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THOUGH LARGE NUMBER OF COUNSEL ARGUED FOR DIFFERENT SETS OF PERSONS, BUT BASICALLY TWO CONTENTIONS WERE ADVANCED. ONE BY MR. RAKESH DWIVEDI, THE LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL, APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF BIHAR, CONTENDING THAT THE VALIDATION ACT AUTHORISES THE STATE GOVERNMENTS TO LEVY AND REALISE TAX WHICH WERE DUE UP TO THE DATE OF VALIDATION, NAMELY, 4.4.1991 AND THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY EMBARGO ON THE STATE'S POWER TO REALISE THE SAME NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE LIFE OF THE VALIDATION ACT WAS ONLY UPTO 4.4.1991. THIS STAND OF MR. DWIVEDI, LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF BIHAR WAS SUPPORTED BY MR. CHAUDHARY, APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, MR. SANJAY HEGDE, APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AS WELL AS MR. MARIARPUTHAM, APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU. ACCORDING TO MR. DWIVEDI, THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IN KANNADASAN'S CASE SQUARELY COVERS THE POINT AND HAS RIGHTLY BEEN DECIDED AND THE SAME DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY RE- CONSIDERATION. ON BEHALF OF DIFFERENT SETS OF ASSESSEES, ARGUMENTS WERE ADVANCED BY DIFFERENT COUNSEL, PARTICULARLY BY MR. SHANTI BHUSHAN, MR. PARASARAN, MR. KK VENUGOPAL, DR. A.M. SINGHVI, MR. AK GANGULI AND MR. RANJIT KUMAR, ALL SENIOR COUNSEL, AND THE ESSENTIAL CONTENTION WAS THAT THE PARLIAMENT IN FACT CAME FORWARD WITH THE VALIDATION ACT AFTER DIFFERENT CESS ACTS WERE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE SOLELY TO ENSURE THAT THE LEVIES COLLECTED ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE REFUNDED BY THE STATES WHICH WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE STATE REVENUES OF THE CONCERNED STATE GOVERNMENTS, AND THEREFORE, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY LAW SUBSEQUENT TO 4.4.1991 THE AUTHORITY TO COLLECT HAS DISAPPEARED AND CONSEQUENTLY THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN KANNADASAN'S CASE HOLDING THAT NOT ONLY THE TAXES ALREADY COLLECTED NEED NOT BE REFUNDED, BUT THE TAXES AND CESSES WHICH HAVE NOT ALREADY BEEN COLLECTED ALSO BE COLLECTED IS NOT CORRECT IN LAW. IT WAS ALSO FURTHER CONTENDED THAT THIS COURT WHILE EXAMINING THE PROVISIONS OF THE VALIDATION ACT IN THE LIGHT OF THE PURPOSE THAT WAS SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED BY THE PARLIAMENT HAS NOT BORNE IN MIND THE VERY STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS AS WELL AS THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 2 OF THE VALIDATION ACT, AND THE ABSENCE OF A PROVISION IN THE VALIDATION ACT, CORRESPONDING TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN SECTION 6 OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT. IT IS THE UNIFORM CONTENTION OF ALL THE COUNSEL APPEARING FOR DIFFERENT SETS OF ASSESSEES THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IN KANNADASAN CONFERRING RIGHT ON THE STATE TO LEVY AND COLLECT THE TAXES ON MINERALS, WHICH COULD BE LEVIABLE UNTIL 4TH APRIL, 1991, WOULD RUN CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 265 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND WOULD TRAVERSE BEYOND THE OBJECT OF THE VALIDATION ACT, AND CONSEQUENTLY IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THIS LARGER BENCH TO RE-CONSIDER THE EARLIER JUDGMENT OF TWO JUDGE BENCH IN KANNADASAN'S CASE.

THE PATNA HIGH COURT DISPOSED OF THE BATCH OF WRIT PETITIONS ON 17TH JANUARY, 1996 BEFORE THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IN KANNADASAN'S CASE. IN THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT THE HIGH COURT HAS HELD THAT:

(A) THE PARLIAMENT HAS NOT ENACTED THE ENTIRE CESS ACT OF 1880 BUT HAS MERELY RE-ENACTED THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED THEREIN WHICH RELATE TO CESS AND OTHER TAXES ON MINERALS;

(B) THE LAWS WHICH HAVE BEEN ENACTED BY THE STATE LEGISLATURE ARE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED BY THE PARLIAMENT.

