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17. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, the Court held that since the petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution against the judgment and order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and was heard by a single Judge, intra-Court appeal was not maintainable as it was expressly barred under Clause 15. It was, therefore, observed that no error of law was committed by the Division Bench of the High Court in holding that LPA was not maintainable.

From the decision in Umaji Keshao, in our judgment the following principles relevant to the case on hand appear to us to be well settled;

32. Now, to substantiate the argument that LPA is maintainable we have been taken by the learned counsel for the appellant to several decisions. Special reference was made to Umaji Keshao and our attention was invited to various paragraphs of the said judgment. It may, however be noted that in Umaji Keshao, proceedings were of a civil nature. In tenancy proceedings, a matter had gone to Revenue Tribunal from which it reached before learned single Judge of the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur). When LPA was filed against the judgment of a single Judge, the Division Bench held that LPA was not maintainable. The Supreme Court also held that the order passed by the Division Bench was correct. While considering rival submissions, the Supreme Court traced the history of Letters Patent, nature of proceedings before the learned single Judge and maintainability or otherwise of intra-Court appeal from a "judgment" of a single Judge of High Court. The Court also observed as to when an order can be said to be "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of Letters Patent. The Court further stated that an intra Court appeal would not lie against the judgment or order, made or passed by the learned single Judge in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. The Court also considered the relevant provisions of Indian High Courts Act, 1861 by which High Courts were empowered to exercise civil, criminal and other jurisdiction original as well as appellate. The Court noted that the Constitution saved the powers of existing High Courts under Article 225 of the Constitution and invested with powers and jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution on other High Courts. It was posited that if a petition was under Article 227 of the Constitution, no intra-court appeal would lie but it is was under Article 226 of the Constitution or under both the Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the party will not be deprived of right of intra-court appeal, if otherwise such an appeal would be competent.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the Chief Secretary of the Government of Gujarat may personally remain present in the Court so that the Court can ascertain how the liquor is available in the State where it is totally prohibited.

(Emphasis supplied)

57. Being aggrieved by that part of the order by which the Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat was directed to remain personally present in the Court, an appeal was filed by the State. Notice was issued, pursuant to which parties appeared. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the accused that LPA was not maintainable as the order was passed by the learned single Judge in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. The argument of the learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, was that the direction to the Chief Secretary of the Government to remain personally present in the Court could not be said to be in exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the learned single Judge and did not fall under the bracketed portion of Clause 15 which excluded intra-Court appeal. The submission was that such direction was either under Art. 226 of the Constitution or in suo motu exercise of power in public interest litigation. The Division Bench was of the opinion that the submission of the learned Government Pleader was well founded inasmuch as according to assignment of work, the learned single Judge was hearing bail matters. Had an order been passed granting or refusing to grant bail, it could have been said to be in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. But a direction to the effect that the Chief Secretary should remain personally present in the Court to explain as to how liquor was freely available in a dry State, could not be said to be an order in exercise of "criminal jurisdiction". Such direction, therefore, must either be in exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution which is power in public interest litigation. In a latter situation, however, the matter could not have been placed nor could have been heard by a single Judge since as per roster, matters pertaining to Public Interest Litigation could be entertained only by a Division Bench of the First Court headed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

70. Special attention was invited to a decision of Full Bench of this Court in Palel Kashiram Lavjibhai v. Narottamdas Bechardas (1978) 19 GLR 1047 (FB). In that case, a reference was made by a Division Bench to a Full Bench in view of conflicting observations by two different Division Benches. In a decision of the Full Bench, the facts were not stated. We, therefore, called for the original matter which was Special Civil Application No. 1110 of 1970. Looking to the controversy raised in the petition, it was clear that it related to tenancy rights. The learned single Judge disposed of the matter against which LPA was filed. The question before the Division Bench was whether LPA was maintainable. The matter was referred to Full Bench with the following question: