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Ms. Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the appellant company had filed the application under Section 24 read with Section 25 of the Maharashtra Act only on the ground that the strike in question was allegedly illegal as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) meaning thereby it was alleged that the notice was not in the prescribed form and also on the ground of violative of Section 24(1)*i); that no case was even alleged for voiding the notice and the ultimate strike on the ground that provisions of Section 24(1)(b) were violated. It was also submitted by her that the main requirements of the prescribed notice as per Form-I read with Rule 22 of the Rules under the Act were complied with by the said notice. That the notice was addressed to the authority of the company in charge of the management of the factory at the relevant time; that it was clearly mentioned that there were grounds indicated therein which were compelling Respondent No.1 union to go on strike. Even the time for going on strike was also mentioned as 14 days' after the service of the notice' that clause-2 of the prescribed Form-1 could not have applied as it was not the case of the appellant company itself before the Labour Court that Respondent No.1 was a recognised union as per the Maharashtra Act. Therefore, the asterisk placed against clause 2 of Form-1 which permitted the striking off of clause 2 when not applicable gets squarely applied to the facts of the present case. She submitted that in order to be a recognised union. certificate was to be issued in favour of Respondent No.1 union, as seen from the definition of Section 3(13) of the Maharashtra Act. That it was not the case of the appellant that provisions of Chapter III, especially, Sections 10 to 12 were ever complied with by Respondent No.1 union so as to be treated as a recognised union under the Maharashtra Act. Consequently, paragraph 2 of the prescribed Form-I of the notice did not apply to Respondent No.1 union. Therefore, there was no occasion for Respondent No.1 union to even whisper about obtaining vote of majority of the members in the said notice as tried to be submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant. It was contended that the notice in question substantially complied with the requirements of the said prescribed form of the notice. Consequently, the Labour Court was in patent error when it took the view that Respondent No.1 had not given strike notice in the prescribeed form and on that score Section 24(1)(a) got attracted on the facts of the present case. Such a patent error was rightly set aside by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. She next contended that as the appellant company did not invoke alleged violation of Section 24(1)(b) before the Labour Court, there was no question of examining the said ground either by the Labour Court or by the High Court. She submitted that the very fact that the said sub-clause (b) was not pressed in service by the appellant company shows that it neverr treated Respondent No.1 as a recognised union. So far as the applicability of Section 24(1)(i) is concerned, she submitted that the strike notice was not given during the currency of the settlement with respect to any of the matters covered by the settlement. It was submitted that Demand No.14 regarding the privilege leave as found in the settlement only granted crystalisation of the right of the workmen represented by Respondent No.1 union for getting privilege leave of 12 days for each completed 240 days of work per year and further privilege leave of one day for every additional 12 days of work as provided therein. That the dispute raised in the strike notice did not seek, in any way, to change the basis of the said grant of privilege leave but the grievance was entirely different as it pertained to the proper computation of the privilege leave as per the terms of the settlement. In a way it amounted to calling for correct and proper implementation of the settlement for which Respondent No.1 union could have filed a complaint under Section 28 of the Act pertaining to unfair labour practice on the part of the employer as found in Schedule IV Item 9 of the Maharashtra Act. But that did not take away the additional right of strike available to Respondent No.1 union on behalf of its workmen. It was also submitted that the very fact that failure to implement the award was made by the legislature a subbject matter of the complaint, showed that such implementation would not be covered by the settlement. It is for the simple reason that if it had already been covered by the settlement, even the more drastic remedy of strike for getting the settlement implemented would have stood barred under Section 24(1)(i).

