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"5. The question is, does not power of the High Court of Madras to punish contempt of itself arises under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, so that under Section 25 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply? the answer to such a question is furnished by Article 215 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 themselves. Article 215 declares that every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Whether Article 215 declares the power of the High Court already existing in it by reason of its being a Court of record, or whether the Article confers the power as inherent in a Court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not arising or derived from the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and therefore, not within the purview of either the Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a position is also clear from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Section 3 of that Act provides that every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself. The only limitation to the power is, as provided by Sub-section (2), that it shall not take cognizance of a contempt committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code. As explained in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, 1954 SCR 454 at page 463 = (AIR 1954 SC 186) Section 3 of the Act is similar to Section 2 of the 1926 Act, and "far from conferring a new jurisdiction, assumes, as did the Old Act, the existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High Court and further assumes the existence of a special practice and procedure, for it says that every High Court shall exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority "in accordance with the same procedure and practice..." In any case, so far as contempt of the High Court itself is concerned, as distinguished from that of a Court subordinate to it, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, and so no Act of a Legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority. No doubt, Section 5 of the Act states that a High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into and try a contempt of itself or of a Court subordinate to it whether the alleged contempt is committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction and whether the contemner is within or outside such limits. The effect of Section 5 is only to widen the scope of the existing jurisdiction of a special kind and not conferring a new jurisdiction. It is true that under Section 4 of the Act the maximum sentence and fine which can be imposed is respectively simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- or both. But that again is a restriction on an existing jurisdiction and not conferment of a new jurisdiction. That being the position, Section 25 in the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot apply. The result is that Section 70 of the Penal code is no impediment by way of limitation in the way of the recovery of the fine."

7. The learned Counsel pointed out that in the above Judgment of the Supreme Court a clear distinction has been made between the power of the High Court as a Court of record to punish for contempt of itself which is conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution and the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt of subordinate Courts conferred on it by an Act of Legislature i.e. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In our opinion, the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court applies on all fours to the question raised in this case based on Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and on that basis the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents has to be rejected.

8. The learned Counsel for the respondents, however, argued strenuously that the above decision was of no assistance to answer the question arising for consideration in this case as that decision was rendered with reference to the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, in which there was no special provision prescribing a period of limitation either for taking action for contempt or for recovery of fine imposed for proved act of contempt of Court. Elaborating the above submission, the learned Counsel stated as follows:- Entry 14 of List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution is "Contempt of Court but not including contempt of Supreme Court"...Therefore, it is competent for the Parliament as also the State Legislature to make law on the topic of contempt of Court including that of the High Court. Therefore, it was competent for the Parliament to regulate the contempt of Court proceedings before the High Court. The 1971 Act was enacted for that purpose. The power to make a law laying down a procedure for taking action for contempt of Court and to regulate the imposition of penalty for contempt of Court includes the power to prescribe a period of limitation also. It is in exercise of that legislative power the Parliament has incorporated Section 20 into the Act and therefore it applies to all proceedings of contempt of Court including those of the High Court and the Supreme Court, whether taken suo moto or otherwise. In support of the above submission, the learned Counsel relied on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in BARADAKANTA MISHRA v. MISRA C.J. ORISSA H.C., and BOARD OF REVENUE v. VINAYA CHANDRA, . Relevant portion of the Judgment in Mishra's case on which the learned Counsel relied reads:-

11. Now, let us turn to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It does not refer to the institution of any proceedings for contempt. The very fact that it does not refer to the institution of any proceedings goes to suggest that no application or petition can be instituted in the true sense of the term for the purpose of taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. What Section 20 contemplates is initiation of proceedings for contempt. Such initiation may be on its own motion by the Court or may be otherwise, that is to say on the information supplied by someone, in case of civil contempt; in the case of criminal contempt on the motion of the Advocate General or on the motion of someone else with the consent of the Advocate General in writing Court can initiate proceedings. Initiation of proceedings, for civil contempt as well as for criminal contempt can be done by a Court on its own motion in addition to what we have stated earlier. When the Court takes action or takes the first step in that direction, it does not institute proceedings. Proceedings are instituted by a litigant and not by the Court. A Court merely initiates proceedings. We, therefore, find that Section 20 is such that it does not contemplate institution of a petition or an application by a private individual for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It merely contemplates initiation of proceedings by a Court on its own motion or otherwise. The fetter which Section 20 places on the jurisdiction of the Court is that the Court shall not initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiration of a period of one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. Since there is no application or petition before the Court in such proceedings, the question of condoning delay does not arise. Delay can be condoned in a case where a person who has a right to institute action has approached the Court after the expiry of the period of limitation. Section 20 does not contemplate such situation when the Court initiates contempt proceedings on its own motion, the question of condoning delay does not arise. To illustrate, if the Court initiates proceedings after the expiry of the one year from the date on which the alleged contempt was committed, who has to pray for condoning delay? Who has to bring on record the circumstances under which delay was caused in initiating the proceedings or in other words, does the Court condone delay caused by it in initiating proceedings against the alleged contemner under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? To say that the Court can condone its own delay is something which is beyond our comprehension so far as Section 20 is concerned. If the Court has to condone its own delay, after trotting out reasons, the Court shall be the prosecutor and the Judge in its own cause. That is not what Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act contemplates."