(C) IT BECAME NECESSARY FOR THE PARLIAMENT TO INTERVENE AND TO ENACT A LAW WITH A VIEW TO PROTECT A STATE FROM THE CONSEQUENCES THAT FOLLOWED DECLARATION MADE BY THE SUPREME COURT IN INDIA CEMENT AND ORISSA CEMENT. (D) THE PARLIAMENT TOOK PRECAUTION TO ITSELF RE-

WITH THE AFORESAID CONCLUSIONS, THE DEMANDS MADE BY THE STATE HAVING BEEN QUASHED AND THE STATE HAVING BEEN RESTRAINED FROM TAKING ANY STEPS TO REALISE THE DEMANDS THE STATE THROUGH ITS MINING OFFICER IS IN APPEAL BEFORE THIS COURT.

MR. RAKESH DWIVEDI, THE LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF BIHAR CONTENDED THAT THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 2(1) OF THE VALIDATION ACT IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF THE ONLY CONSTRUCTION THAT THE RELEVANT LAW SPECIFIED IN THE SCHEDULE WAS ENACTED BY THE PARLIAMENT AND REMAINED VALID UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 AND CONSEQUENTLY, THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO COLLECT THE CESS OR TAXES ON MINERALS, WHICH BECAME PAYABLE UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. ABSENCE OF ANY LAW SUBSEQUENT TO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 WOULD NOT STAND AS A BAR ON LEVY AND COLLECTION OF THE CESS AND TAXES ON MINERALS AND ANY TAX OR CESS, WHICH IS VALIDLY LEVIABLE UNDER A VALID LAW COULD BE COLLECTED EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE LAW IN QUESTION. THE HIGH COURT, THEREFORE, WAS IN ERROR IN LIMITING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2(1) OF THE VALIDATION ACT BY MAKING REFERENCE TO THE STATEMENT OF OBJECT AND REASONS. MR. DWIVEDI FURTHER CONTENDED THAT THE PREAMBLE ALSO UNEQUIVOCALLY INDICATES THAT THE ACT IS TO VALIDATE THE IMPOSITION AND COLLECTION OF CESS AND CERTAIN OTHER TAXES ON MINERALS UNDER CERTAIN STATE LAWS. NECESSARILY, THEREFORE, THE RIGHT TO IMPOSE THE LEVY AND COLLECT THE SAME BY VIRTUE OF THE VALIDATION ACT, CANNOT BE NULLIFIED OR TAKEN AWAY, MERELY BECAUSE THE ACT HAD ITS LIFE TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. MR. DWIVEDI ALSO FURTHER CONTENDED THAT THE ACT ITSELF HAVING BEEN ENACTED ON 4TH OF APRIL, 1992, THE DATE ON WHICH IT RECEIVED THE ASSENT OF THE PRESIDENT AND WAS PUBLISHED IN THE GAZETTE OF INDIA AND INDICATING THEREIN THAT THE ENACTMENT IN QUESTION MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY PARLIAMENT AND KEEPING THE PROVISIONS VALID UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 IS CLEARLY SUGGESTIVE OF THE FACT THAT THE PARLIAMENT INTENDED TO ENACT THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE STATE LAWS DEALING WITH THE LEVY AND COLLECTION OF CESS AND TAXES ON MINERALS, THEREBY, CONFERRING RIGHT UPON THE STATE TO MAKE THE LEVY AND COLLECT THE SAME IN RESPECT OF THE MINERALS ON WHICH THE CESS COULD BE LEVIABLE UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991, AND UNLESS SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IS GIVEN, THE VALIDATION ACT WOULD BE MEANINGLESS AND WOULD NOT SUBSERVE THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH PARLIAMENT BY DEEMING FICTION, LEGISLATE THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE STATE ACTS, AS IF IT WAS AN ENACTMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT. ADJUDGED FROM THIS STAND POINT, MR. DWIVEDI CONTENDS THAT THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN KANNADASAN'S CASE, DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY RE-CONSIDERATION AND THE COURT RIGHTLY HELD THAT THE VALIDATION IN QUESTION IS NOT ONLY IN RELATION TO THE CESS ALREADY COLLECTED UNDER AN INVALID LAW, BUT ALSO IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO LEVY, DEMAND AND COLLECT, WHICH WOULD BE COLLECTABLE UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. ACCORDING TO MR. DWIVEDI, THE TWO FICTIONS ENGRAFTED IN SECTION 2(1) OF THE VALIDATION ACT, MUST BE GIVEN FULL PLAY AND EFFECT AND, THEREFORE, IN THE EYE OF LAW, A VALID STATUTE ENACTED BY THE PARLIAMENT HAVING LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE FOR THE SAME BEING OPERATIVE TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991, THERE IS NO RHYME OR REASON TO DEBAR THE STATE FROM MAKING ANY DEMAND OR COLLECT THE CESS, WHICH IS COLLECTABLE UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 ON THE MINERALS EXTRACTED. ACCORDING TO THE LEARNED COUNSEL, THE IMPUGNED VALIDATION ACT IS A UNIQUE PIECE OF LEGISLATION, BUT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS APPARENT FROM THE LANGUAGE USED AS WELL AS IN THE SETTINGS IN WHICH THE ENACTMENT WAS MADE, CONFERRING THEREBY UPON THE STATE GOVERNMENT, A RIGHT TO LEVY AND COLLECT TAXES IN RESPECT OF THE PAST PERIOD, EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. MR. DWIVEDI URGED THAT IN CONSTRUING SUCH A UNIQUE PIECE OF LEGISLATION, THE COURTS MUST ADOPT A DYNAMIC APPROACH AND IT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY ELABORATE ARGUMENT TO DISCOVER THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT WHICH HAS BEEN WELL EXPRESSED IN THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE STATUTE ITSELF. ACCORDING TO MR. DWIVEDI, THE VALIDATION ACT CANNOT BE HELD TO BE A TEMPORARY STATUTE AND REMAINS AS A VALID PIECE OF LEGISLATION, CONFERRING THE RIGHT TO COLLECT AND MAKE THE LEVY, WHICH WOULD BE COLLECTABLE UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 AND THE PROVISIONS OF GENERAL CLAUSES ACT WOULD BE APPLICABLE. MR. DWIVEDI URGED THAT THERE IS NO QUARREL WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSITION ENGRAFTED IN ARTICLE 265 OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT LEVY AND COLLECTION SHOULD BE BY AUTHORITY OF LAW. BUT IN RESPECT OF MINERALS EXTRACTED UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991, IF ANY CESS OR TAX IS TO BE LEVIED AND COLLECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MACHINERY PROVIDED FOR THE SAME, THAT RIGHT OF THE STATE WILL NOT GET FRUSTRATED, MERELY BECAUSE THE LEGISLATION IN QUESTION IN THE EYE OF LAW WAS EFFECTIVE TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. THE COUNSEL URGED THAT WHAT THE PARLIAMENT INTENDED, IS THAT THE STATE COULD LEVY AND COLLECT CESS ON MINERALS EXTRACTED TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991, BUT WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO MAKE ANY LEVY OR COLLECT CESS ON MINERALS EXTRACTED SUBSEQUENT TO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. ACCORDING TO MR. DWIVEDI, EVEN WHILE THE RELEVANT ACT WAS STRUCK DOWN BY THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IN ORISSA CEMENT'S'CASE, IN THE VERY JUDGMENT, IT WAS INDICATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE STATE TO REFUND THE CESS ALREADY COLLECTED TILL THE DATE OF THE JUDGMENT I.E. 4.4.1991, AND IT WAS UNNECESSARY FOR THE PARLIAMENT TO INCLUDE THAT ACT IN THE SCHEDULE AND VALIDATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT BY A DEEMING FICTION OF ENACTMENT BY THE PARLIAMENT MERELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ABSOLVING THE STATE FROM THE LIABILITY OF REFUNDING THE CESS ALREADY COLLECTED, AS SUCH A DIRECTION WAS PART OF THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IN ORISSA CEMENT CASE. IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT THE PARLIAMENT ENACTED THE PROVISIONS OF THE RELEVANT ACT UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 WITHOUT ANY PURPOSE OR OBJECT. IT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE RATIONAL TO CONSTRUE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE ENACTMENT IN QUESTION WAS TO HAVE A VALID LAW TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991, THEREBY, CONFERRING THE STATE THE RIGHT TO LEVY AND COLLECT ALL CESS AND TAXES ON MINERALS, WHICH WAS COLLECTABLE UPTO THE 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. THE CONSTRUCTION PUT-FORTH BY THE PATNA HIGH COURT IN THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT IS, THEREFORE, ERRONEOUS. WITH REFERENCE TO THE PRESS