In other words, it was contended that matters covered by the settlement as per Section 24(1)(i) would be only those matters which were expressly referred to in the settlement. Computation of the benefit as per the agreed terms in tthe settlement was not a matter which was covered by the settlement but was a matter even if arising out of the settlement was one which was consequent upon the settlement. It was an independent matter for which there was no express provision in the settlement. It was posterior to the settlement and not embeedded therein. Consequently, Section 24(1)(i) also was not applicable to the facts of the present case and as the Labour Court had committed a patent error in this connection it was rightly corrected by the High Court. Similar was her contention regarding Demand No.26 about Medical Check-up. It was submitted that the said settlement had nothing to do witth the prevention of discase as Demand No.26 referred to medical treatment for the disease which was already suffered by the workmen due to occupational hazards. Prevention of such disease which was the subject matter of impugned notice was anterior to the question of medical check-up and was not covered by the terms of the settlement. Even on that ground Section 24(1)(i) did not get attracted. That the High Court rightly corrected the patent error of the Labour Court in this connection. It was, therefore, contended that the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227, was justified in interfering with the order of the Labour Court and in setting aside the patently erroneous order of the said court. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. She contended that 40 workmen who were out of job since more than 15 years have suffered immensely and that their services have been illegally terminated by the appellant company. This part of the grievance, in our view, cannot form subject matter of the present proceedings and, therefore, whatever practice on the part of the employer as found in Schedule IV Item 9 of the Maharashtra Act. But that did not take away the additional right of strike available to Respondent No.1 union on behalf of its workmen. It was also submitted hat the very fact that failure to implement the award was made by the legislature a subject matter of the complaint, showed that such implementation would not be covereed by the settlement. It is for the simple reason that if it had already been covered by the settlement, even the more drastic remedy of strike for getting the settlement implemented would have stood barred under Seection 24(1)(i). In other words, it was contended that matters covered by the settlement as per Section 24(1)(i) would be only those matters which were expressly referred to in the settlement. Computation of the benefit as per the agreed terms in the settlement was not a matter which was covered by the settlement but was a matter even if arising out of the settlement was one which was consequent upon the settlement. It was an independent matter for which there was no express provision in the settlement. It was posterior to the settlement and not embedded therein. Consequently, Section 24(1)(i) also was not applicable to the facts of the present case and as the Labour Court had committed a patent error in this connection it was rightly corrected by the High Court. Similar was her contention regarding Demand No.26 about Medical Check-up. It was submitted that the said settlement had nothing to do with the prevention of discase as Demand No.26 referred to medical treatment for the disease which was already suffered by the workmen due to occupational hazards. Prevention of such disease which was the subject matter of impugned notice was anterior to the question of medical check-up and was not covered by the terms of the settlement. Even on that ground Section 24(1)(i) did not get attracted. That the High Court rightly corrected the patent error of the Labour Court in this connection. It was, therefore, contended that the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227, was justified in interfering with the order of the Labour Court and in setting aside the patently erroneous order of the said court. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. She contended that 40 workmen who were out of job since more than 15 years have suffered immensely and that their services have been illegally terminated by the appellant company. This part of the grievance, in our view, cannot form subject matter of the present proceedings and, therefore, whatever remedies may be available to the concerned workmen, in this connection, may be open to them in accordance with law. It will be equally open to the appellant company to resist the said future proceedings in accordance with law if at all that occasion arises. We do not express any opinion about the same. In this case, we are concerned with the short question whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the Labour Court's order declaring the strike of the workmen from 30th March, 1983 illegal as per provisions of Section 24(1)(i) and Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act. Aforesaid rival contentions give rise to the following points for our consideration:

i) The name of the Trade Union giving notice, its address and the date of the notice;

ii) The name of the employer and full address of the undertaking for which the notice is meant;

iii) Clear indication in the notice about the call for strike of the workmen employed in the undertaking and the date from which the strike is to be resorted to;

iv) and the reasons for the proposed strike.

