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It is undoubtedly true that my judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. case (supra) was a minority judgment but so far as this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution and it is equally clear from the same decision that though judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament by amending the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament can certainly, without in any way violat- ing the basic structure doctrine, set up effective alterna- tive institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the compe- tence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. Then, instead of the High Court, it would be another insti- tutional mechanism or authority which would be exercising the power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the constitutional limitations and maintaining the rule of law. Therefore, if any constitutional amendment made by Parlia- ment takes away from the High Court the power of judicial review in any particular area and vests it in any other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be viola- tive of the basic structure doctrine, so long as the essen- tial condition is fulfilled, namely that the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the parlia- mentary amendment is no less effective than the High Court. Here, in the present case, the impugned Act has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 323A which was introduced in the Constitution by Constitution (42nd Amendemnt) Act, 1976. Clause (2) (d) of this Article provides that a law made by Parliament under clause (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1). The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 by any law made by Parliament under clause (1 ) of Article 323A is, there- fore, specifically authorised by the constitutional amend- ment enacted in clause (2) (d) of that Article. It is dear from the discussion in the preceding paragraph that this constitutional amendment authorising exclusion of the juris- diction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 postu- lates for its validity that the law made under clause (1) of Article 323A excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 must provide for an effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority for judi- cial review. If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law made under clause (1) of Article 323A to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 without setting up an effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, it would be violative of the basic structure doctrine and hence outside the constituent power of Parliament. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in this constitutional amend- ment that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it must not leave a void but it must set up another effective insti- tutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of judi- cial review in it. Consequently, the impugned Act excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 in respect of service matters and vesting such jurisdic- tion in the Administrative Tribunal can pass the test of constitutionality as being within the ambit and coverage of clause (2) (d) of Article 323A, only if it can be shown that the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act is equally efficacious as the High Court, so far as the power of judicial review over service matter is concerned. We must, therefore, address ourselves to the question whether the Administrative Tribunal established under the impugned Act can be regarded as equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power or judicial review as the High Court acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation and applicability of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. These questions require for their determination not only judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law. It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have same modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of these questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. That is the reason why at the time of the preliminary hearing of these writ petitions we insisted that every bench of the Administrative Tribunal should consist of one judicial member and one administrative member and there should be no preponderance of administrative members on any bench. Of course, the presence of the administrative member would provide input of practical experience in the function- ing of the services and add to the efficiency of the Admin- istrative Tribunal but the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input or not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court. Now section 6 provides that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at least two years held office of Vice-Chairman or he should have for at least two years held the post of Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India. I entirely agree with Ranganath Misra, J. that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have for at least two years held office as Vice-Chairman. If he has held office as Vice-Chairman for a period of at least two years he would have gathered sufficient experience and also within such period of two years, acquired reasonable familiarity with the constitutional and legal questions involved in service matters, But substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a Secretary to the Government and who has no legal or judicial experience would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tribunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism than the,High Court. We cannot afford to forget that it is the High Court which is being supplant- ed by the Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned as to inspire confidence in the public mind that it is a highly competent and expert mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity. Of course, I must make it clear that when I say this, I do not wish to cast any reflection on the mem- bers of the Civil Services because fortunately we have, in our country, brilliant civil servants who possess tremendous sincerity, drive and initiative and who have remarkable capacity to resolve and overcome administrative problems of great complexity. But what is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended to supplant the High Court is legal train- ing and experience. I am, therefore, of the view, in agree- ment with Ranganath Misra, J. that clause (c) of section 6 (1) must be struck down as invalid.