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27. The next contention of the learned Government Advo ste, end an important one, is that the three contracts are void and unenforceable against the Government as they have not been executed in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 175 of the Government of India Act. In support of his contention he relied upon recent decisions of the Supreme Court as to the effect of the violation of the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution, which I shall presently refer to. These contracts were executed when the Government of India Act. 1935, was in force, but there is absolutely no difference between the provisions of Section 175 (3) of the Government Of India Act and those of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution. Section 175 (3), as in force in 1943, whett the contracts were made provides as follows:

30. In the case of Chaturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram, (1954) SCR 817 at p. 834 : (AIR 1954 SC 236 at p. 243) (F), Bose J., delivering the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court observed as follows as to the effect of the relation of Article 299 (1) :

"We feel that some reasonable meaning must be attached to Article 299 (1). We do not think the provisions were inserted for the sake of were form. We feel they are there to safeguard Government, against unauthorised contracts. If in fact a contract is unauthorised or in excess of authority it is right that Government should be safeguarded. On the other hand, an officer entering into a contract on behalf of Government can always, safeguard himself by having recourse to the proper form.
"It may be that Government will not be bound by the contracts in that case, but that is a very different thing from saying that the contracts as such are void and of no effect, It only means that the principal cannot be sued; but we take it there would be nothing to prevent ratification, especially if that was for the benefit of Government."

The contracts though not in conformity with the provisions of Article 299(1) may no doubt be roti-fied by the Government, but the question is how that ratification is to be brought about. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were not concerned in that case with the manner and mode of ratification of the contract which was unenforceable by reason of violation of the provisions of Article 299 (I). In the present case, the acceptance by the defendant of the goods tendered by the plaintiff is said to constitute ratification.

This opinion is borne out by a decision of the Supreme Court in 1954 SCR 817: (AIR 1954 SC 236) (F), where Bose, J. approved the strict view taken by the Bombay High Coun in Krishnaji Nilkant v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 Bom 449 (P) & by the Calcutta High Court in Province of Bengal v. S.L. Puri, 51 Cal WN 753 (Q). It was observed by Bose, J. that the reasoning of the Federal Court in J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. v. Emperor,. 1947 FCR 141: (AIR 1947 PC 38) (R), with regard to Section 40 (1) of the Ninth Schedule of the Government of India Act was not applicable to the interpretation of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution which was couched in different language, Bose, J. also held that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Dattatreya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay. 1952 SCR 612: (AIR 1932 SQ 181) (S), with regard to Article 166 (1) of the Constitution was also not applicable to the interpretation of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution. Bose, J. further held that the provisions of Article 299 (1) were not inserted in the Constitution for the sake of mere form, but the provisions were inserted for the purpose of safeguarding Government against unauthorised contracts. It was accordingly held by the Supreme Court that Article 299 was not complied with as the contracts were made by correspondence and, therefore, the Union Government could not have been sued upon them and the contracts were unenforceable and void as against the Union Government. At P. 834 of SCR: (p. 243 of AIR), Bose, J. states :