It is easy to visualise that if all the aforesaid four requirements are fulfilled, in substance, the basic requirements of Form-I would get satisfied. It is not as if that the notice must be typed in the samee sequence in which Form-I is drafted or that it must mention Section 24(1). The latter are mere formal requirements. In substance, the notice must fulfil the aforesaid basic requirements of the prescribed form. If they are fulfilled, which section of the Act applies to such notice can be easily found out by reference to the Act. Similarly, whether notice is given by registered post or by hand delivery is also not a basic requirement. It refers to mode of service. In the present case, it is not in dispute that notice was duly served on the management. Sending of copies of notice to mentioneed persons is also not a part of the basic requirement of the notice. When we examine the impugned strike notice, we find that all these four basic requirements of Form-I have been complied with in the present case. the name and address of the Trade Union which served the notice are clearly mentioned, the date of the notice is also indicated, the nature of the addressee of the notice and his address are also mentioned, namely, it has been addressed to the Factory Manager of the company who was in-charge of the company at the relevant time and under whom the workmen proposing to go on strike were actually working. It is also clearly mentioneed as to forrm which date the strike is proposed to be resorted to, as it is mentioned that the strike would be resorted to on the expiry of 14 days from the date of the receipt of the letter cum notice. It is also clearly mentioned that the letter will be treated as notice for going on proposed strike. Then follows the heart of the notice, namely, reasons why the proposed strike has to be resorted. Thus, all the basic requirements of Form-I have been satisfied. even the Labour Court took the view that the substance of the notice had to be seen and not its form. Still, however, it persuaded itself to hold that the notice was not in the prescribeed fform. The said finding of the Labour Court was patently illegal and was rightly reversed by tthe High Court in the impugned judgment, Learned senior counsel for the appellant, Shri Bhandare, however, submitted that requirement of paragraph 2 of the said Form-I was not complied with in the present case. It is not mentioned in the notice that the Union beeing a recognised union has obtained the vote of majority of the members to go on strike. It must be kept in view that this clause 2 of Form-I being an asterisk which says that any portion which is not applicable has to be struck off when not applicable. It was not the case of the appellannt at any time that Respondent no.1 Union was recognised union under the Act having followed the equirements and had obtained the certificate of a recognised union under Section 12 of the Act. On the contrary, when we turn to the application filed by the appellant before the Labour Court, we find that it was the case of the appellant itsef before the Labour Court that the Union was a registered Union and claimed to represent the employees employed by the applicant in the said factory. It was not the case of the appellant before the Labour Court in the application Under Section 25 that respondent No.1 Union was a recognised union under the Act. Not only that, the application sought to invoke only Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act and did not invoke Section 24(1)(b) of the Act which deals with a recognised union. It is also the case of Respondent no.1 that it is not a recognised union under the Act, Thus, it was almost an admitted position on the record before the Labour Court that Respondent no.1 Union was not a recognised union under the Act. Once that conclusion is reached, it becomes obvious that paragraph 2 of the form-I did not apply to the facts of the present case and had to be treated to have been struck-off for the purpose of issuing strike notice by Respondent no.1 Union to the appellant company. Consequently, the finding of the Labour Court that the impugned notice was not in a prescribed form and therefore, would result in the strike of 30th March, 1983 onwards becoming an illegal strike being contrary to Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act must be held to be patently erroneous and was rightly sett aside by the High COurt in writ jurisdication. In fact, on this aspect, two views are not possible at all and only one view which appealed to the High Court is the only possible and permissible view. The view taken by the Labour COurt was clearly contrary to evidence on record and had to be treated as perverse and patently illegal. It must, therefore, be held that the impugned notice of strike was not violative of the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act. It must be held that the said notice was a perfectly valid strike notice as required by the said provision read with Rule 22 and Form-I of the relevant M.R.T. and P.U.I.P., Rules, 1975. The first point is, therefore, answered in negative, in favour of Respondent no.1 Union and against the appellant company.

Point No.2:

This takes us to the consideration of Point No.2, It is obvious that it was not the case of the appellant company before the Labour Court that the impugned strike was contrary to the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, In fact, as seen earlier, it was not the case of the appellant company that Respondent no.1 Union, was a recognised union under the Act at the relevant time when it gave the impugned notice. COnsequently, the appellant's case before the Labour Court for getting the strike declared illegal was based only on the violation of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act. The Labour Court has also treated the proceedings accordingly and the ultimate decision rendered by the Labour Court is also to the effect that the strike notice of 14th March, 1983 was no notice in law and violative of provisions of Section 24(1)(i). In substance, the Labour Court had no occasion to consider the question whether it was violative also of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act. It is also, in this connection, perttinent to note the prayer in the application moved by the appellant before the Labour Court under Section 25 of the Act. the said prayer reads as under: