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10. The judgments of Olympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd. vs. Meena Vijay Khetan3 and Rashmi Mehra vs. Eac Trading Ltd.4 cited by learned Counsel of the Petitioner are clearly distinguishable. In Olympus Superstructures, the dispute revolved around three agreements for sale of flats and three related agreements for interior design of these flats. The agreements for sale had an arbitration clause inter alia requiring disputes in any way connected with the subject matter of the agreements to be referred to a sole arbitrator. There were three separate agreements appointing the appellants as "Interior Designers". Each of these three agreements also had an arbitration clause requiring the disputes to be referred to two named arbitrators. All three agreements for sale were terminated by the appellants on account of default of payment. The respondents contested the case of default; they gave details of payments made under the main as well as interior design agreements and claimed that there was no significant balance. On the respondents' application under Section 11 of the Act, a sole arbitrator was appointed. The arbitrator passed an award granting the relief of specific performance in respect of all three main agreements as well as interior design agreements. In their challenge before the Supreme Court, the argument of the appellants was that the arbitrator could not have decided the disputes regarding the three interior design agreements as the reference was based on the three main agreements for sale; the interior design agreements had their own arbitration clauses. The Supreme Court held that the disputes and differences arising under the 3 (1999) 5 Supreme Court Cases 651 4 2007(2) Mh.L.J. 737 Pg 11 of 19 sg arbp715-14.doc interior design agreements were integrally "connected with" the disputes and differences under the main agreements. The court held that where there were disputes in connection with the main agreement and also disputes in regard to "other matters" "connected" with the subject matter of the main agreement, such disputes would be governed by the general arbitration clause of the main agreement. The court observed that the intention of the parties, when they incorporated clause 39 in the main agreement and clause 5 in the interior design agreement, was that the former clause was to apply to situations when there were disputes arising under both agreements and the latter when there were no disputes or differences arising under the main contract but the disputes and differences were confined only to the interior design agreement. The court held that that was the only way by which the general arbitration provision in clause 39 of the main agreement and the arbitration provision concerning the named arbitrator contained in clause 5 of the interior design agreement could be harmonised and reconciled. The court held that there could not be conflicting awards under the two agreements; such a situation was never contemplated by the parties. These facts and the consideration applied to those are clearly distinguishable from our case. In our case, the two agreements cannot be said to be integrally connected with each other. The leave and licence agreement is referred to in the purchase option letter at a few places only to indicate, generally, that the purchase option letter was in the backdrop of the leave and licence agreement and, particularly, the exercise of option under the purchase option letter and the effective date of sale thereunder, were related to a particular juncture during the subsistence of the leave and licence agreement and the date of its expiry, Pg 12 of 19 sg arbp715-14.doc respectively. In Rashmi Mehra's case there was, on the one hand, an agreement to invest and a shareholders' agreement, and on the other, a related buy back agreement. The buy back agreement did not have an arbitration clause whereas the shareholders' agreement had such clause. This court, however, held that the buy back agreement formed an integral part of the shareholders' agreement and was not an independent or stand-alone agreement. The court held that the buy back agreement was not only connected with or related to, but in fact, had stood merged with, the agreement to invest and the shareholders' agreement; these latter agreements were really the substratum, the sole purpose and the root of the former agreement. The court held that the buy back agreement in the case was indeed the basis of the entire arrangement/transaction comprised in the shareholder's agreement; without the buy back agreement, the entire venture would be still born. These facts, the court observed, established that the buy back agreement was inalienable from the shareholders' agreement, and it was, therefore, unnecessary for the parties to provide for a separate arbitration clause in the buy back agreement; by implication, the terms and conditions of the agreement to invest and the shareholders' agreement would get incorporated into the buy back agreement along with the arbitration clause. Once again, these facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of our case, where there is no such integral relationship for merger of the two agreements. Neither of the agreements can be said to be the substratum or purpose or the root of the other. They are not in any sense inalienable.