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8. She further submits that the Industrial Court failed to apply the true and correct ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shramik Utkarsh Sabha v. Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 1137. The Supreme Court clearly held that Section 21 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Lanpir Practoces Act, 1971 ("MRTU & PULP Act") operates in respect of undertakings governed by the Industrial Disputes Act and restricts representation in specified unfair labour practices to recognised unions alone and the present undertaking is governed by the MIR Act. This crucial distinction has been completely overlooked in the impugned order.

wp1457-2015 ith wp9332-2015-J.doc Statutory frame.

16. Sections 20 and 21 of the MRTU and PULP Act, read with Section 30 of the Mahahrashtra Industrial Relations Act, lay down a structured system of representation of workmen. The Act does not permit multiple voices to speak for workers on collective issues. It recognises one representative union so that the employer deals with a single body. This arrangement avoids confusion, rivalry between unions, and conflicting demands. It promotes discipline and industrial peace. Section 30 of the MIR Act, therefore, places the recognised union at the center of collective representation and collective bargaining. At the same time, the Legislature has consciously carved out a narrow and specific exception. Section 20(2)(b) of the MRTU and PULP Act makes it clear that where the Court is examining the legality or propriety of an order of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination or suspension, representation is not restricted only to the recognised union. This exception rests on a sound basis. Matters of termination directly affect the livelihood of an individual workman. In such cases, the Act permits the workman to seek support from a union of his choice, as the dispute is personal in nature and not one of collective bargaining. Section 21(2) of the MRTU and PULP Act reinforces this distinction. It expressly restricts representation only in proceedings relating to unfair labour practices under Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV. These items deal with collective issues such as interference with union activities and refusal to bargain collectively. The restriction applies only to these collective matters and to no other category. The wp1457-2015 ith wp9332-2015-J.doc language of the provision leaves no scope for extending this restriction to Item 1 of Schedule IV, which deals with discharge or dismissal.

Applicability of Shramik Utkarsh Sabha

22. The Supreme Court, in Shramik Utkarsh Sabha, was examining the scope of Section 21 of the MRTU and PULP Act. The Court made it clear that this provision applies only to undertakings governed by the Industrial Disputes Act. It does not apply to undertakings governed by the Mahahrashtra Industrial Relations Act. This distinction reflects the legislative choice to create two different systems of industrial relations. In undertakings governed by the MIR Act, the role of the Representative Union is central and dominant. Section 21 of the MRTU and PULP Act cannot be lifted from its context and applied to such undertakings in a manner that weakens or bypasses the statutory scheme of the MIR Act. The wp1457-2015 ith wp9332-2015-J.doc Supreme Court also clarified the scope of the exception contained in Section 21. The permission to appear is given to an employee. It is not extended to a union other than the recognised or representative union. The judgment expressly rejects the argument that any unrecognised union can appear in all unfair labour practice proceedings except those falling under Items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV. This clarification shows that the exception is narrow. It is personal to the affected employee. It is intended to protect an individual workman in a limited situation. It does not create a general right in favour of unrecognised unions to take over disputes of a collective nature.

Appicability of Bajirao Rajaram Patil

24. In Bajirao Rajaram Patil, the Court was dealing with a very limited and clearly defined situation. The complaint before the Court was filed by a single employee of an undertaking governed by the MahahrashtraIndustrial Relations Act. The grievance raised was against a transfer order passed against that employee alone. The Court, therefore, framed a narrow question. Whether such an individual employee could maintain a complaint under Items 3 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act without routing the grievance through the representative union. On the facts before it, the Court answered that question in the affirmative. The reasoning of the Court leaves no room for doubt. The judgment repeatedly notes that the complaint was purely personal in nature. The transfer order affected only the concerned employee. It did not change service conditions of other employees. It did not result in any mass action or collective consequence. On these facts, the Court held that neither Section 21 of the MRTU and PULP Act nor the scheme of the MIR Act barred the employee from approaching the Court directly. The Court specifically relied upon Section 28 of the MRTU and PULP Act, which permits an affected employee to file a complaint in the absence of any express statutory prohibition. What is equally significant is the limit the Court wp1457-2015 ith wp9332-2015-J.doc placed on its own reasoning. The judgment does not lay down that an unrecognised union can espouse collective disputes in undertakings governed by the MIR Act. The Court nowhere suggests that the statutory role of the representative union can be bypassed in matters affecting a class of employees. On the contrary, the judgment expressly accepts the ratio of Shramik Utkarsh Sabha and reiterates that statutory restrictions on representation operate in collective matters. The distinction is carefully maintained. Individual disputes may be pursued by individuals. Collective disputes must be handled through representative unions. This distinction is further strengthened by the passages from Shramik Utkarsh Sabha which the Court in Bajirao Rajaram Patil quotes with approval. Those passages explain why the law insists on exclusive representation in collective matters. The purpose is to facilitate collective bargaining and preserve industrial peace. The exception is confined to individual disputes between employer and employee. The judgment in Bajirao Rajaram Patil does not weaken this principle.