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4. Mr. V. B. Patel, Learned Counsel, after having invited our attention to the provisions of constitution as well as Industrial Disputes Act, submitted that even though the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises powers to adjudicate rights of the parties, they are not "Courts". In other words, Mr. Patel submitted that the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals are not 'Courts' even though they have trappings of the powers of the courts. In the submission of Mr. Patel, they are exercising purely quasi-judicial powers under the supervision of the High Court and, therefore, mere supervision by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not a real test so as to make them "Courts" within meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Mr. Patel finally submitted that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (The) Alahar Cooperative Credit Service Society v. Shamlal 1995 (2) GLH 550 wherein the Supreme Court, in no uncertain terms, has held that the Labour Court constituted under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act is not a 'court subordinate to High Court' under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act and, therefore, the contempt proceedings for non-compliance of the order or award are not maintainable, the point is concluded and, therefore, the present application is required to be rejected.

26. As observed earlier, in view of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which confers same power as vested in the Civil Court in respect of certain matters only, the proceedings before them are deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the IPC. Under sub-section (6) of Section 7, the presiding officers of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of S. 21 of the IPC. They are deemed to be Civil Court for the purpose of Ss. 345, 346 and 348 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only. The proceedings before such forums are judicial proceedings in view of the powers conferred on them by Section 11(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. They have all the trappings of the Judicial Tribunal. If they were Courts, such provisions were not necessary. Merely because they are subjection under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and they are amenable to writ jurisdiction, they are not "Courts" as contemplated by the Contempt of Courts Act. In view of this, the phrase used "Court subordinate to High Court" under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act is for the purpose of judicial supervision. Even while exercising wide powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, High Court cannot withdraw a case to itself from a Labour Court or Tribunal and dispose of the same, or determine merely the question of laws as to the interpretation of the Constitution arising before the Labour Court or Tribunal. Article 228 intends to confer jurisdiction and power on High Court to withdraw a case for the purpose mentioned above from the ordinary courts of law whose decision may, in the normal course of things, be taken up to High Court by way of an appeal. In any case, once the Apex Court, in the case of Alahar Cooperative Service Society v. Shamlal, 1995 (2) GLH 550 has held that the Labour Court/Tribunals are not "Courts" subordinate to High Court under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, in our opinion, there is no reason for this High Court to take a different view against the decision of the Apex Court. Merely because the Apex Court did not give reasons for reaching to the said conclusion in Alahar's case (supra), it would be too much for us to overlook the said judgment. Likewise, merely because the Apex Court did not refer the earlier judgments on the point, one may not draw a conclusion that earlier judgments were not in the mind of Their Lordships at the time of deciding Alahar's case (supra).

