) of Section 7, Court-fees Act, the suit must aim at a single, composite relief, in which the main and basic part will" consist of a declaratory decree and the "further relief will only form an adjunct to it, to be granted or refused along with it, and, not independently of it. Hence, the mere fact that a certain relief flows from the right declared will not ipso facto make it "consequential relief" within the meaning of Section 7 (iv) (c), Court-fees Act: see, for instance, Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal, AIR 1932 All 485; ILR 54 All 812 (F. B.)

71. It is well settled that where the Civil Court deals only with the question of title of land and gives a decree to a person declaring his title such a decree of the Civil Court will not debar a Magistrate from deciding the question of possession under Section 145 (4) of the Code, irrespective of such a declaratory decree of the Civil Court. Under Section 145 (4) of the Code, the Magistrate has to make an enquiry about possession, which may even be quite contrary to title supported by a decree of the Civil Court.

84. In the suit against an attachment under Section 146 (1) the Civil Court has to decide question of title of the party before it and to find out who the rightful Owner of the land attached is, whereas, in the suit against an order or attachment under Section 145 (4), where there is no prayer for recovery of possession, the Civil Court has to decide only the question of title, but the question of actual possession has to be decided by the Magistrate under Section 145(4), and, the said declaratory decree will not be binding on him on the question of possession. In this view, it is mandatory for the plaintiff to seek recovery of possession and if he does not do so, the Civil Court may refuse to grant him a mere declaratory decree which would be ineffective to enable the plaintiff to get a declaration of possession from the Magistrate under Section 145 (4). This is the vital distinction, but the argument of Mr. Chatterji ignores this basic fact.