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3. In Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli and Ors. , two learned Judges of the Apex Court were asked to consider the question as to whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could govern an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. They referred to the earlier pronouncements of the Apex Court in Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd., Salem and in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva , wherein it was ruled that Article 181 of the Old Limitation Act, 1908 (to which Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 corresponds), applies only to applications made under the Code of Civil Procedure, and chose to follow the same rule, even in respect of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, despite some alterations brought in by it and declined to apply the said Article 137 to applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Judges of the Apex Court looked at the question from another angle also, and their discussion, useful for our present purpose, is found at paragraph 11 of the report as follows:

xxx In our view Article 137 only contemplates applications to Courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, all the other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a Court. Further Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contem plated is "when the Court is closed". Again under Section 5 it is only a Court which is enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period has expired if the Court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to Courts, and that the Labour Court is not a Court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. xx xx xx The learned Judges did not deem it necessary to express their views as to whether applications to Courts under other provisions, apart from the Code of Civil Procedure, are included within Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or not. From these two pronouncements of the Apex Court, viz., in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli . and in Nityanand M. Joshi and Anr. v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. , the proposition, which emerges clearly, is that the Limitation Act applies only to applications to Courts and its provisions cannot be enlarged to include within them applications to bodies other than Courts, such as quasi judicial Tribunals or even Executive Authorities.
xxx The alteration of the division as well as the change in the collocation of the words in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 compared with Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act shows that applications contemplated under Article 137 are not applications confined to the Code of Civil Procedure. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division between applications in specified cases and other application as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words "any other application" under Article 137 cannot be said on the principle of ejiisdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division. Any other application under Article 137 would be petition or any application under any Act. But it has to be an application to a Court for the reason that Sections. 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed and extension of prescribed period if applicant or the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application during such period xxx The view taken by the two learned Judges on this question in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli was differed from as follows:
xxx This Court in Nityanand Joshfs case (supra) has rightly thrown doubt on the two Judge-Bench decision of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case (supra) where this Court construed Art 137 to be referable to applications under the Civil Procedure Code. Article 137 includes petitions within the word "applications". These petitions and applications can be under any special Act as in the present case.
The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a Civil Court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure xx