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12. But Mr. Desai, the learned advocate who appears on behalf of the Corporation, has contended that there is absolutely no evidence that fat embolism was caused due to the multiple fractures. It is also the contention raised by Mr. Desai that there is no link of causation between the accidental injuries and the death. It. is also a further contention raised by Mr. Desai that the link of causation can never be inferred by the Tribunal or any other court awarding the compensation but the same, namely, the link of causation is required to be proved by cogent evidence on record. Arguing on the same line Mr. Desai has further urged that in the instant case no damages could have been awarded to the applicants for the accidental death of the deceased because there is absolutely no evidence of the development of fat embolism due to the accidental injuries. Mr. Desai has, therefore, urged that the learned Tribunal was perfectly justified in not recognising the claim of the applicants for the dependency loss allegedly suffered by them because of the accidental death of the deceased. Mr. Desai has, therefore, urged that there is no reason for us to interfere with the judgment and the award pronounced by the Tribunal and, therefore, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed with costs.

14. As noticed above, the main question to be decided by us is as to whether there is a nexus or connection between the accidental injuries and the death of the deceased as would have been called by the Indian courts. It would have been asked by the English courts as to whether there is a link of causation between the two. The learned Tribunal was aware that the medical evidence before the Tribunal was to the effect that the probable cause of the death was the development of fat embolism. The Tribunal was also aware of the fact that the development of fat embolism is a common or known complication in case of the fractures involving longer bones. Anyhow the Tribunal had reached the conclusion, that it was not conclusively established that the deceased had died because of the development of fat embolism which would be the result of the accidental injuries. This position becomes clear when a reference is made to some portions of the judgment rendered by the Tribunal. At para 19 the learned Tribunal has taken pains to narrate the injuries and the multiple fractures sustained by the deceased. The Tribunal has also written in extenso the injuries and fractures received by the deceased as deposed by Dr. Mahendra Desai, Orthopaedic Surgeon attached to the V.S. Hospital at Ahmedabad.

30. Two English decisions also, on which Mr. Desai has placed reliance, would not come to his rescue in the appeal before us. The first is the House of Lords decision in Mckew v. Holland & Hannen & Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd. (1969) 3 All ER 1621. In that case, before the House of Lords, the appellant the original petitioner had sustained injury in the course of his employment for which the employers were made liable. As a result, on occasions, the appellant unexpectedly lost control of his left leg which gave way beneath him. Once, while leaving a flat accompanied by his wife and child and his brother-in-law his leg collapsed and he had tried to jump so that he would land in a standing position rather than falling over down the stairs. On landing he had suffered a severe fracture of the ankle. On the question whether the respondents were liable for the injuries caused by the second accident, the House of Lords had held that in case before their Lordships the act of appellant in attempting to descend steep staircase without handrail was unreasonable and that the chain of causation was broken and ultimately the respondents were not held liable in damages for the second injury. Mr. Desai has placed heavy reliance upon the abovesaid case-law while urging that, in the instant case before us also, there is no chain of causation which would make the respondents liable in damages. But the facts in the abovesaid case before the House of Lords are eloquent. The appellant had previous injuries and while leaving the flat his leg had collapsed, he had jumped down and had suffered fracture of the ankle. It cannot be urged that this second injury was also such that the respondent would be liable to satisfy the claim of damages. In our view, therefore, this decision would not help Mr. Desai in his submission before us.

31. The other decision on which Mr. Desai has placed reliance is the decision rendered by House of Lords is Whilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority (1988) 1 All ER 871. In that decision, the facts were that the infant plaintiff was born prematurely suffering from various illnesses including oxygen deficiency. While in a special baby unit at the hospital, where the infant plaintiff was born, he was given excess oxygen. The plaintiff was later discovered to be suffering from an incurable condition of the retina resulting in near blindness. This could have been caused by excess oxygen but it also could have occurred in premature babies who were not given oxygen. In the background of these facts the House of Lords had reached the conclusion that since the plaintiff's retina condition could have been caused by any one of a number of different agents and it had not been proved that it was caused by the failure to prevent excess oxygen being given to him, the plaintiff had not discharged the burden of proof as to causation. On the basis of this case-law, Mr. Desai has tried to urge that the link of causation has not been established. But looking to the facts of the case as narrated above we feel unable to subscribe to the view which is being canvassed by Mr. Desai before us.