NOTE THAT WAS ISSUED ON 17.2.1992, MR. DWIVEDI CONTENDS THAT THE EXPRESSION "THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO VALIDATE THE COLLECTION OF CESSES AND OTHER LEVIES UPTO 4.4.91" WOULD UNEQUIVOCALLY INDICATE THAT THE COLLECTION ALREADY MADE AS WELL AS THE COLLECTION TO BE MADE IN RESPECT OF THE COLLECTABLE DUES UPTO 4.4.91 WAS INTENDED TO BE VALIDATED. IT IS THE CONTENTION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL THAT ALL LEVIES WHICH WOULD BE VALIDLY IMPOSABLE UPTO 4.4.91 COULD BE COLLECTED BY THE STATE AND THAT WAS THE OBJECT FOR WHICH THE PARLIAMENT MADE THE ENACTMENT. IT WAS ALSO URGED THAT IF THE LANGUAGE USED IN SECTION 2(2) IS READ IN JUXTAPOSITION TO LANGUAGE USED IN SECTION 2(1), IT WOULD BE APPARENT THAT SECTION 2(1) WAS NOT CONFINED TO THE VALIDATION OF THE LEVY THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN COLLECTED, BUT IT WAS A VALID LAW, MAKING THE STATE ENTITLED TO COLLECT THE CESS REALISABLE UPTO 4.4.91. IN RESPONSE TO THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE HIGH COURT ON THE QUESTION OF A SAVING CLAUSE, MR. DWIVEDI CONTENDS THAT THE SAID ABSENCE OF A SAVING CLAUSE IS NOT DECISIVE AND EVEN IF THE ACT IS HELD TO BE A TEMPORARY ACT, IF THE LIABILITY IS OF AN ENDURING NATURE, THE SAME WOULD SURVIVE EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE ACT ITSELF, AS WAS HELD BY THIS COURT IN THE CASE OF BHUPENDRA BOSE, 1962 SUPP. (2) S.C.R. 380. ACCORDING TO MR. DWIVEDI, BY PROCESS OF RE-ENACTMENT OF THE STATE LEGISLATIONS BY THE PARLIAMENTS ITSELF, THE PARLIAMENT WAS IN FACT BALANCING BETWEEN THE PUBLIC INTEREST INVOLVED IN THE MATTER OF DIRECTION OF REFUND BY THE SUPREME COURT AND AS SUCH WANTED TO PLACE ALL THE STATES UNIFORMLY BY MAKING THE LEGISLATION ENACTED TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. IN THE MATTER OF BALANCING SUCH PUBLIC INTEREST, IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO HOLD THAT PERSONS FROM WHOM TAX COULD NOT BE COLLECTED WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN THE PERSONS FROM WHOM THE TAX HAD ALREADY BEEN COLLECTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD BE MORE LOGICAL TO HOLD THAT LIABILITY TO PAY THE TAX ON THE MINERALS EXTRACTED UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 WOULD BE UNIFORMLY APPLIED AND, THEREFORE, THE STATE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE LEVY AND COLLECT THE SAME. WITH REFERENCE TO THE VARIOUS VALIDATING ACTS AND THE PATTERN OF VALIDATION, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE ASSESSEES, MR. DWIVEDI CONTENDS THAT WHILE CONSTRUING THE PROVISIONS OF A PARTICULAR STATUTE, THE LANGUAGE USED IN THAT STATUTE IS OF PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION INASMUCH THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE IS WELL EXPRESSED IN THE LANGUAGE USED. FURTHER THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN JOURA SUGAR MILLS, 1966(1) S.C.R. 523, AND THE RATIO THEREIN WOULD SQUARELY APPLY TO THE CASE IN HAND AND, THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE ONLY REASONABLE TO CONSTRUE THAT THE STATE COULD RECOVER ALL THE CESS AND TAX ON MINERALS, WHICH WOULD BE FOUND DUE UPTO 4.4.91 AND THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY FETTER ON THE POWER OF THE STATE TO COLLECT SUCH DUES MERELY BECAUSE THE LIFE OF THE ACT HAS EXPIRED ON 4.4.91. ACCORDING TO MR. DWIVEDI, THIS COURT WHILE DECIDING THE TRUE IMPORT AND EFFECT OF THE VALIDATION ACT IN KANNADASAN'S CASE, BORNE IN MIND THE BACKDROP OF A SPECIAL HISTORICAL SITUATION WHERE CESS AND TAXES ON MINERALS WERE BEING COLLECTED BY DIFFERENT STATES UNDER THEIR LAWS AT DIFFERENT RATES OVER A LONG PERIOD, WHICH LAWS WERE STRUCK DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT, ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE. THE DECISION RENDERED BY THIS COURT IN KANNADASAN'S CASE, THEREFORE, MUST BE HELD TO BE CORRECT AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY RECONSIDERATION.

