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:-8-: ITA. No:561/Chny/2025
9. Going by the nature of the payment of interest under the LAA, we are inclined to hold that the payment of interest on delayed payment of compensation to an assessee, be it under Section 28 or Section 34 of the LAA, would partake the character of the principal compensation itself since it is essentially paid to compensate the assessee for the loss he sulflered on account of not having the use of the principal compensation amount at the time when it fell due. We cannot lose sight of the fact that compensation amounts paid to a person towards compulsory acquisition of his property traces its roots to the constitutional obligation to pay such compensation under Article 300A of the Constitution. Recent judicial pronouncements have also recognised the right to property as a human right. In Dharnidhar Mishra (D) v. State of Bilhar [(2024) 10 SCC 605] the court pointed out that although the right property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978, continues to be a human right in a welfare state, and a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution. Accordingly, the State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The court went on to observe that the obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred from that Article since the court has recognized the right to property as a basic human right. That apart, recently in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah [(2024) 10 SCC 533] the court, while rejecting the contention of the Corporation that it had effectively acquired the property of a citizen, drew a distinction between a statutory provision that confers a power of acquisition to the Corporation and other provisions that dealt with the procedure to be followed in the exercise of that power. The court found that Article 300A of the Constitution, that prohibited the deprivation of property of a citizen save as authorized by law, conferred on a citizen seven sub-rights viz. (i) the right to a notice of the proposed acquisition, (ii) the right to be heard on the objections if any to such proposal (iii) the right to a reasoned decision thereon (iv) the right to insist that the acquisition could only be for a public purpose (v) the right to restitution or fair compensation (vi) the right to an efficient and expeditious process and (vii) the right to a conclusion of the proceedings. In essence, the court saw the concepts of substantive and procedural due process as integral aspects of the phrase 'authority of law' in Article 300A of the Constitution. The developed jurisprudence on property rights therefore unambiguously points to the necessity of treating interest payments for delayed payment of principal compensation amounts for compulsory acquisition of property, as an accretion to the compensation amount itself. For a citizen whose property has been compulsorily acquired by the State, the right to receive the compensation in full accrues from the date of his dispossession and any statutory interest paid to him for delayed payment of the principal compensation amounts partakes the character of the compensation itself. This is irrespective of whether the interest that is paid is under Section 28 or Section 34 of the LAA because the interest payments under both of the said provisions are premised on the same rationale [See: The constitution bench decision in Sundar v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 211 ].