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11. The Respondents herein have filed two affidavits-in-reply. The first affidavit is filed by one Satish Kumar Ohri, Under Secretary, DPEA Cell. The said affidavit is dated 29th July, 1998. In the said affidavit, the background leading to the issuance of DPCOs has been mentioned. It has been stated that the DPCOs are issued under the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act. It is further stated that DPCO, 1979 was preceded by the report of the Jaisukhlal Hathi Committee which looked into the various aspects of drug price control and which had submitted its report in the year 1979. It is further stated that the DPCO, 1979 which was issued on 31st March, 1979 took into consideration the recommendations of the said Hathi Committee. On the basis of the DPCO, 1979, the prices of the bulk drugs and formulations during the year 1980-81 were fixed by the Government. It is further stated that 12 Companies aggrieved by the said price fixation had filed a Writ Petition in the Delhi High Court. The said writ petition was allowed and the price fixation done by the Government in respect of the bulk drugs was quashed and set aside. Aggrieved by the decision of the Delhi High Court, the Union of India had filed a Special Leave Petition in the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the judgment reported in 1987 (2) SCC 720 in the matter of Union of India and another vs. Cynamide India Limited and another, upheld the validity of the provisions of the DPCO, 1979 as also the price fixation carried thereunder. It is further stated that during the period of litigation, the pharmaceutical Companies had not scrupulously followed the provisions of the DPCO, 1979 which had resulted in accrual and undischarged liabilities to the DPEA. Subsequent to the said judgment in Cynamide's case, the Government was entitled to make recoveries. One of the categories of the manufacturers against whom recoveries were liable to be made was the category of manufacturers of formulations who are required to deposit into the DPEA the excess amount determined by the Government in respect of those quantity of drugs which had been procured either indigenously or through imports for prices less than those allowed by the Government while fixing the prices of formulations. It is stated that the unauthorised retention of amount under para 7 (2) of DPCO, 1979 would run into several hundred crores of rupees which cannot be allowed to be retained by the members of the Petitioners. It is further stated that though the DPCO, 1979 has been repealed by virtue of the saving clause contained in paragraphs 14 and 30 of the DPCO, 1987 and paragraphs 12 and 27 of the DPCO, 1995, it is amply clear that if a liability has accrued under the provisions of the DPCO, 1979, the concerned manufacturers/importer or distributor, as the case may be, has to deposit the relevant amount in the DPEA. It is further stated that the liability has accrued under the DPCO, 1979 when the manufacturer has used the bulk drug in question in the formulation. It is stated that after the issuance of DPCO, 1979, there were around 345 bulk drugs under price control and it is further stated that the process of recovery after the judgment in Cynamide's case was initially confined to 47 bulk drugs due to administrative reasons. However, thereafter the process was initiated in respect of the remaining bulk drugs by eliciting details from the manufacturers relevant for the purposes of determining their liability under para 7 (2) of the DPCO, 1979 read with relevant paragraph of DPCO, 1987 and DPCO, 1995. It is further stated that in respect of bulk drugs where no price was fixed by the Government, it is stated that in most of such cases where no price of bulk drug was fixed by the Government, the drug was being imported and it was known to the industry as to what was the then prevailing price of such a bulk drug.

25. In so far as the said aspect is concerned, the saving clauses of DPCO 1987 and 1995 would have to be considered. In the said context, it would be relevant to note that the said DPCO, 1987 was preceded by the drug policy, 1986.

The said drug policy, as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General, inter alia, provides that a provision would have to be made in the new Drug Price Control Order to ensure that amounts which have already accrued to the DPEA and those which are likely to accrue as a result of action in the past are protected and used for the purpose stipulated in the existing DPEA. This was in view of the fact that the Central Government was firmly of the view that the liability which has incurred prior to the repeal of DPCO, 1979 of depositing the monies into the DPEA would necessarily have to be honoured. As can be seen from the DPCO, 1987, which contains a saving clause in paragraph 14, the express language of paragraph 14 saves the liabilities which were incurred under the repealed DPCO, 1979. The notice contemplated in paragraph 14 would require the manufacturers, etc. to deposit the amounts which have accrued on account of the actions under the DPCO, 1979 on or before the commencement of the said order. The notice would require deposit not of amounts determined under the DPCO, 1979 but amounts which have accrued under the DPCO, 1979. The said aspect can be seen even clearer from the savings clause of the DPCO, 1995 which is paragraph 12.

The said paragraph 12 makes it clear that there was a specific legislative mandate in the said DPCO that the quantification could be done even after the repeal of DPCO, 1979, under the DPCO, 1987 and/or DPCO, 1995 meaning thereby that there would be no question of raising the issue of latches or delay. In the said context it will be pertinent to note the language used in paragraph 12 of DPCO, 1995, the language used is not amounts which have been determined and not even the amounts which had accrued under the DPCO, 1979 but it simply uses the expression "the amount which has accrued under the provisions of the DPCO, 1979 " which means the amount so accrued irrespective of whether it has been determined or not. As rightly contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General, any other interpretation in respect of a socio-economic legislation would make mockery of the whole purpose, scheme, drift and tenor of the said legislation. In our view, therefore, by the saving clauses of DPCO, 1987 and DPCO, 1995, the power for recovering the amount accrued under the DPCO 1979, is saved.

26. Now, coming to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Seervai that the savings clause in DPCO, 1987 and DPCO, 1995 is limited to the extent of only the amount that is so determined under the DPCO, 1979 by an adjudicatory process. It is well settled that the repealing statute provides the clue as to the extent of the saving of the repealed statute. In the instant case, as held hereinabove, as per para 14 of DPCO, 1987 and para 12 of DPCO, 1995, the amounts accrued under the DPCO, could be recovered by having recourse to the said provisions. We, therefore, do not accept the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the saving clauses in question are limited only to the amounts determined. In our view, if such an interpretation of paragraphs 14 and 12 of DPCOs 1987 and 1995, as stated above, is to be given, it would negate the entire policy relating to drug price control as formulated by the Government. In so far as the submission of the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Seervai that under the DPCO, 1979 there was an option available to the Government of either proceeding under para 7 (2) (a) or para 7 (2) (b) and, therefore, it cannot be said that liability has been incurred as the Government has not exercised either of the options during the currency of the DPCO, 1979. No doubt, there were two options available with the Government, however, in our view, para 7 (2) (a) and 7 (2) (b) of DPCO, 1979 deal with the consequences which may arise on account of the incurring of the liability and its determination. In our view, it does not affect the incurral of the liability but merely states that once the liability is so incurred, consequences of that would depend on the discretion of the Government keeping in mind the public interest either to follow the first part of para 7 (2) which is to the effect that monies be directed to be deposited in the DPEA or its second part which is fixing the price. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the said submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners.