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48. It appears that the words "except as respects things done or omitted to be done" found in Article 358 of the Constitution are literally carried over in Clause 2 of the Defence of India Rules, 1965. As the Defence of India Act itself has been enacted in consequence of the proclamation of emergency and that Rule 132-A has been made under the Defence of India Act itself and Article 858 suspends the provisions of Article 19 during such emergency, the saving provided in the said Article has been reproduced in the said rule. It may, therefore, be necessary, to consider what is meant by the words used in Article 858 than to consider Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or Section 1(3) of the Defence of India Act where we do not find the exact wards used in Article 358 which have been re-introduced in the Defence of India Amendment Rules of 1965.

49. The learned Counsel, relying upon the decision in Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab A1B 1964 S 0 881 contended that a limited meaning should be given to the words ''things done or omitted to be done" In discussing the effect of Article 358 alter the Proclamation of Emergency ceases, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

As soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate the legislative enactments passed and the executive Actions taken during the course of the said emergency shall be inoperative to the extent to which they confect with the rights guaranteed under Act. 19 because as soon as the emergency is lifted, Article 19 which was suspended during the emergency is automatically revived and begins to operate. Article 858. however, makes it clear that things done or omitted to be done during the emergency cannot be challenged even after the emergency is over. In other words, the suspension of Article 19 is complete during the period in question and legislative and executive action which contravenes Article 19 cannot be questioned even after the emergency is over.

57. The relevant facts in this case are these : The accused in that case were prosecuted in respect of certain acts alleged to have been committed by them daring the month of November 1943 in contravention of the provisions of Clauses 5 and 8, Iron and Steel (Control of Distribution) Order, 1941. This contravention was alleged to constitute offences punish, able under certain provisions of the Defence of India Rules and the Special Tribunal constituted for the specific purpose of trying the offences under the Defence of India Rules framed charges against the accused on 14-10-1946.Thereupon the accused filed an application in revision before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, raising certain paints touching the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal to try the aforesaid offences. The High Court die-missed the application and on a certificate granted by the High Court, the Federal Court heard the matter. The accused contended that the trial of the offences by the Special Tribunal could not be continued after 30-9-1946 as the Iron and Steel (Control and Production and Distribution) Order, 1941 expired by that time. The Distribution Order was made under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 81 of the rules made under the Defence of India Act, 1939. The Defence of India Act was enacted pursuant to the powers conferred by Section 102 of the Constitution Act, after the Proclamation of Emergency of 3-9-1939. By subs. (4) of Section 1 of the Defence of India Act, it was provided that the Act should be in force during the continuation of the Second World War and for a period of six months thereafter. The Proclamation was revoked on 1-4.1946. The Defence of India Act therefore expired on 80.9.1946 and with it all rules and orders made hereunder. But the Defense of India Act being a temporary Act as Section 6, General Clauses Act would not apply in respect of savings, by Ordinance 12 of 1946 promulgated on 80-8-1946, Sub-section (4) of Section 1, Defence of India Act, 1989, was amended with the saving provisions substantially analogue to the provision under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. It was found that the savings provided under Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Defence of India Act would not apply to the order in question as it dealt with a provincial subject and that, therefore, Sub-section (4) of Section 102 of the Constitution Act would apply, The effect of Sub-section (4) of Section 102 is that any provision of the Defence of India Act purporting to deal with provincial subjects has to cease to have effect on 80-9-1946, except as things done or omitted to be done before that date. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the scope of these words was only to protect or indemnify officials in respect of acts or omissions on their part and the words do not authorise a continuation of the prosecution. After incorporating the speech of Viscount Simon in 1947-1 All E. R. 205 the Federal Court observed that it was difficult to see why these words "except as respects thing done or omitted to be done" should be given such a restricted meaning. It was held that the words will save prosecutions. The words found in Section 102(4) are the same as the words found in Article 358 of the Constitution of India and, therefore. I am of the view that the interpretation given by the Federal Court in respect of the words. as respects things done or omitted to be done, as found in the Defence of India Amendment Rules, 1965 has to be accepted and I am bound by it. The learned Counsel painted out that that was a case where the prosecution was already launched before the Act expired. In my view, the does not make any difference.