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(i) A meaningful reading of the plaint shows that it essentially challenges the consent decree dated 18 th July 2018 on the ground that it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. Such a challenge is impermissible under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC. It is submitted that under Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC any agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, shall not be deemed to be lawful, within the meaning of the said rule. It is submitted that section 19 and 19 A of the Contract Act make it clear that when the consent to an agreement is obtained by coercion, fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence such agreement is voidable in nature.

(III) It is submitted that where the case of one party practicing fraud on the other ( which is distinct from the fraud practiced on the court itself) such question cannot be decided in the limited/summary jurisdiction under Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC. Consequently a separate suit in such a case cannot be said to be barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC.

(IV) It is submitted that the explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 applies only to that Rule and not Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC. It is submitted that the only change brought about by the 1976 amendment is that prior to the said amendment even a voidable contract/agreement could form the basis of a compromise/consent terms without the party who was entitled to avoid the contract/agreement taking steps to avoid/rescind the same or it being set aside by the court N.S. Kamble page 13 of 39 1-Jud-CRA-665-19 with IASt-92417-20 in AOSt-92414-20 as required under section 19A of the Contract Act.

23. The Supreme Court found that the precise question which fell for consideration was whether the High court was right in directing the appellant/plaintiff to seek redress in the suit having regard to the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 A of CPC. In the context of the said issue this is what is held in para 11 of the Judgment.

"11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms of the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 where one party alleges and the other denies adjustment or N.S. Kamble page 24 of 39 1-Jud-CRA-665-19 with IASt-92417-20 in AOSt-92414-20 satisfaction of any suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order XXIII Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within meaning of the said rule if the same is void or voidable under Indian Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the Court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order XXIII Rule 3A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the Court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that Court and that Court alone who can examine and determine that question. The Court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS No.5326 of N.S. Kamble page 25 of 39 1-Jud-CRA-665-19 with IASt-92417-20 in AOSt-92414-20 2005 to challenge validity of the compromise decree, the Court before whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the application made by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (respondents herein) could hardly be heard to argue that the plaintiff (appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No.5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher Court."

25. In Banwarilal the compromise was signed by the parties challenging the same. It was interalia held thus in para 7 of the Judgment:-

"7. By adding the proviso along with an explanation the purpose and the object of the amending Act appears to be to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the same before the Court which had recorded the compromise in question. That Court was enjoined to decide the controversy whether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawful manner. The explanation made it clear that an agreement or a compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. Having introduced the proviso along with the explanation in Rule 3 in order to avoid multiplicity of suit and prolonged litigation, a specific bar was prescribed by Rule 3A in respect of institution of a separate suit for setting aside a decree on basis of a compromise."