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17. Mr Shah submitted that the impugned assessment order is a common assessment order concerning the 1st and 2nd Petitioner, two distinct and separate legal entities. He submitted that neither the MVAT Act nor the Rules provide for making such a common assessment order for two distinct and separate legal entities. He submitted that issuing such a common order amounts to an exercise of powers not vested in the Respondents, apart from such exercise being arbitrary, perverse and ultra vires.

18. Mr Shah submitted that the impugned assessment order dated 14 March 2022 had been made beyond the statutorily prescribed period under Section 23(4) of the MVAT Act, which is a maximum of eight years. He submitted that for FY 2013- 2014, this limitation period expires on 31 March 2022. He submitted that the impugned assessment order had been backdated and was served upon the 3rd Petitioner only on 1 July 2023, viz., after the delay of 15 months and beyond the statutory limitation period.

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19. Mr Shah submitted that the impugned order dated 14 March 2022 surprisingly refers to Vikas Gattani appearing and attending the hearing before the 3rd Respondent on 23 May 2023. He submitted that in the impugned order purportedly made on 14 March 2022, there could have been no reference to Vikas Gattani attending the hearing on 23 May 2022. He submitted that this constitutes clinching evidence about the impugned assessment order dated 14 March 2022 being backdated and made to appear as having been issued within the statutory limitation period. Mr Shah submitted that no greater evidence could exist on legal mala fides.

26. For all the above reasons, Ms Vyas submitted that this Petition be either dismissed or, after setting aside the impugned assessment order, the matter could be remanded to the assessing officer for fresh adjudication following and after giving the Petitioners full opportunity of being heard.

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27. Mr Rohan Shah submitted that a remand would not be appropriate in the present case's gross facts. He submitted that upon remand, the Respondents would secure an enhanced period of 36 months to make an assessment, which, in fact, was barred, but for the subterfuge adopted by the 3rd Respondent of backdating the impugned order. He submitted that the officials of the Respondents are aware of the legal provisions regarding service of notice, compliance with natural justice, and the compulsion to complete the assessments within the statutorily prescribed periods of limitation. He submitted that for the breach of all such legal provisions, the Respondents should not get some premium by enhancing the limitation period.

36. Mr Shah contended that the impugned assessment order, though dated 14 March 2022, was made much beyond 31 March 2022, the expiry of the statutorily prescribed period wp.11929-2023(F).docx of limitation, but it was backdated and made to appear as issued within that period.

37. At least prima facie, we cannot lightly reject Mr Shah's contention. Firstly, the impugned assessment order dated 14 March refers to allegedly hearing Mr Gattani, an employee of the 3rd Petitioner, on 23 May 2023. This is not a slip, but prima facie appears to be an attempt at manipulation. Secondly, the impugned assessment order dated 14 March 2022, if indeed made on 14 March 2022, was admittedly communicated to the 3rd Petitioner only on 1 July 2023, 15 months from the date of its alleged issue.