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27. To illustrate the point, if in a given case, a certain sum of money was due to the company for the money lent, article 19 of the Limitation Act, provides for three years from the date when the loan is made. If, in such a case, more than three years had elapsed on the date the winding up proceeding was commenced, it is not possible to appreciate how such a claim can be enforced by the official liquidator after the winding up order is passed taking refuge under article 137 of the Limitation Act and also on the ground that the right to sue has accrued to him only on the date the winding up order is passed. Similarly several claims answering the descriptions mentioned in various articles of the Schedule to the Limitation Act which had become time-barred on the date the winding up proceedings was commenced, cannot be enforced applying article 137 of the Limitation Act.

"The changed definition of the words 'applicant' and 'application' contained in sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the 1963 Limitation Act indicates the object of the Limitation Act to include petitions, original or otherwise, under special laws. The interpretation which was given to article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act, on the principle of ejusdem generis is not applicable with regard to article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act. Article 137 stands in isolation from all other articles in Part I of the third division. This court in Nityananda Joshi's case, , has rightly thrown doubt on the two-judge Bench decision of this court in Athani Municipal Council's, case where this court construed article 137 to be referable to applications under the Civil Procedure Code. Article 137 includes petitions within the word "applications". These petitions and applications can be under any special Act as in the present case.
The conclusion we reach is that article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two-judge Bench of this court in Athani Municipal Council's case, , and hold that article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act, is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act."

30. Therefore, it is clear that in Kerala State Electricity Board's case, , it has not been laid down that article 137 of the Limitation Act could be availed of even though there is another article in the Limitation Act which is relevant to the claim in question. Similarly, in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, , also, no such proposition has been laid down. This is clear from para 11 of the judgment which is as follows (at page 1343) :

"The point in our opinion, may be looked at from another angle also. When this court earlier held that all the article in the third division to the Schedule, including article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908, governed applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only, it clearly implied that the applications must be presented to a court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Even the applications under the Arbitration Act that were included within the third division by amendment of articles 158 and 178 were to be presented to courts whose proceedings were governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. At best the further amendment now made enlarges the scope of the third division of the Schedule so as also to include some applications presented to courts governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. One factor at least remains constant and that is that the applications must be to courts to be governed by the articles in this division. The scope of the various articles in this division cannot be held to have been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial Tribunal or even an executive authority. An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission made that this article will apply even to applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court. The alterations made in the article and in the new Act cannot, in our opinion, justify the interpretation that even applications presented to bodies, other than courts, are now to be governed for purposes of limitation by article 137."