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12. On the question of jurisdiction of the Court at Gurgaon to try the offence of alleged rape, of course, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge Gurgaon was of the opinion that as the offence of rape is alleged to have been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of his Court, the Court at Gurgaon had no jurisdiction to try that offence and, therefore, held that the trial of the accused for the offence under Section 376 I.P.C. is dropped. In doing so, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge relied upon the decision of this Court in Jagan Nath v. State of Haryana, (1983 Chandigarh Cr. Cases 408 : 1983 Cri LJ 1574. That was also a case where a girl was' kidnapped from Ambala and was taken to Delhi and raped by two persons, Jagan Nath and Baij Nath. It was contended that the offence of rape having been allegedly committed at Delhi, it was the Court at Delhi alone that was competent to try that offence. The trial Court relied on the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Ram Partap v. State, (AIR 1970) Raj 250: (1970 Cri LJ 1559), wherein it was held that the act of rape and kidnapping, although committed at two different places and within the jurisdiction of two different Courts, is a part of the same transaction within the meaning of Section 235, Cr. P. C. 1989 which is equivalent to Section 220 of the Code of Cr. Procedure, 1973. Therefore, the trial judge held that both the appellants could also be tried at Ambala for the rape alleged to have been committed by them at Delhi. But on appeal, the learned Judge of this High Court did not agree with the proposition laid down in Ram Pratap's case (supra) and held that the provisions of Section 220, Cr. P. C. 1973, would not be applicable to that case, because they will be applicable to offences which are committed in a series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction. The learned judge held that the offence of rape is an independent act and a separate offence with different ingredients altogether. The learned judge also held that the offence of kidnapping is complete as soon as the person is kidnapped with the requisite guilty intention or knowledge, and the consequence of kidnapping or abduction does not form an essential part of the offence of kidnapping or abduction under Section 363 or 366, I. P. C. and this being so, under Section 179 (Cr. P. C.) the offence of rape committed at Delhi cannot be enquired into or tried by Courts at Ambala and only the offence of kidnapping can be tried by the Courts at Ambala and the offence of rape had to be tried by the Courts at Delhi. The learned judge also relied upon the decision in the State v. Sri Lal, (1971 Cri LJ 141), wherein it was held that the cones quence of kidnapping was not an essential part of the offence of kidnapping and the offence of rape can be enquired into and tried only by the Courts within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it has been committed. Therefore, the learned judge of this High Court held that the appellants before the High Court could not be tried at Ambala for the offence of rape alleged to have been committed by them at Delhi. With very great respect to the learned judge who decided Jagan Nath's case (supra), we are not in agreement with the view taken by learned judge.

The reasons for our view are as follows:-

Lila Devi, the prosecutrix in this case, was kidnapped from a village known as Naharpur Kasan in the State of Haryana (within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court at Gurgaon) and taken away to Rajasthan and Delhi where she was raped by accused Naresh. Section 177 of the Code of Cr. P. C. of course, provides that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. But Section 184, Cr. P. C, provides as follows:-

Under Section 497 of the I. P. C, a man having sexual intercourse with a person, who is the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of the latter, is guilty of the offence of adultery and can be punished as provided for thereunder. Section 498. I.P.C. provides that a person who takes or entices away a married woman from her husband or from any person having the care of her on behalf of her husband with the intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person shall be punished as provided for thereunder. It cannot be stated that the offence of enticing, constituting an offence under Section 498 is complete the moment the woman is taken away from her husband and, therefore, disconnected from the act of adultery, constituting an offence under Section 497. They form an integral part of the same transaction. Unless there is the intention to have sexual intercourse, the act of taking the married woman will not constitute an offence under Section 498. Such intention can be gathered from the previous or subsequent conduct or action of the accused. The subsequent conduct or action of the accused in having sexual intercourse with her discloses his intention. It may be that in a given case, he may not succeed in having sexual intercourse with the married woman because of her resistance. In such a case, his attempt to have sexual intercourse with the woman will also establish his intention. Therefore, the action of enticing the married woman with the intent to have sexual intercourse with her and the act of having sexual intercourse with her are so connected with each other that we may call them integral parts of the same transaction. Similar is the case of kidnapping a girl with the intent to force her to have sexual intercourse and then committing rape pn her. So, it is clear from Sub-section (1) of Section 220 Cr. P. C, that the offence of kidnapping with the intent to force a girl for sexual intercourse and the offence of rape can be tried at one trial for every such I offence.

16. In such a case, the offence under Section 366 I. P. C. will not be complete when the girl or woman is merely taken away from her lawful guardianship. May be, having sexual intercourse is not the consequence of kidnapping as defined under Section 363 and Section 366. Therefore, Section 179 of the Code of Cr. Procedure, will have no application to the facts of such a case where kidnapping is for the purpose of forcibly having sexual intercourse and then committing rape on a girl or a woman. But on that basis, we are of the view, that the learned judge who decided Jagan Nath's case (supra) was not right in holding that the Court at Ambala will have no jurisdiction to try the offence of rape, in view of the provisions of Section 184, read with Section 220, Cr. P. C. of course, the attention of the learned judge does not appear to have been drawn to Section 184 Cr. P. C, even though the learned judge has referred to Section 220.