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7. Mr. Mansoor Ali, learned Counsel on behalf of the BRPL submits that the Section 152 of the Act permitted compounding of the offence only by the authorized officers of the appropriate Government. He refers to a notification dated 5th May, 2006 issued by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi appointing Deputy Commissioners as officers authorized to accept the compounding fee in terms of Section 152 of the Act. He accordingly submits that the application for compounding could therefore not have been filed before the learned Special Judge. Notwithstanding the preliminary objection, he submits that the Respondent No. 1 was justified in insisting the payment of the entire theft bill as a pre-condition to accept the compounding fee.

(3) The acceptance of the sum of money for compounding an offence in accordance with Sub-section (1) by the Appropriate Government or an officer empowered in this behalf shall be deemed to amount to an acquittal within the meaning of Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(4) The compounding of an offence under Sub-section (1) shall be allowed only once for any person or consumer.

9. The legislative intent as is evident from a plain reading of Section 152 shows that compounding of an offence has to be preceded by a bilateral agreement between the complainant which is BRPL and the accused. In Sub-section (3) the words "the acceptance of the sum of money for compounding an offence in accordance with Sub-section (1) by the Appropriate Government..." indicate that the offer of the compounding fee by the accused has to be accepted by the authorized officer as designated by the Appropriate Government. Secondly, the words in Sub-section (1) to the effect "may accept from any consumer..." indicate that this is a discretionary power and it is not in each and every case that the authorized officer is required to accept the compounding fee for compounding the offence. Sub-section (4) also indicates that this is a one-time measure vis--vis the consumer.

(2) Where an offence has been compounded under Sub-section (1), the offender, if in custody, shall be discharged and no further proceedings shall be taken against him in respect of such offence.

11. The observations of the Supreme Court in P. Ratnakar Rao (supra) have to be understood in the context of the wording of Section 200 MV Act. It is no doubt true that in para 4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Ratnakar Rao it was observed thus: (para 4 pages 625-626)

4. It is not mandatory that the authorized officer would always compound the offence. It is conditional upon the willingness of the accused to have the offences compounded. It may also be done before the institution of the prosecution case. In the event of the petitioners willing to have the offence compounded, the authorized officer gets jurisdiction and authority to compound the offence and call upon the accused to pay the same. On compliance thereof, the proceedings, if already instituted, would be closed or no further proceedings shall be initiated. It is a matter of volition or willingness on the part of the accused either to accept compounding of the offence or to face the prosecution in the appropriate court. As regards canalization and prescription of the amount of fine for the offences committed, Section 194, the penal and charging section prescribes the maximum outer limit within which the compounding fee would be prescribed. The discretion exercised by the delegated legislation i.e. the executive is controlled by the specification in the Act. It is not necessary that Section 200 itself should contain the details in that behalf. So long as the compounding fee does not exceed the fine prescribed by penal section, the same cannot be declared to be either exorbitant or irrational or bereft of guidance.

12. However, it would not be appropriate, given the difference in the texts of Section 200 MV Act, to interpret Section 152 of the Act in the manner in which Section 200 MV Act has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.

13. As regards the contention whether a condition in addition to what is evident from the statute can be imposed for accepting the compounding fee, it requires to be observed that the compounding is of the offence by the Petitioner and the fee is for compounding that offence. It would be inconceivable that the complainant can be expected to accept the compounding fee without the theft bill being discharged. Viewed in this context, the insistence by the Respondent No. 1 that the theft bill would have to be paid as a pre-condition to accept the compounding fee, cannot be said to be unreasonable or illegal.