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9. The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and panchayat Samitis (amendment and Validation ) Act, 1981 ( Maharashtra Act 46 of 1981).

10. The Orissa Cess Act, 1962 (Orissa Act II of 1962).

11. The Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act, 1958 (Tamil Nadu Act xxxv of 1958).

The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the bill states that cesses and other taxes on minerals imposed by certain State governments were struck down by this Courts on account of which they have become liable to refund cesses and other taxes collected by them. Since such refund is likely to have serious impact- on the revenues of the concerned State Governments and also because it is extremely difficult to ensure that the levies collected are refunded to the large number of end users of minerals who have actually borne the burden of such levies, the said Act was being made by Parliament. The Preamble to the Act states that it was an Act "to validate the imposition and collection of cesses and certain other taxes on minerals under certain State laws". The Act is deemed to have come into force on February 15, 1992, the date on which the Ordinance of 1992 was promulgated by the President. Section which contains three sub-sections the main provisions in the Act. Sub-section (1) says that the provisions contained in the laws specified in the Schedule to the Act relating to cesses anc other taxes on minerals, shall be and shall be deemed always to have been as valid as if the provisions contained therein had been enacted by Parliament and that such provisions shall be deemed to have remained in force upto the 4th day of Aprils Sub-section (2) elaborates and elucidates the content of sub-section ( Having regard to the decisions of this Court and the High Courts on the question of validity of cesses and taxes on minerals imposed by the States, the sub-section opens with a non-obstante clause "notwithstanding any judgments decree or order of any court". The sub-section then provide three things. It firstly says that "all actions taken, things done, rules made, notifications issued or purported to have been taken, done made or issued shall be deemed to have been validly taken done, made or issued. as the case may be, as if this section had been in force at all material times when such actions were taken, things were done, rules were made and notifications were issued". Secondly, it says that "cesses and other taxes on minerals realised under any such laws shall be deemed to have been validly..... realised....... as if this section had been in force at all material times when such...... cesses or other taxes were realised". The third thing provided by the sub-section is the declaration that "no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any court for the refund of the cesses or other taxes realised under any such laws". sub-section (3) is clarificatory in nature. It starts with the words "for the removal of doubts" and declares that nothing in, sub-section (2) shall be construed as preventing any person from claiming refund of any cess or tax paid by him in excess of the amount due from him under any of the laws mentioned in the Schedule. It is a case of stating the obvious by way of abundant caution.

We must also say that the fact-situation and the ratio of Madan Mohan Pathak and Nachane is totally at variance with the fact-situation in the case before us. They are worlds apart in every sense of the term. The first contention of the appellants is accordingly rejected.

The second contention of the learned counsel for appellants- petitioners is that Section 2 of the impugned enactment does not achieve the purpose set out in the Preamble and that the language employed in Section 2 is not adequate to create any fresh levies. It is submitted that the Parliament must first create the levy and then give it retrospective effect. But it cannot relegate both the making of law and giving it retrospective effect to the realm of fiction, it is argued. The Parliament cannot say that it must be deemed to have made a law without actually making it. It is submitted that in sub-section (1) of Section 2, there are no words saying that the Parliament is levying the various taxes/cesses mentioned in the said subsection read with the Schedule. By way of contrast, our attention is invited to the language of Section 3 of the Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 which was enacted by Parliament in view of the decision of this Court in Diamond Sugar Mills Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1961 (3) S.C.R.243] and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court following it and declaring that the levy of cess on sugarcane under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1958 was beyond the legislative competence of the Madhya Pradesh legislature. Several States had levied similar cesses. To meet the situation To meet the situation arising from the decisions aforesaid, the parliament enacted the Sugarcane Cess (validation) Act, Section 3 whereof reads:

(a) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any court for the refund of any cess paid under any State Act;

(b) no court shall enforce a decree or order directing the refund of any cess paid under any State Act; and

(c) any cess imposed or assessed under any State Act before the commencement of this act but not collected before such commencement may be recovered (after assessment of the cess, where necessary) in the manner provided under that Act.

