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The bridge, in question, is the Gai Ghat bridge which was constructed by the State Government on the river Sarju, District Bahraich in 1968-69 at a total cost of Rs.39,97,000/-. In 1970, the bridge was opened to the public. On 7th February 1985, the State Government leased out the right to collect toll tax in respect of the bridge to one Chhotai Yadav. In 1988, a writ application was filed by a truck owner, Devi Dayal Singh, challenging the right of the State Government to recover by way of toll under Section 2 of the Toll Act, 1851 any amount apart from the actual cost of construction of the bridge, viz. Rs. 39,97,000/-. On 21st February 1990, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowed the writ application. The High Court held that the State Government was not entitled to realise interest on the amount spent by the State Government in the construction of the bridge by way of toll tax unless that amount had been borrowed from any financial institution. The High Court found that the bridge had been constructed by the State Government out of its own funds and that neither the interest on the expenditure nor the maintenance charges could be realised under Section 2 of the Act. The High Court found that the State Government had already recovered the original cost of construction and accordingly directed the appellants not to realise any further toll tax in respect of the Gai Ghat bridge. In arriving at this decision, the High Court relied on two earlier decisions of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, namely, Jiya Lal and Others V. State of U.P. and Others (AIR 1981 Allah. 72) and Lal Bahadur Ram v. State of U.P. and Others (AIR 1988 Allah. 146). The order dated 21st February 1990 is the subject matter of the first appeal before this Court. The lessee (Chhotai Yadav) who had been granted the right to collect tax in respect of the bridge, moved an application for review of the order before the High Court. The review application was dismissed on 26th April 1990. Chhotai Yadavs challenge to the orders dated 21st February 1990 and 26th April 1990 is the subject matter of the second appeal before us. On the Special Leave Petition being filed by the State Government, this Court, on 3rd September 1990, stayed the operation of the order dated 14th February 1990 and it is not in dispute that as against the initial input of Rs.39,97,000/- for construction of the bridge, the State Government has recovered more than four times that amount by way of toll. The concept of toll is derived from English jurisprudence. Shorn of connotations which are historically irrelevant in this country, a toll may be defined as a sum of money taken in respect of a benefit arising out of the temporary use of land. It implies some consideration moving to the public either in the form of a liberty, privilege or service. In other words, for the valid imposition of a toll, there must be a corresponding benefit. [See in this connection Hammerton V. Eart of Dysart (1916-18 A.C. 57-58) ; Brecon Markets Co. V. Neath & Brecon Rly Co. ((1872) 7 CP 555); Hindustan Vanaspati Manufacturing Co. Ltd. V. Muncipal Board, Ghaziabad and Others (AIR 1961 Allah. 25(SB)), Maheshwari Singh V. State of Bihar and Others (AIR 1966 Pat. 462 (DB)); Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of U.P. (AIR 1967 Allah.

(b) The rate of interest shall be 10% per annum on the amount invested or to be invested in future by the Government for construction of a bridge and the amount of interest shall be calculated on the balance after repayment of the instalment of the loan, if any, taken for the construction of the bridge.

In the writ application filed by Devi Dayal Singh, the notification dated 2nd June 1976 has not been challenged. An interpretation of the relevant paragraph of the notification makes it clear that the intention to levy the toll is to financially self-liquidate the construction and upkeep of bridges and roads. The notification thus allows toll to be collected only for a specified period viz. 50 years from the date of first levy or until the total cost of its construction is realised, whichever is earlier. The total cost of construction has been defined in paragraph III