APPLYING THE RATIO OF THE AFORESAID CASE TO THE CASE IN HAND AND IN VIEW OF OUR CONCLUSION EARLIER AS TO THE TRUE OBJECT AND IMPORT FOR WHICH THE VALIDATION ACT HAD BEEN ENACTED BY THE PARLIAMENT, GIVING THE LIFE TO A STATE LAW TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO HOLD THAT ANY RIGHT CAN BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN CREATED IN FAVOUR OF THE STATE OF AN ENDURING NATURE, WHICH COULD BE ENFORCED EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE LIFE OF THE ACT ITSELF. THE PARLIAMENT HAD STEPPED IN AND HAD FICTIONALLY ENACTED CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE STATE LAWS BEING CONFRONTED WITH THE SITUATION THAT THE LIABILITY TO REFUND THE TAXES, ILLEGALLY COLLECTED WOULD HAVE A DISASTROUS EFFECT ON THE STATE ECONOMY. IT WAS INDICATED ALSO THAT A VALIDATION ORDINANCE HAD BEEN PROMULGATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO VALIDATE COLLECTION OF SUCH LEVIES BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT UPTO THE 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. IN THE CONTEXT, IT OBVIOUSLY REFERS TO THE COLLECTION OF LEVIES ALREADY MADE AND WOULD NEVER RELATE TO ANY COLLECTION TO BE MADE THEREAFTER. IN THIS VIEW OF THE MATTER, WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO ACCEPT THE SUBMISSION OF MR. DWIVEDI, APPEARING FOR THE STATE OF BIHAR THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE VALIDATION ACT, THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CESS ACT OF 1880, AS APPLICABLE IN THE STATE OF BIHAR, CONFERRED AN INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT ON THE STATE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE LEVY AND COLLECT CESS OR TAXES ON MINERALS, WHICH WAS COLLECTABLE UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991, EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE VERY LAW ITSELF. IN OUR CONSIDERED OPINION, THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN STATE OF ORISSA VS. BHUPENDRA KUMAR BOSE CASE, WILL HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. THE NEXT CASE, MR. DWIVEDI RELIED UPON WAS THE CASE OF R.C. JALL VS. UNION OF INDIA, 1962 SUPP.(3) S.C.R., 436. IN THAT CASE, AN ORDINANCE HAD BEEN PROMULGATED ON 26TH AUGUST, 1944 IN EXERCISE OF POWERS VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA UNDER SECTION 72 OF THE NINTH SCHEDULE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 READ WITH INDIA AND BURMA (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT, 1940, CALLED THE COAL PRODUCTION FUND ORDINANCE, 1944, FOR CONSTITUTING A FUND FOR FINANCING OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTION, MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION OF COAL AND COKE. THE SAID ORDINANCE WAS A PERMANENT ONE AND WAS TO BE CONTINUED TO BE IN FORCE TILL REPEALED, AS IS APPARENT FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IN HANSRAJ MOOLJI'S CASE, 1957 S.C.R. 634. A SECOND ORDINANCE WAS PROMULGATED, REPEALING THE EARLIER ONE ON 26TH OF APRIL, 1947 AND IN THE REPEALING ORDINANCE, AN EXPRESS TERM WAS THERE, MAKING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6 OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, SHALL APPLY IN RESPECT OF THE REPEAL. THE QUESTION AROSE WHETHER AFTER EXPIRY OF THE LIFE OF THE REPEALING ORDINANCE ON NOVEMBER 01, 1947, WHAT WOULD BE ITS EFFECT IN RESPECT OF THE LIABILITY CONTINUED IN RESPECT OF THE PAST TRANSACTIONS? THIS COURT HELD THAT THE REPEALING ORDINANCE HAD CONTINUED THE LIFE OF THE ORIGINAL , WHICH WAS A PERMANENT ONE, IN RESPECT OF PAST TRANSACTIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE EXPIRY OF ITS LIFE(LIFE OF REPEALING ORDINANCE) COULD NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THAT LAW TO THE EXTENT SAVED, AND, THEREFORE, IT MUST BE HELD TO HAVE CONTINUED TO HAVE FORCE UNDER ARTICLE 372 OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNTIL IT WAS ALTERED, REPEALED OR