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10. We may now proceed to indicate the spread of the petitions at this stage and now we propose to deal with the same.

11. There are petitions which question the validity of the whole enactment as well certain specific provisions of the 'Act itself. Mainly the validity of the enactment is questioned on the ground that these enactments infringe the constitutional injunction with regard to the property and the rights declared and guaranteed in favour of the landholders. Constitutional challenge is a four-fold one. Firstly, it seeks to assert incompetency of the Legislature arising either because law is not made in accordance with the terms of Article 31-A and/ or Article 31-C or because it is made contrary to the declared guarantee of Article 301 of the Constitution. Secondly, it is the rampart raised on the base of basic structure of the Constitution. It is said that Article 359 (1-A), Article 31-B or Ninth Schedule cannot protect State Legislation if it affects basic structure doctrine and robs the constitutional premise of this vitality. Thirdly, constitutional incompetency of the Legislature is put in issue because it is submitted that certain provisions run riot beyond the geographical jurisdiction, power and limit of the State Legislature and the doctrine in-

60. A collateral issue which can be disposed of at this stage is challenge to the present amending Acts on the basis that the basic structure doctrine is violated by these laws. The four constitutional pillars quoted above from the judgment of Chandrachud J. are said to have been shaken by the premises of the provisions of these Acts. It may be mentioned that the same said challenge is made to the Presidential Order directing suspension of enforcement of Article 14 during the period of emergency because of Atricle 359 (1-A), as amended. We will deal with the question of validity oi the Article 359(1-A) later. Upon the ratio of the judgments in BASIC STRUCTURE CASE as well ELECTION CASE it appears to us that challenge to laws or order is not permissible on the ground that these contravene any basic principle or framework.

limited constituent power and is not therefore omnipotent.
SECOND: These basic structure principles include the fundamental constitutional contemplation of the permissive judicial review of the Constitutional Am-andment Act so as to find out firstly whether in exercise of the constituent powers what is enacted is a law permissible by the premises of Article 368 of the Constitution; and secondly whether the amendment in substance does or does not accord with basic structure doctrine or basic framework or basic principles of the Constitution. In the exercise of making an amendatory law by exercise of constituent power, it would be impermissible to render legislative judgments on cases which under the Constitution form part of the jurisdiction of the judiciary and is preeminently a judicial function.

69. Now what survives for consideration on the constitutional aspect of the challenge is referable to the submissions advanced against the Constitution (Thirty-Eighth Amendment) Act, 1975, which amended Article 359 by inserting Clause (1-A) and other submissions made to challenge Article 31-B itself which was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.

70. The validity of Article 31-B as enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 appears to us to be fully reinforced by the BASIC STRUC-. TURE CASE itself. There, as we stated above, inter alia Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act was questioned which had put the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act No. 35 of 1969 and Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971' (Kerala Act No. 25 of 1971) in the Ninth Schedule. The efficacy and validity o'f the provisions of Article 31-B was not at all doubted. On the other hand it was observed that the provision of Article 31-B was an independent provision affording immunity to the laws placed in the Ninth Schedule independently of Article 31-A of the Con-etitution. Once that immunity is available, the provisions of Part III in regard to laws providing for acquisition of any, estate or any right therein would be rendered wholly immune from challenge. Upon the ratio of the BASIC STRUCTURE CASE where the first doctrine of basic structure was formulated and where the Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act was in terms upheld, it is difficult to understand the submission that because of the basic structure doctrine now Article 31-B should be held to be vulnerable or is assailable. Article 31-B itself is on the Statute Book along with Article 31-A since the first amendment of the Constitution. It is too late and too futile to question the validity of that provision on the assumption that the constitutional device of Article 31-B is likely to be abused or likely to create Para-Constitution always running counter to the fundamental or basic structure of the Constitution itself.