The third contention which has been urged by every counsel appearing for appellants-petitioners with great vehemence is this: the impugned Act is designed to and provides only for validating the taxes and cesses already recovered under the relevant provisions of the enactment mentioned in the Schedule. The impugned Act does not, however, empower or authorise the Parliament or its agencies to recover taxes and cesses which are payable under the said provisions but have not been recovered on or before 4th day Aprils, 1991. The Statement of Objects and Reasons and the language in sub-section (2) of Section 2 are relied upon in support of this contention. It is also pointed out that Section 2 does not contain a clause or words corresponding to clause (c) in sub-section (1) of Sections 3 of the Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961, referred to hereinbefore. It is not possible to accede to this contention, either. Section 2 enacts the relevant provisions of the enactments mentioned in the Schedule with retrospective effect. The provisions so enacted do create the levy. Indeed, unless the levy is validated recoveries already made cannot be validated. It is for this reason that the Preamble to the Act says that it is an Act "to validate the imposition and collection of cesses and certain other on minerals under certain state laws". Once the provisions, which create the Ievy, are deemed to have been enacted by Parliament, the levy is very much there with retrospective effect. Once there is a valid levy, not only the taxes already collected need not be refunded but the taxes and cesses which have not already been collected can also be collected. It is impossible to see any distinction in principle between both. Merely because sub-section (2) inter alia state that "cesses or other taxes on minerals realised under any such laws shall be deemed to have been validly...realised....as if this section had been in force at all material times when such....cesses or other taxes were realised", it does not mean that the axes which were levied but not collected cannot be collected. The said words in sub-section (2) are not words of limitation; they are words of validation and put in by way of abundant caution in view of the Judgments and orders of the Courts. On the language of Section 2 which enacts with retrospective effect, the relevant provisions levying cesses and taxes on minerals and also validates the rules and notifications issued thereunder, we find it impossible to say that the levy is validated only for the limited purpose of saving the taxes already collected, i.e., to sty the refund of taxes already collected. Indeed, if the section were so construed, it would lead to discriminatory consequences. Take two persons 'A' and 'B'. Both are equal liable to pay the cess on minerals levied by say the Madras legislature. One pays the tax according to law and the other does not. If the argument of appellants petitioners is to be accepted, the man who paid will be worse off than the person who did not pay because no tax can now be collected from the person who did not pay. No such unreasonable intention can be attributed to Parliament. It would not be reasonable to assume that the Parliament intended such discriminatory treatment between two similarly placed persons and for no reason. Some of the counsel for appellants-petitioners sought to that the above situation cannot be described as discriminatory. According to them, there is a reasonable classification between the person who does not pay, comes to the court and succeeds in his challenge and the person who does not come to the court but quietly pays the tax and sits at home. This illustration proceeds on the assumption that only a person not paying the tax comes to the court. That may not always be true. A person may pay the tax demanded and then come to court challenging the demand and collection. There may also be a situation, where tax is collected from him even before he comes to court. It is also possible that in a given case, stay is not granted by the court and he is obliged to pay. There may also be a situation where both 'A' and 'B' in the above illustration may not come to court. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that once the levy is created or validated as the case may be, distinction can be drawn between the person who has paid and the person who has not paid. We are also unable to find any words in Section 2 or anywhere else in the impugned enactment limiting the levy only to the extent of the taxes/cesses already collected on or before 4th day of April, 1991. Nor are we satisfied that absence of a clause or words corresponding to clause (c) in Section 3(1) of the Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act makes any difference. The said clause merely sets out the consequence flowing from he validation contained in the main limb of Section 3(1), by way of abundant caution. It cannot be treated as a substantive provision. Sri K. Parasaran then submitted that the words "imposition and collection" in the Preamble do evidence the intention to confine the imposition to amounts already collected. It is not possible to agree. By reading them conjunctively, their meaning cannot be cut down. On the contrary, the said words indicate the intention to validate the imposition as well as collection. "Collection" does not mean what is a already collected alone. It means future collection as well. Neither the Preamble nor Section 2 say that what is already collected alone is validated. This contention too accordingly fails.