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2. Shri Holey, the learned counsel for the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 2084 of 1974, contended before us that there is no nexus between the emergency declared under Article 352 of the Constitution of India and the present legislation, and therefore, the petitioners are entitled to challenge the present enactment on the ground that it is violative of the petitioners fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. it is contended by the learned counsel that under the Constitution two distinct and separate provisions are made for declaration of emergency, Article 352 of the Constitution confers a power upon the President to declare emergency if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whereas Art. 360 confers a powers upon the President to declare emergency if he is satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, to the present legislation the provisions of Article 358 are not applicable . According to the learned counsel as Article 360 appears on the statute book after Article 358 it is not applicable to a legislation which is based on financial stringency or paucity of funds. He further contended that the present legislation, namely, the Maharashtra Raw Cotton (procurement , Processing and Marketing) Act, 1971 and in particular Maharashtra Ordinance No. XXIII of 1974 has been promulgated providing a mode of payment of the advance price because of financial stringency of paucity of funds. According to the learned counsel, the present legislation has, therefore no nexus with the emergency declared under Article 352 of the Constitution and hence it is open for the petitioner to challenge the said legislation on the ground that it is violative of the petitioner's fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution.

3. In our opinion, the contention raised by Shri Holey needs to be mentioned only for being rejected. Art. 358 of the Constitution deals with the suspension of provisions of Article 19 during the emergency. It is not open for this Court to go behind the proclamation. Only because Article 360 appears in the Statute book after Article 358, are not applicable to a legislation providing for the mode of payment of advance price due to financial stringency of paucity of funds. The protection given by Art. 358 to a legislation made during the subsistence of emergency is a blanket protection. This Court has considered this aspect of the matter in detail in Rajaram v. State of Maharashtra (1973 Mah. LJ 813) while dealing with the present legislation itself. In view of this in our , opinion, it is not open for the petitioners to challenge e the present legislation on the ground that it is violative of their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In all fairness to Shri Manohar, he has not adopted this part of the argument of Shri Holey.

5. It is not possible for us to accept this contention of Shri Manohar. It cannot be disputed that in view of the provision of Article 358 of the Constitution , while a proclamation of emergency is in operation, the provisions of Art. 19 are suspended during the pendency of emergency. If this is so, then it is not open for the petitioners to contend during the pendency of emergency that the present legislation violates their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. If this is so, is our opinion , it is not also permissible for the petitioners to avail of the same right obliquely or indirectly. The protection given by Article 358 to a legislation made during the subsistence of emergency against an attack on the ground of violation of article 19 of the Constitution is a blanket protection if the legislation is otherwise legal and constitutionally valid. In this view of the matter in our opinion. It is not open for the petitioner to take aid of the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution is a blanket protection if the legislation is otherwise legal and constitutionally valid. In this view of the matter in our opinion, it is not open for the petitioner to take aid for the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution of India for contending that they are being deprived of their property without authority of the law, meaning thereby that the law, which deprives them of their property, is violative of their fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 of the Constitution. Apart from this, in our opinion , the sale of the cotton by the petitioners under the provisions of the Act at the centres opened by the Government at a price to be determined by the Government in exercise of the power conferred upon it by the Act cannot be termed to be a compulsory acquisition or requisition of the property within the meaning of Article 31 of the Constitution. The present piece of legislation merely requires a person to sell the cotton to the Government or its agent as per provisions of the act and monopoly scheme. It does not empower the Government either to acquire or take possession of property. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, it is not necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in State in West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel in support of his contention. Moreover, after the said decision of the Supreme Court, Article 31 of the Constitution of India itself was amended. In the present case if it is not possible for the petitioners to attack the present legislation on the ground that it is violative of their right guaranteed under art. 19 of the Constitution, then , in our opinion , no argument based on infringement of Article 31 read with Article 19 of the Constitution can be independently set up.