27. The decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Labour Laws Practitioners Association 1998 I CLR 850 SC followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Prantiya Kamdar Sena v. State of Gujarat 1998 (2) GLH 970 and by the Full Bench in this case of Majdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat 1998 (2) GLH 151 on which reliance is placed by the Learned Counsel appearing as interveners will have no application. In all the three judgments referred to above, this Court was not directly concerned with the issue involved in the present case, namely whether the Labour Court is a "Court" within the meaning of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Considering the provisions of Sections 77 and 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Labour Laws Practitioners Association (Supra), held that the Labour Court discharges judicial functions and the Judges of the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals belong to judicial service of the State and appointment of these judges is required to be made in consultation with the High Court as provided in Article 234 of the Constitution. The hierarchy contemplated in the case of Labour Court Judges is the hierarchy of Labour Court Judges and Industrial Tribunal Judges with the Industrial Tribunal Judges holding superior position of District Judges. In view of this, a finding was recorded that the recruitment of Labour Court Judges was required to be made in accordance with Article 234 of the Constitution. There cannot be any dispute with respect to the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment. True, the Apex Court, in the said judgment, did consider its earlier judgment rendered in Bharat Bank's case (supra) and the judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mohammedbhikhan (supra) and reached the conclusion that the Labour Court is undoubtedly a "Court". However, the said question was decided for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether the presiding officer of such a Court can be said to hold the post in judicial service as contemplated in Article 234 of the Constitution. It appears to us that the question whether the Labour Court is a "Court" was decided for the purpose of deciding the question of recruitment of presiding officers. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gujarat Majdoorsabha v. State of Gujarat, after following the judgment of the Apex Court in the State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association, has ruled that the person presiding over Industrial and Labour Court constitute a judicial service. In the said judgment also, the Full Bench of this Court was not concerned with the dispute involved in the present case. In view of the fact that the decision of the Apex Court in Alahar's case (supra) was not cited either before the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association (supra) or before the Full Bench of this Court which is directly on the point, it is binding to us. The present case is distinct from the case before the Apex Court as well as the case before the Full Bench. The Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Prantiya Kamdar Sena v. State of Gujarat, 1998(2) GLH 970 has held that the Labour Court Judges form part of judicial service and, therefore, it is the constitutional duty on the part of the Governor to consult the High Court before such appointment is made and, therefore, consultation for such appointment is a sine quo non. It was a case where the rules framed for appointment of Judges of the Labour Court, for example, Labour Judges (Junior Division) Recruitment Rules 1982 and the recruitment rules for the post of Member, Industrial Court were never submitted to the High Court for its opinion for the reason that the Judges of the Labour Court and the Members of the Industrial Court were not considered as part of the State Judicial Service. In the opinion of the Division Bench of this Court, no steps were taken to frame fresh recruitment rules in consultation with the Public Service Commission and the High Court, even after the decision of the Apex Court, in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association. In the circumstances, the Division Bench was required to hold that the rules must be sent to the High Court for scrutiny at the stage they are proposed so as to enable the High Court to offer its advice. True, the Division Bench of this Court, in fact, considered the decision of the Apex Court in Alahar's case (supra). However, it did not rely upon the ratio laid down on the ground that the Apex Court has not dealt with in detail and the question as to whether the Labour Courts would fall within the purview of "subordinate courts under the High Court" was not specifically decided. In any case, for deciding the question involved in the matter, the Division Bench, after placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners Association, decided the same. As observed earlier, even if the Labour Court performing judicial functions and forming part of judicial service and the Judges of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal belong to the judicial service of the State, will not make the Labour Court/Tribunal as a "Court" so as to attract the provisions of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Merely because the High Court exercises powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India over the subordinate courts or tribunals and they are amenable to writ jurisdiction, will not make them "Courts" as contemplated by the Contempt of Courts Act. If that reason is accepted, all the forums constituted under the Central or Local Acts shall have to be declared as "Courts". They have wide powers which are out of the way from the ordinary law administered by Courts of law and they are not bound by ordinary law. They act on the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. Thus, their subjection to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is for a specific purpose and merely because they are amenable to writ jurisdiction, it would not make them "Courts" as contemplated by the Contempt of Courts Act.

34. On the facts of the case, the Court found the Respondent guilty of contempt and was punished. This Court decided the said case on the basis that Labour Court is a Court within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act without deciding the said point.

35. In the case of Bipinchandra P. Singwala v. Navin Fluorine Industries and Anr. 1981 GLR 1070, the Division Bench of this Court, after considering Secs. 33-C and 33A(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the power of the High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act does not depend on whether or not the Petitioner can make an approach to the Labour Court or can file Civil Suit or apply for the execution of the award through the Collector by way of Recovery Application. In the opinion of the Division Bench, the Courts should avoid multiplicity of proceedings and should see that justice is done to the parties and they are not obliged in incur avoidable expenditure. Relying on this decision, it was contended by the learned advocates who appeared as interveners that the remedy under Section 33C under the Industrial Disputes Act is no remedy and even if the remedy is available under Section 23 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy under the Contempt of Courts Act does not depend upon the alternative remedy. Here also, this Court proceeded on the footing that Labour Court is a Court and decided the dispute on the question of remedy to execute award.