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I am indebted to Mr. J.D. Inverarity of the Bombay Ear for drawing my attention to the fact that in this case both parties contended that the vested remainder was good : and the only question at issue was whether it was capable of attachment.
Sir Dinshah Mulla, in his Mahomedan Law, 9th Edn., p. 31, comments on this case as follows :-
It is submitted that this case does not support the view that a vested remainder is recognised by the Sunni law, as seems to have been thought by the High Court of Bombay in Banoo Begum v. Mir Abed Ali (1907) I.L.R. 32 Bom. 172, s.c. 9 Bom. L.R. 1152...All that the Privy Council held was that the interest taken by the son was not a mere expectancy which could neither be attached nor sold, but a definite interest which was attachable and saleable. The question whether a vested remainder is recognised by the Sunni law was not before the Privy Council in that case.
It is to be noted that no original texts or other authorities relating to gifts, life-estates or vested remainders were cited before or considered by the Board in this case.

16. In Cassamally Jairajbhai v. Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim (1911) I.L.R. 36 Bom. 214, s.c. 13 Bom. L.R. 717, which was a Shia case, Beaman J. has distinguished Umes Chunder Sircar v. Mussummat Zahoor Fatima (1890) L.R. 17 I.A. 201. He observes (p. 251):-

In the Privy Council case (Umes Chunder Sircar v. Mussumat Zahoor Fatima), it was only those persona who were interested in the gifts over on failure of issue to the donee with the life estate who came before the Court and the question really seemed to bo in their Lordships' opinion whether a postponed estate of that kind could be validly transferred or as I prefer to say trafficked in, I have never been able to understand how in that case it was held that the gifts over to the two sons were more than contingencies, although apparently their Lordships thought they were something less than vested remainders. For they are very careful to say that they are something like vested remainders. The facts were that these gifts over were only to take effect in the event of the lady whose life estate was interposed not having a son. Now, in the case of a child-bearing woman married, I cannot conceive of a more uncertain event than that of her having or not having a male child. And whatever nice refinement of meaning the law may place upon such a condition, I am quite certain that any person waiting upon it would have to regard it as contingency, and a very uncertain contingency indeed. I can quite understand that if their Lordships of the Privy Council had :had their minds upon that point and if it had been really a case of vested remainders, they might have come to the conclusion, though I do not think they ever did, that such a vested remainder could properly be made the object of a gift inter vivos. But I cannot conceive how it ever could have been held, as I am sure it never hag yet been held, that a gift in futuro contingent upon the happening of uncertain events, could be given consistently with the requirements of the Mahomedan Law of gift inter vivos, nor do I see how in the particular case the vested remainders could have been any more made the object of such a gift because they were called vested remainders (liable to bo displaced by the happening of an uncertain event than if they had been called simply contingent interests or contingent remainders.)

43. The case of Times Chunder Sircar v. Mussummat Zahoor Fatima (1890) L.R. 17 I.A. 201 is directly in my favour. The settlor Sultanali. gave full interest to his wife Amani if she bore a son by him, but she was only to get a life interest if she had no child, and the existing sons of the settlor were to take in that case. The interest which the existing sons took was during the lifetime of the donor treated as a vested remainder and recognised by the Privy Council. It was regarded as a property capable of being attached (p. 209). It was not in the interest of both parties to support the vested remainder. Umes Chunder (appellant) could only succeed if the deed of January 26, 1871, was valid and conferred a vested remainder on the judgment debtor (Farzand Ali); whereas the respondents (Zahoor Fatima) could only succeed if the deed was invalid, and Farzand Ali took the property as the son and heir of Sultanali and not under the deed. The High Court "treated the case as if the two sons had no interest during the life of their father, but as if, upon the father's death, they inherited the property from him," thereby implying that in their opinion the deed was invalid. The Privy Council reversed the High Court only on this point confirming its decision on all other points. Banoo Begum v. Mir Abed Ali (1907) I.L.R. 32 Bom. 172, s. c. 9 Bom. L.R. 1152 was a Shia case. But Jenkins C.J. holds that Times Chunder Sircar v. Mussumat Zahoor Fatima is a direct authority on the point that a remainder, such as we are concerned with, may be created. He also refers to an estate vested in possession ; and deals with Abdul Wahid Khan v. Mussumat Nuran Bibi.

Rangnekar, J.

106. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellant against two of her brothers and two sisters for the administration of the estate for her deceased father Haji Ajam, and the main question raised in the appeal is as regards the effect of a will executed by a Mahomedan lady. First as to the facts. One Aishabai died in 1897 leaving a will dated November 21, 1882, and leaving her surviving her daughter Hafizabibi and her step-son the said Haji Ajam. Haji Ajam died in February 1919, and Hafizabibi died in December 1926. By an order of reference made on a notice of motion in the suit the Commissioner was directed to ascertain the right, title and interest of Haji Ajam in certain property situate at Bander. The appellant contended that under the will of Aishabai Hafizabibi had only a life-estate and Haji Ajam took a vested remainder. Respondents Nos. 2A and 20, who are the sons of Haji Ajam, argued that under the Mahomedan law a life-estate as such operates as an absolute estate, and, therefore, Hafizabibi took an absolute estate and on her death they were entitled to take the property as her heirs. They further contended that in any event the Mahomedan law does not recognise a vested remainder, and that Haji Ajam having predeceased Hafizabibi, his heirs as such took no interest in the property. It is conceded that if Hafizabibi took an absolute interest in the property, it would devolve after her death on the sons of Haji Ajam to the exclusion of the daughters. If, on the other hand, it formed part of the estate of Haji Ajam, then all his heirs, both male and female, would succeed to the property in proportion to their shares under the Mahomedan law. It may be stated that the parties to the litigation are Sunnis and governed by the Hanafi School of Mahomedan law. The learned Commissioner held that the intention of the testatrix was only to give a life-interest to her daughter Hafizabibi with a restraint against alienation and the remainder to her step-son Haji Ajam and his heirs, but under the Mahomedan law applicable to the parties the restraint against alienation was void and Hafizabibi took an absolute interest. He, therefore, held that neither the deceased Haji Ajam nor his heirs had any right, title or interest in the property. To the report of the Commissioner the plaintiff filed exceptions, which came up for hearing before Mr. Justice Mirza, who dismissed the same and confirmed the report. The learned Judge held that according to the Mahomedan law applicable to the parties the grant of a life-estate operated as an absolute estate in favour of the donee of the grant, but he felt himself bound by the Privy Council decision in Amjad Khan v. Aehraf Khan (1929) L.R. 56 I.A. 213, s. c. 31 Bom. L.R. 809, although he did not agree with it, and held that the life-estate given to Hafizabibi could not be regarded as an absolute estate. But he further held that the gift was bad under the Mahomedan law and that the gift over or the vested remainder in favour of Haji Ajam was invalid.