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"recognised" means recognised by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board, or by any officer authorised by him or by any of such Boards.
If all these definitions are read together, it becomes clear that a primary school, secondary school, higher secondary school, junior college of education or any other technical or vocational school which imparts education or training in any faculty or subject below the degree level, which is managed by authority which is not a government or local authority and which is recognised by the Director of Education or Director of technical Education or Director of Vocational education or Educational Board or the State Board can be called "private school". Thus, in order that the school can be called "private school", the school must be recognised. The Act does not make any provisions for recognisation of a school. The provisions for recognisation of a school are to be found in the Secondary Schools Code, which lays down elaborate procedure for recognisation of a school. It is clear from the provisions of the Act quoted above that even a school recognised by a State Board or a Regional Board of Education is also a private school within the meaning of the Act. According to the provisions of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Board Act in order to get recognisation from the State Board or the Regional Board the school has to comply with the conditions laid down by the Secondary Schools Code. It may be pointed out at this juncture that the Supreme Court has considered the question of recognisation of school by the State or Secondary or the Regional Boards in its judgment in the case of M.G. Pandke and Ors. v. Municipal Council, Hinganghat, and has held that because of the provisions of the Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board Act, the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code have statutory force. Perusal of the provisions of the Secondary Schools Code shows that apart from the aspect of recognisation of a school, it also has provisions dealing with conditions of services of the employees in the recognised school. The Supreme Court in its judgment in M.G. Pandke's case has observed thus:

as also to what is contained in paragraph 13 of that judgment, which reads as follows:-

13. We are, therefore, of the view that an appointment of a teacher either in the primary school, secondary school, junior college, etc. is required to be approved by the Education Officer and the Education Officer while discharging this duty performs an implied statutory function under the provisions of the M.E.P.S. Rules.

Thus, the Division Bench in Shailaja Walse's case has held that though there is no specific provision either in the Act, the Rules framed thereunder or the Secondary Schools Code, it is implicit in the scheme of the Act, Rules and Secondary Schools Code that appointment of a teacher made in a private school is required to be approved by an officer of the Education Department. This obviously is an approval after the appointment is made and not previous approval, though the Division Bench in Shailaja's case was considering the case of appointments of teachers in primary schools who do not hold requisite training qualification and therefore their appoints would have required previous approval. In this background, now e have to see another judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe v. The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal and Ors., of the judgment the Division Bench has observed thus:-

14. So far as the orders terminating etc. of an employee are concerned and so far as the Second Schools Code is concerned, there was a remedy of an appeal provided against those orders before the authorities of the Education Department. Similarly, in the Act a remedy of an appeal is provided to the School Tribunal. Under the Secondary Schools Code, the authorities of the Education Department, who were vested with appellate powers had all the powers which the tribunal under the Act possesses i.e. power to set aside the orders and power to grant reinstatement in service. Therefore, in our opinion, it cannot be said that by the Act any new remedy is being provided. The School Code before the commencement of the Act contained provisions regulating the conditions of the services of the employees in recognized non-government schools. The Act contains provisions regulating the conditions of services of an employee of a private school which are essentiality a non-government recognized school. The School Code provided an administrative appeal to the authorities of the Education Department against the order of termination etc. and the Act now provides for an appeal to the tribunal constituted under the Act. As observed above, by the Act the nature of the forum is changed namely instead of providing an appeal to the administrative authority now appeal is provided to the judicial authority. Under the Secondary Schools Code by the Code itself no finality was attached to the order passed by the Appellate Authority. However, by virtue of Section 12 now finality is attached to the order passed by the School Tribunal. While Secondary Schools Code was in the field, civil suits were filed by the employees of the non-government recognized school challenging the orders passed by the management in relation to the termination of their services. Perusal of the provisions of Section 15 shows that those provisions contemplate transfer to the tribunal of all the appeals filed by the employees pending before the authorities of the Education Department against orders which can be subjected to challenge under Section 9. It is to be noted here that before us it was stated that when the Act came into force there were several civil suits pending where either orders passed by the management regarding termination of the services of the employees were challenged or where the orders passed by the authorities of the Education Department in appeal were challenged. But the Act no where provides for transfer of civil suits where orders passed by the management were under challenge to the school tribunal. We have seen above that now as a result of judgments of two Division Benches of this Court a remedy of filing an appeal under Section 9 against the order of termination etc. is available to an employee whose appointment has been approved and therefore, obviously an employee whose services are terminated by the management because of non-approval of his appointment by the Education Department will be entitled to institute a civil suit challenging the order of termination of his services. One more feature of the Act and the power of the Tribunal which has to be noted is that under Section 11 the School Tribunal can make an order against the management and that order is binding on the management because of the provisions of sub-section 3 of Section 11 so far as the State Government and its authorities are concerned, the Tribunal cannot make any order which will bind the State Government. The power of the School Tribunal is only to make recommondation to the State Government.

15. It is further to be seen here that the Act does not provide any effective remedy for breach of all the rights that have been created by the Act. An appeal under Section 9 is provided only against the order of termination of services, of dismissal, of reduction in rank and an order of supersession. The Rules make elaborate provisions regarding transfer of an employee, but there is no effective remedy provided by the Act if an employee is transferred in breach of the provisions of the Rules. The Act and the Rules make elaborate provisions regarding the procedure to be followed by the management in making appointment. But if an appointment is made by the management in breach of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, then there is no remedy provided by the Act and the Rules. Several such examples can be given. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Act provides effective remedy for enforcement of all the rights that are created by the Act. The provisions in relation to appointment, holding of departmental inquiry, termination of services were all made in the Secondary Schools code and as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pandke's case the Secondary Schools Code has statutory force, and therefore, it cannot be said that by the act any new rights have been created, which were not previously in existence. One more aspect to which we have referred to above, which is relevant and which has not been considered by the learned Single Judge in Satyawadi's case is that the Act while making provision for transfer of matters which matters which were pending on the date of commencement of the Act before the authorities of the Education Department to the tribunal did not make similar provision in relation to the matters which were pending before the civil court on the date of commencement of the Act. Perusal of paragraph (11) of the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Satyawadi's case shows that the judgment of the another learned Single Judge in Rasta Peth's case has been held to (sic) not laying down good law, only because the learned Single Judge who decided Rasta Peth's case did not consider the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Panch Nagar Parakh Mandasur's case referred to above.