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(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was held to be applicable and not the narrow definition under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.

20. Mr. Srivastava submitted that as far as the State of Madhya Pradesh was concerned, the same submissions would also be relevant in SLP(Crl.)No.6929/07.

21. Replying to the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel, firstly, took us to the Charge framed against the respondents under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 409, 418, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Tankha pointed out that the Charge was framed against the Respondent No.1 in his capacity as Chairman/Manager of the Indore Premier Co- operative Bank and as a Member of the Loan Sanctioning Committee during the period from 4th March, 1997 to 4th May, 1998, when he was a public servant. The charge against the Respondent No.1 was that in connivance with the other accused persons and on the basis of forged documents relating to "Indore Motor and Agro Machinery", he had, without verification of the loan applications filed for the purpose of purchasing of vehicles by the other co- accused, without ensuring that the margin money was deposited as per the rules and without obtaining security, sanctioned the loans in contravention of the Bank Rules and issued the cheque/drafts of such loans to the applicants directly who withdrew the amount without purchasing the vehicles, resulting in misappropriation of Rs.56,50,000/-. Accordingly, the Respondent No.1 was purported to have committed the offence punishable under the above-mentioned provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal code. Similar charges were framed against the other respondents.

22. Mr. Tankha submitted that from the Inquiry Report of the District Vigilance Committee it would be quite apparent that it was the Branch Managers of the different Branches of the Bank who had failed to comply with the procedure relating to grant and sanction of loans and that all the lapses which were attempted to be foisted on the respondents by Mr. Srivastava during the course of his submissions, were required to be fulfilled at the Branches before proposals were put up for sanctioning of the loans. Mr. Tankha submitted that the Loan Sanctioning Committee had to deal with innumerable loan applications and it was not possible for the said Committee to scrutinize each application to ensure whether all the conditions for grant of loan had been satisfied. Mr. Tankha, in fact, urged that in the Inquiry Report, the only allegation made against the respondents herein was that they had not taken any action despite the Inspection Report of NABARD and it was only a presumption that as a result thereof a conclusion must be drawn that the Chairman of the Bank and the Chief Executive Officer had also played a main role in the fraud committed upon the Bank.

24. Mr. Tankha submitted that there was no justification whatsoever for framing of charges against the respondents herein, either under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He urged that if any irregularity had been committed by the Respondents in sanctioning the loans, there was sufficient scope for action to have been taken against them under the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act instead of taking recourse to the criminal process to apply pressure in respect of a dispute, which was basically civil in nature. Referring to the decision of this Court in Indian Oil Corpn. vs. NEPC India Ltd. 7 Ors. [(2006) 6 SCC 736], Mr. Tankha relied on the observations made by this Court in holding that it was necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases and at the stage of an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. all that was required to be seen was whether necessary allegations existed in the complaint to make out an offence as alleged.

26. Mr. Tankha also referred to the decision of this Court in Manoj Sharma vs. State & Ors. (MANU/SC/8122/2008), where the question which fell for determination was whether the First Information Report for offences which were not compoundable, could be quashed either under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution when the accused and the complainant had compromised and settled the matter between themselves. Mr. Tankha submitted that this Court had set aside the order upon holding that once a dispute of a civil nature between private parties, had been settled, the more pragmatic view would be to exercise powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution to bring and end to such litigation.