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28. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 11th E. at p. 79, it is stated thus:-"general words and phrases, therefore, however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense,' must, usually, be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act. It would be "perfectly monstrous" to construe the general words of the Act so as to alter the previous policy of the law. In construing the words of an Act of Parliament we are justified in assuming the legislature did not intend to go against the ordinary rules of law, unless the language they have used obliges the court to come to the conclusion that they did so intend". Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. at p. 177, it is stated that but in some cases a limitation may be put on the construction of the wide terms of a statute. At p. 178 it is stated that one of the safest guides to the construction of sweeping general words, which it is difficult to apply in their full literal sense, is to examine other words of like import in the same instrument, and to see what limitations must be imposed on them. If it is found that a number of such expressions have to be subjected to limitations or qualifications, and that such limitations or qualifications are of the same nature, that forms a strong argument for subjecting the expression in dispute to a like limitation or qualification. In Bennion's Statutory Interpretation at p. 385, it is stated that however the true view is not that strict and liberal construction are in themselves interpretative criteria. They are simply methods or techniques by which the court applies the interpretative criteria. In Statutory Interpretation by Cross at p. 145 in the Chapter presumption against unclear changes in the law, it is stated that the name prescription against unclear changes in the law goes back to the days when, by far, the greater proportion of law was common law and statutes were, for the most part, thought of as minor emendations of that law. In modern times it is possible to make a traversity of the presumption by stating it in some such form as that "it is to be presumed that a statute alters the common law as little as possible." At p. 146 it is stated that no useful purpose would be served by multiplying examples, but it should be pointed out that "the presumption applies to changes in statute law".

29. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Ed. at p. 177, it is stated that but in some cases a limitation may be put on the construction of the wide terms of a statute. At p. 178 it is stated that one of the safest guides to the construction of sweeping general words, which it is difficult to apply in their full literal sense, is to examine other words of like import in the same instrument, and to see what limitations must be imposed on them. If it is found that a number of such expressions have to be subjected to limitations or qualifications, and that such limitations or qualifications are of the same nature, that forms a strong argument for subjecting the expression in dispute to alike limitation or qualification. In Bennion's Statutory Interpretation at p. 385, it is stated that however the true view is not that strict and liberal construction are in themselves interpretative criteria. They are simply methods or techniques by which the court applies the interpretative criteria. In Statutory Interpretation by Cross at p. 145 in the Chapter presumption against unclear changes in the law, it is stated that the name "prescription against under changes in the law" goes back to the days when, by far, the greater proportion of law was common law and statutes were, for the most part, thought of as minor emendations of that law. In modern times it is possible to make a travesty of the presumption by stating it in some such form as that "it is to be presumed that a statute alters the common law as little as possible." At p. 146 it is stated that no useful purpose would be served by multiplying examples, but it should be pointed out that "the presumption applies to changes in statute law."

31. The construction or interpretation, must therefore, be construed with reference to its intended purpose and the scope of meaning of the statute must be determined by the language used therein. Necessary implications may be read into the statute. True implications, sense and spirit are as much a part of the language which makes up the statute as the meanings of the various words as a part of it. The statute must, therefore, be analysed and expressed meaning ascertained. Whether liberal or strict construction will be given depends largely upon a finding whether the given determinate was intended from the alternative part of the statute, the type and its nature. Often in some statute if the same parts are subjected to different types of construction, whether liberal or strict construction is a means by which the scope of the statute is expounded or restricted in order to convey the legislative meaning. According to Crawford, "if that be the proper position to be accorded to strict or liberal construction, it would make no difference whether statute involved was penal, criminal, remedial or in derogation of any rights as a distinction based upon its classification would then mean nothing." Strict or liberal construction, therefore, should be used as a tool in the process of ascertaining the legislative intent when it is in doubt. Otherwise they will have little or no value. This is a part of interpretive process assigned to the court as a subject to make the legislative intent, clear, effective and efficacious.