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37 The MOH, 'L' ward, addressed a letter dated 12 th July, 2017 to the Senior Inspector of Police of Respondent No.1, requesting to file an FIR against the Public Information Officer of 'L' ward. This request was made since the Public Information Officer had stated in response to a RTI application filed by one Vijay Manthena, on 26th October, 2015, that the file of permissions in respect of Kinara was untraceable.

JUNE 10th, 2025 S.R.JOSHI 1-wp-659-2018.doc 38 In the aforesaid context, it is important to note that, as of 19th August, 2019, i. e. nearly about four years after the tragedy at Kinara, the enquiry against the Public Information Officer still remains pending. The belated nature of Respondent No.2's enquiry is all the more appalling since this was not for the first time that the Public Information Officer of the Health Department, 'L' ward, had refused to give information on the ground of unavailability of files. As far back in September, 2012, even before the fire broke out at Kinara, the Public Information Officer had, in response to a RTI application made by Martin Matthews, stated that the permissions pertaining to Kinara were not available with it. At that time, no action, whatsoever, were taken to locate the files or hold the concerned officials responsible. More importantly, findings have been rendered in Respondent No.2's own departmental enquiry that the MOH may have deliberately misplaced the files to conceal his wrongdoings. Instead of acting upon these findings and uncovering the actual perpetrator behind the missing files, Respondent No.2 was merely penalizing the Public Information Officer. 39 The MOH 'L' ward addressed a letter dated 6th August, 2019 to the Mumbai Fire Brigade, requesting for a certified copy of JUNE 10th, 2025 S.R.JOSHI 1-wp-659-2018.doc the fire NOC granted to Kinara. This request was made since the file had been 'misplaced' by Respondent No.2's Health Department at 'L' ward. Similarly, another letter dated 6 th August, 2019 was addressed by the MOH, 'L' ward, to the Building and Factories Department, requesting for a certified copy of the permission granted by it to Kinara.

82 Mr. Sakhare submitted that it should be noted that Kinara is situated in 'L' ward, which is the largest ward in the Corporation, with an area of 15.88 sq. kms, which stretches from JUNE 10th, 2025 S.R.JOSHI 1-wp-659-2018.doc Sion to Ghatkopar and Chembur to Powai. The population of the said ward, as per the 2011 census, was around 8,92,279, and considering the growth in population, it might have been around 10 to 11 lakhs in the year 2015. He submitted that the number of licensed eateries in the said ward are 313. Mr. Sakhare submitted that, as per the organizational structure of the Public Health Department, MOH is the licensing authority under whom there is a Senior Sanitary Inspector, and below the Senior Sanitary Inspector are Sanitary Inspectors. He submitted that, at the time of the incident, there was only one Senior Sanitary Inspector, and against four posts of Sanitary Inspector, there were only three Sanitary Inspectors available. He submitted that the said officers had the humongous task of ensuring strict compliance of regulatory requirements in the 'L' ward, in addition to their other duties and responsibilities. 83 In support of his submissions, Mr. Sakahre relied upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajkot Municipal Corporation v/s. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum and Others (1997) 9 SCC 552. Mr. Sakhare submitted that, in the said judgement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has evolved the doctrine of direct and immediate causation which mandates that accountability be affixed only to the party whose negligent act or omission proximately JUNE 10th, 2025 S.R.JOSHI 1-wp-659-2018.doc resulted in the harm suffered. Mr. Sakhare submitted that applying the said principle of the judgement to the present case, the explosion at Kinara was a direct and exclusive consequence of the wilful violation of statutory safety norms by the hotel owner and manager, specifically concerning the improper storage and handling of LPG cylinders. Mr. Sakhare submitted that Respondent No.2, in its capacity as a regulatory authority, cannot be held liable for the said incident in the absence of any proximate act or omission on its part that directly contributed to the explosion or fatalities. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the actions of the hotel management constitute an independent and intervening cause which severs any casual link between Respondent No.2 and the resulting harm. 84 Further, in the context of the MOH of 'L' ward, Mr. Sakhare submitted that, it was only when an application under the RTI Act was received by the MOH, 'L' ward, from one Vijay Manthena, that it was realized that the file of Kirana was not traceable. This was after the incident of the fire. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the MOH of 'L' ward ought to have lodged a complaint with the police in respect of the missing file. However, in the present case, the said step was not taken for a considerably long period. Mr. Sakhare submitted that when it was learnt that the files JUNE 10th, 2025 S.R.JOSHI 1-wp-659-2018.doc are not traceable after the incident of fire, for such lapse, departmental enquiry had been initiated against the MOH of 'L' ward.