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36. As objections were filed under section 34 of Act 1996, it was obligatory upon Court below to examine, whether objections filed by claimant-opposite party fulfill any of the parameters provided for in section 34 of Act 1996 itself for challenging an award. Court below referred to judgements of Apex Court wherein the provisions of sections 34 of Act 1996 have been interpreted. Reference was made to the judgement in Mcdermott International Inc. Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others, 2006 (11) SCC 181, wherein following has been observed:

(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality, or
(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.

Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void."

53. Law laid down by Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (Supra) was consistently followed and came to be reiterated in Mcdermott International Incorporation Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Others, 2006 (11) SCC 181, wherein Court considered previous judgements on the ambit and scope of Section 34 and held in paragraphs 58, 59, 60, 62 and 63 as follows:

22. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. [McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181] , this Court held: (SCC pp. 209-10, paras 58-60) "58. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] this Court laid down that the arbitral award can be set aside if it is contrary to (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; (b) the interests of India; or (c) justice or morality. A narrower meaning to the expression ''public policy' was given therein by confining judicial review of the arbitral award only on the aforementioned three grounds. An apparent shift can, however, be noticed from the decision of this Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. [(2003) 5 SCC 705 : AIR 2003 SC 2629] (for short ''ONGC'). This Court therein referred to an earlier decision of this Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly [(1986) 3 SCC 156 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 429 : (1986) 1 ATC 103] wherein the applicability of the expression ''public policy' on the touchstone of Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India came to be considered. This Court therein was dealing with unequal bargaining power of the workmen and the employer and came to the conclusion that any term of the agreement which is patently arbitrary and/or otherwise arrived at because of the unequal bargaining power would not only be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India but also hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. In ONGC [(2003) 5 SCC 705 : AIR 2003 SC 2629] this Court, apart from the three grounds stated inRenusagar [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] , added another ground thereto for exercise of the court's jurisdiction in setting aside the award if it is patently arbitrary.

43. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. [McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181] , this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 225-26, paras 112-13) "112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied. The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. [See Pure Helium India (P) Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission[(2003) 8 SCC 593 : 2003 Supp (4) SCR 561] and D.D. Sharma v. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 325] .]