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15. According to the reply affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2, the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, the issues raised in the writ petition are incapable of resolution by judicially manageable standards. It is stated that in the unfortunate incident of 24.2.2000, Police had to take certain unpalatable steps to contain what was admittedly an unlawful assembly. In the course of discharge of their duty of enforcing prohibitory orders in the vicinity of the Parliament House, the police took steps which they considered appropriate to prevent members of the unlawful assembly from reaching the Parliament House and crossing prohibited areas. Some members of the Bar undoubtedly have been hurt in the action taken by the police and otherwise and some members of the police force also have sustained injuries. It is also stated that in the enquiry conducted by the Divisional Commissioner (Revenue) of the Government of NCT of Delhi, it was found that the two Assistant Commissioners of Police whose suspension is demanded by the lawyers had acted with restraint and done their best in the situation. It is contended that the disciplinary control over the police force is a matter in the discretion of the administration and that where the disciplinary authority bona fide feels that on the facts and materials before it, no case has been made out for initiating the disciplinary proceedings and does not initiate the disciplinary proceedings, it is not a matter amendable to judicial review. The fact that some members of the Bar did get injured is regrettable and has caused concern to the Government. Seeing the gravity of the situation, the Government had requested the Police to take appropriate action in the matter. After a careful evaluation it was found that appropriate action under the disciplinary rules was to take immediate action against the officers who ex-facie were seen using force which was perhaps unwarranted. While admitting that some members of the Bar have suffered injury in the incident on 24-2-2000, it is stated that some members of the Police force also suffered injuries during the incident. It is further stated that responding to the sensitivity of the situation, the matter was given serious consideration and the individuals noticed have immediately been dealt with by taking action against three such officials. It is further stated that two separate cases have been registered by the Police against the lawyers under the relevant provisions of the IPC and the Prevention Damage of Public Property Act but no precipitated action has been taken thereafter. It is also stated that the two Assistant Commissioners of Police were transferred out of the District to remove any possible suggestion which may be made on a later occasion that the officers have in any manner influenced the inquiry or affected its fairness. In defense of the lathi-charge and use of force by the police, respondent No. 2 has stated that the Government of India has vide its Notification dated 1/7/78 authorised the Commissioner of Police to exercise the powers under Section 70 of the Delhi Police Act 1978, to exercise the powers of an Executive Magistrate and District Magistrate. In exercise of the aforesaid powers, a notification under Section 144 of the Cr. P.C. was issued by the Commissioner of Police which came into force w.e.f. 28/12/99 and remained in force upto 25th February, 2000. The schedule to this order admittedly covers the area in which the Police was endeavouring to prevent the agitators from crossing the cordons and barricades put up by the Police. The order under Section 144 was within the knowledge of the agitators. At no point of time, the legality of the order under Section 144 Cr. P.C. was put in issue. It is also stated that during the continuance of the order under Section 144 Cr. P.C. any assembly of 5 or more persons would constitute unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141 of the IPC.

18. Lawyers all over India were protesting against the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1999 and certain changes in the Advocates Act suggested by the Law Commission and the apprehended entry of foreign lawyers to practise in Indian Courts. The issues raised by the lawyers were directly connected with the legal profession and the administration of justice. Whatever be the merits and demerits of their objections, the lawyers had a right to protest and they decided to hold a Parliament March on 24.2.2000 to lodge their protest. Thousands of lawyers from different parts of India assembled in Delhi and marched to the Parliament House shouting slogans and holding placards and banners. The programme was pre-arranged and police authorities were informed of it in advance. However, the lawyers were denied permission to hold the demonstration in the vicinity of the Parliament House. A prohibitory order under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was already in force in the localities surrounding the Parliament House. In such circumstances the police stopped the demonstrators at Parliament Street and prevented them from proceeding to the Parliament House. The police directed the demonstrators to disperse on the ground that the assembly had been declared an unlawful assembly. When some of the lawyers crossed over the barricades put up by the police and tried to march forward, the police used tear gas, water cannons and ultimately lathi-charge (described as cane charge in the affidavit of respondent No. 2) to disperse the unlawful assembly. In this process about 135 lawyers got injured and many of them sustained grievous injuries. Some of the injured lawyers had to be admitted and treated in the different hospitals. There is not much dispute about the above facts. However, Mr. P.N. Lekhi contended that the lawyers were holding only a peaceable demonstration; that they were unarmed; that they had a right to violate the prohibitory order under Section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code as a mark of protest; that they were only trying to court arrest; that they did not attack the police or indulge in any form of violence; that the police resorted to the use of tear gas, water cannons and lathi-charge without any provocation or justification; that before using force the police did not follow the procedure or observe the mandatory requirements under the law; that excessive force was used by police and the lawyers were brutally attacked and assaulted causing grievous injuries; that the action of the police amounted to criminal offences and misconduct; and that considering seriousness of the offences and the misconduct of the police afficials, they should be placed under suspension pending the Inquiry by the Commission. According to the learned Solicitor General, apart from crossing over the barricades and trying to march forward, some lawyers allegedly attacked the police with sticks of the banners and threw stones at policemen and their vehicles and damaged public property. It was also claimed that some police officials were injured while discharging their duty of dispersing the unlawful assembly. But names or details of such injured police officials were not furnished whereas respondent No. 3 had placed on record the list of 135 injured lawyers. It was further contended by the learned Solicitor General that excessive force was not used and no criminal offence or misconduct was committed by the police officials. According to the learned Solicitor General there is absolutely no justification for taking any action against the police officials or placing them under suspension till the Commission of Inquiry submits its report.

20. In view of the provisions contained in Article 19(2) and 19(3) of the Constitution of India, in the interest of public order reasonable restrictions can be imposed by law on the exercise of the rights conferred by Article 19(1)(a) and 19. In Madhulimaye Vs. S.D.M. Monghyr the Supreme Court has held that the expression "in the interests of public order" in the Constitution is very wide and it is capable of taking within itself certain acts which disturb public tranquillity or are breaches of the peace. Section 144 of Cr.P.C. confers power on the District Magistrate, Sub Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, to issue an order or direction which has the effect of imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and 19. The Constitutional validity of Section 144 of Cr. P.C. was upheld by the Supreme Court in Madhulimaye Vs. S.D.M. Monghyr (Supra). In exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. the Commissioner of Police, Delhi had made a written order prohibiting: (i) the holding of any public meeting, (ii) assembly of 5 of more persons, (iii) carrying of fire arms, banners, placards, lathis, spears, swords, sticks, brickbats etc. (iv) shouting of slogans, (v) making of speeches etc., (vi) processions and demonstrations and (vii) picketing or dharna in any public place within the area specified in the Schedule and Site Plan appended to the order, without a written permission. The said order under Section 144 Cr. P.C. came into force with effect from 28.12.1999 and remained in force for a period of 60 days i.e. upto 25.2.1999. Any person contravening the said order was liable to be punished under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus on 24.2.2000 the exercise of the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution in any public place within the area specified in the Schedule and Site Plan appended to the order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. stood curtailed or restricted to the extent stated in the said order. In other words the acts mentioned in the said order could not be done without a written permission. Admittedly the area specified in the Schedule and Site Plan appended to the order covered the Parliament House together with its surrounding localities including the Parliament Street. It was not disputed that the lawyers had been refused permission to hold any procession or demonstration in any public place within the specified area on 24.2.2000. The prohibitory order was not challenged in any proceedings. Hence, prima facie, the Parliament March held by the lawyers on 24.2.2000 was in violation of the prohibitory order issued under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. The police were authorised and were duty bound to enforce the prohibitory order and to prevent its violation. They were also authorised and empowered to remove or disperse any unlawful assembly in accordance with law. Hence they were justified in putting up barricades on the road and taking any other lawful action to enforce the prohibitory order and to prevent its violation. At the same time, the lawyers had the right even to violate a prohibitory order in a peaceful and non violent manner and to court arrest as a mark of their protest. The police could have used only the minimum degree force required to enforce the prohibitory order and to disperse the unlawful assembly.

21. According to the police, despite the resistance put up by the police the lawyers forcibly crossed over the barricades and tried to march to the Parliament House, ignoring the warnings and appeals to disperse and some of the lawyers even resorted to different forms of violence like stone throwing, attacking the police with sticks and destroying public property and hence the police officials were constrained to use force to disperse the unlawful assembly. It was claimed that only when the use of tear gas and water cannons failed to disperse the unlawful assembly, the police resorted to lathi-charge. It was contended on behalf of the police that under Section 129 of the Cr.P.C. they were entitled to use necessary force to disperse the unlawful assembly and that they used only the minimum degree of force required. The above allegations were denied by Mr. P.N. Lekhi, appearing on behalf of the lawyers. According to him the lawyers were holding a peaceful demonstration and when they were prevented by police from marching ahead towards the Parliament House, they only wanted to court arrest and register their protest, but, without eny provocation or justification the police resorted to the use of force. Water from water cannons was directed against the body of the lawyers to hit them down and a brutal lathi-charge was inflicted on the lawyers. Even while lawyers were dispersing from the scene, some of them were indiscriminately and severely beaten up with lathis by the police without any justification. He also contended that though permission to hold the demonstration had been refused by the police authorities, there was an understanding reached on the previous day between the leaders of the lawyers and the police authorities that the lawyers would be allowed to walk some distance and then would be stopped and allowed to court arrest. The understanding was that the lawyers would be allowed to violate the prohibitory order in a peaceful and non-violent manner and to court arrest. Several buses were kept ready by the police to remove the arrested lawyers. The said understanding was not disputed by the learned Solicitor General, but he submitted that unfortunately things did not go as agreed and because of the conduct of the lawyers the police had to use force to disperse the unlawful assembly. He also submitted that some of the lawyers forcibly tried to march to the Parliament House and allegedly resorted to violence and even attacked the police with stones and sticks and destroyed public property. In the light of the above rival contentions, the basic issues are whether the police used force without sufficient provocation or justification, whether the police used excessive force, whether before the use of force and the lathi-charge the police had observed the mandatory requirements under the law, whether the police committed any illegality or misconduct or criminal offence and whether the conduct of the police officials warrant any legal action or disciplinary proceedings against them. These are matters which would definitely come under the purview of the inquiry by the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Central Government. Hence it is not for this Court to express any opinion or to make any comment on such matters. We shall confine ourselves to the question whether there is any need or justification for directing the Government to suspend the police officer from service pending the inquiry by the Commission and whether the decision taken by the Government not to suspend the police officers is illegal or arbitrary.