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(3). Shanker Lal filed the suil for division of holding on the allegation that the suit land originally belonged to their ancester Ganga Ram and it has devolved on the parties who were co-tenants. However, after the death of Dhagwan his two brothers got the land in dispute entered in their own names and during the life time of Smt, Champa widow of Bhagwan they continued to put her off on the pretext that she was a widow and whenever she made adoption Bhagwan's 1/3rd share would be got entered in the name of the adopted son. However, even after his adoption Prithvi Raj and Girdhari put Shanker Lal and his mother off on the pretext that they would give possession of their l/3rd share when Shanker Lal comes up of age but when they did not do so even after Shanker Lal attained majority it compelled Shanker Lal to file this suit for division of holding. The defendants No.1 and 2 i.e. the petitioners contested the suit. However the defendant No.3 admitted the plaintiff's claim.

(a) The adopted child for all purposes be deemed to be the child of its adoptive parent or parents;
(b) All the ties of the child in the nalural family will stand terminated from the date of adoption, except the ties of blood for the purposes of marriage.
(c) All the ties of the child will come into existence in the adoptive family from the dale of adoption.

The adopted child is deemed to be the child of the adopter for all purposes and his posilion for all intends and purposes is that of a natural born son. He has the same right, privilege and the same obligation in the adoptive family as held by the High Court of Bombay in Kesharpai vs. State of Maharashtra (16). In the instant case the adoption was made by the widow of Bhagwan who is also a coparcener with others. It is well established proposition of law that when a coparcener dies his individual interest devolves on surviving coparceners by survivorship. Moment the widow of a coparcener adopts a son, the adopted son becomes a coparcener with the surviving coparceners of the adoptive father and consequently acquires the same interest which his adoptive father would have in the property had he been living. This was on account of the doctrine of relating back. The child adopted by the widow of the coparcener became the child of the deceased coparcener from the dale of the death of the coparcener. Mr. Bhoot relied on certain passages in Anant Bhikkappa Patil vs. Shankar Ramchandra Patil (supra). In the above case the position of a son adopted by a Hindu widow under the Shastric Hindu Law, with respect to his rights in the joint family properties of the adoptive father, was explained by the Privy Council. The Privy Council held that the power of a Hindu widow to adopt a son does not come to an end on the death of the sole surviving coparcener. It does not depend upon vesting or divesting of the estate nor the right to adopt is defeated by partition between the coparceners. The Privy Council also held that on the death of a sole surviving coparcener a Hindu Joint Family cannot be finally brought to an end while it is possible in nature or law to add a male member to it. The joint family cannot come to an end while there is still potential mother and that mother can by nature or by law can bring a new male member in the joint family. The fact that the property had vested in the mean time in the heir of the sole surviving coparceners would not itself affect the right of the adopted son and the adoption of a son by a widow of the deceased coparcener would have the effect of divesting the surviving coparceners and vesting the property in the adopted son to the extent of his adoptive father's share in the joint family property. Thus in our view the adoption by the widow Champa will divest the other coparceners and their legal representatives of the interest of her husband Bhagwan in the joint family property notwithstanding a partition amongst the surviving coparceners after the death of her husband. However, the aforesaid Privy Council judgment was not followed by the Supreme Court in Srinivas Krishnarao Kango vs. Narayan Devji Kango (supra). Mr. Bhoot also relied on the judgment in Krishnamurthi Vasudeorao Deshpande & anr. vs. Dhruwaraj (supra), The Supreme Court in this judgment has summarised the principles deducible from its decision in Srinivas Krishnarao Kango vs. Narayan Devji Kango (supra) as under:-

(iv) The principle of relation back applies only when the claim made by the adopted son relates to the estate of his adoptive father. The estate may be definite and ascertained, as when, he is the sole and absolute owner of the properties, or it may be fluctuating as when he is a member of a joint Hindu family in which the interest of the coparceners is liable to increase by death or decrease by birth. In either case, it is the interest of the adoptive father which he adopted son is declared entitled to take as on the dale of his death. This principle of relation back cannot be applied when the claim made by the adopled son relates not to the estate of his adoptive father but to that of a collateral, with reference to the claim with respect to the estale of a collateral, the governing principle is that inheritance can never be in abeyance, and that once il devolves on a person who is the nearest heir under the law, it is thereafler not liable to be divested when succession to the properties of a person other than an adoptive father is involved. The principle applicable is not the rule of relation back but the rule that inheritance once vested could not be divested."

(12). In Dharma Shamrao Agalawe vs. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe and Ors, (supra), the Supreme Court was consideryig the question whether a person adopted by Hindu widow after coming into force of the Hindu Adoption nnd Maintenance Act, 1956 can claim a share in the properly which had devolved on sole surviving coparcener on the death of the husband of the widow who took him in adoption, fn this case one Shamrao died leaving behind him two sons Dharma and Miragu. Miragu died issueless in the year 1928 leaving behind him his widow Champabai, The properties owned by the joint family of Dharma and Miragu passed on to the hands of Dharma who was the sole surviving coparcener on the death of Miragu. Under the law as it stood then, Champabai had only a right of maintenance in the joint Family property. The Act came into force on 21st December, 1956. On 9.8.1968 Champabai took one Pandurang in adoption and immediately thereafter a suit was filed by Pandurang and Champabai for partition and separate possession of one-half share in the properties of the joinl family, of which Dharma and Miragu were coparceners? the suit was resisted by Dharma on the ground thai Pandurang was not entitled to claim any share in the properlies which originally belonged to the joint family in view of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 of the Act and the properlies which had been sold by him in favour of third parlies could not in any event be the subject-matter of the partition suit. The trial court dismissed the suit. The appeal filed by the widow and the adopted son before the Dislrict Judge was allowed and the preliminary decree for partition in favour of Pandurang and Champabai and separate possession of one-half share of the joint family properties except the two fields which had been sold earlier in favour of their parlies. Aggrieved by the decree of the District Judge, an appeal was filed before the High Court which affirmed the decree passed by the District Court following the decision in Y.K. Nalavade vs. Ananda G. Chavan (supra), in which it was observed that clause (c) of the proviso to section 12 of the Act was not a bar to such a suit for partition. An appeal by special leave was filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court the appellant urged only the question that the suit for partiiion should have been dismissed by the High Court as the adopted child Pandurang could not divest Dharma of any part of the estate which had been vested in him before the adoption in view of clause (c) of proviso to section 12 of the Act. The Supreme Court in this judgment approved the decisions in Y.K. Nalavade vs. Ananda G. Chavan (supra) and Vasant vs. Daltu (supra) and relied on Sita Bai vs. Ram Chandra (supra).