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(2) [1924] 1 K B. 171, 204, 205.

difference in law between a writ of prohibition and a writ of certiorari. What is stated there is that both writs of prohibition and certiorari have for their object the restraining of inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction, and they could be issued not merely to courts but to all authorities exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. But there is one fundamental distinction between the two writs, and that is what is material for the present purpose. They are issued at different stages of the proceedings. When an inferior court takes up for hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, the person against whom the proceedings are taken can move the superior court for a writ of prohibition, and on that, an order will issue forbidding the inferior court from continuing the proceedings. On the other band, if the court hears that cause or matter and gives a decision, the party aggrieved would have to move the superior court for a writ of certiorari, and on that, an order will be made quashing the decision on the ground of want of jurisdiction. It might happen that in a proceeding before the inferior court a decision might have been passed, which does not completely dispose of the matter, in which case it might be necessary to apply both for certiorari and prohibition-certiorari for quashing what had been decided, and prohibition for arresting the further continuance of the proceeding. Authorities have gone to this extent that ,in such cases when an application is made for a writ of prohibition and there is no prayer for certiorari, it would be open to the Court to stop further proceedings which are consequential on the decision. But if the proceedings have terminated, then it is too late to issue prohibition and certiorari for quashing is the proper remedy to resort to. Broadly speaking, and apart from the cases of the kind referred to above, a writ of prohibition will lie when the proceedings are to any extent pending and a writ of certiorari for quashing after they have terminated in a final decision. Now, if a writ of prohibition could be issued only if there are proceedings pending in a court, it must follow that it is incapable of being granted when the court has ceased to exist, because there could be then no proceeding on which it could operate. But it is otherwise with a writ of certiorari to quash, because it is directed against a decision which has been rendered by a court or tribunal, and the continued existence of that court or tribunal is not a condition of its decision being annulled. In this context, the following passage from Juris Corpus Secundum, Volume 14, page 126 may be usefully quoted:

"Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it........ is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a pre- ventive remedy issuing to restrain future action and is directed to the court itself".

The decision in Clifford O'Sullivan(1) which was concerned with a writ of prohibition is, therefore, inapplicable to a writ of certiorari to quash. It has also to be noted that in that case as the military Court had pronounced its sentence before the application was filed, a writ of prohibition was bound to fail irrespective of the question whether the Tribunal was functus officio or not, and that is the ground on which Viscount Cave based his decision. He observed:

Our attention has also been invited to a decision of this Court in The Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. The Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association and others(1). In that case, following the decision in Clifford O'Sullivan(2) the Calcutta High Court had refused applications for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition against the decision of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) on the ground, amongst others, that the Tribunal had ceased to exist. In appeal to this Court against this judgment, it was contended for the appellant that on a proper construction of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal must be deemed to be not an ad hoc body established for adjudication of a