AMENDED BY COMPETENT LEGISLATURE, AND CONSEQUENTLY, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE COAL CESS WAS LEVIED OR COLLECTED WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF LAW. WE FAIL TO UNDERSTAND HOW THIS DECISION WILL BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE TO THE CASE IN HAND, WHERE THE ORIGINAL LAW NAMELY THE CESS ACT OF 1880, AS APPLICABLE IN THE STATE OF BIHAR, DID NOT HAVE THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE AND AS SUCH WAS DECLARED VOID. BY THE VALIDATION ACT, PARLIAMENT FICTIONALLY AND BY A DEEMING PROVISION, ENACTED THE PROVISIONS OF THE INVALID LAW IN RELATION TO CESS OR TAXES ON MINERALS AND THAT ALSO TILL 4TH OF APRIL, 1991. THUS, THERE WAS NO PERMANENT LAW, AUTHORISING THE LEVY WHICH WAS BEING VALIDATED BUT ON THE OTHER HAND BY A FICTIONAL ENACTMENT, A LAW PERMITTING COLLECTION MADE UPTO 4TH OF APRIL, 1991 WAS ALLOWED TO BE RETAINED. AS HAS BEEN OBSERVED EARLIER IN THE VALIDATION ACT, NO PROVISION HAS BEEN MADE, CORRESPONDING TO THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN SECTION 6 OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, AND THEREFORE, AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE LIFE OF THE LAW THAT IS AFTER 4.4.1991, THERE CANNOT BE ANY AUTHORITY OF LAW FOR MAKING ANY LEVY OR COLLECTION OF THE CESS AND TAXES ON MINERALS. THIS DECISION ALSO WILL HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THE CASE IN HAND. THE OTHER DECISION OF THIS COURT RELIED UPON BY MR. DWIVEDI IS THE CASE OF M/S. VELJI LAKHAMSI AND CO. AND OTHERS VS. M/S. BENETT COLEMAN AND CO. AND OTHERS - 1977 (3) SCC 160. IN THIS CASE THE QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION WAS WHETHER THE MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER COULD ORDER DEMOLITION OF A BUILDING IN EXERCISE OF POWER UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CITY OF BOMBAY ( BUILDING WORKS RESTRICTION) ACT, 1944, AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE SAID ACT, WHICH WAS A TEMPORARY STATUTE? THIS COURT IN THE AFORESAID CASE HELD THAT QUESTION WHETHER THE RESTRICTIONS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM THE PROVISIONS OF A TEMPORARY STATUTE WHICH CAME TO AN AUTOMATIC END BY EFFLUX OF TIME EXPIRE WITH THE EXPIRY OF THE STATUTE OR WHETHER THEY ENDURE AND SURVIVE AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE STATUTE DEPENDS UPON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE AND THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THE RIGHTS, RESTRICTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS AND NO RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE RULE CAN BE LAID DOWN IN THIS BEHALF. IT IS IN THAT CONTEXT, THE COURT ALSO FURTHER OBSERVED THAT THE TRANSACTIONS WHICH ARE CONCLUDED AND COMPLETED UNDER THE TEMPORARY STATUTE WHILE THE SAME WAS IN FORCE OFTEN ENDURE AND CONTINUE IN BEING DESPITE THE EXPIRY OF THE STATUTE AND SO DO THE RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS ACQUIRED OR INCURRED THEREUNDER DEPENDING UPON THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE AND NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES. APPLYING THE AFORESAID RATIO TO THE CASE IN HAND, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO HOLD THAT THE STATE LAWS WHICH INFUSED LIFE INTO IT UNDER THE VALIDATION ACT BY A FICTIONAL ENACTMENT OF THE LAWS BY PARLIAMENT AND KEEPING IT ALIVE TILL 4TH APRIL, 1991, CAN AT ALL BE SAID TO HAVE CREATED ANY RIGHT ON THE STATE TO LEVY AND COLLECT THE CESS AND TAX ON MINERALS WHICH CAN BE HELD TO BE OF ENDURING NATURE SO AS TO ENABLE THE STATE TO LEVY AND COLLECT EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE STATE LAWS IN QUESTION. CONSEQUENTLY, THE AFORESAID DECISION IS ALSO OF NO ASSISTANCE TO THE STATE OF BIHAR. THE ONLY OTHER CASE RELIED UPON BY MR. DWIVEDI IS THE CASE OF T.VENKATA REDDY AND OTHERS VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH