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21. On the question of submission of a fresh classification list, the ld. counsel submitted that Trade Notice No. 148/79 dated 18-7-1979 issued by the Collectorate clearly provided that if there has been no structural change in the product and there is no change in the Tariff Entry, it was not necessary to file a classification list. The ld. counsel therefore submitted that with the coming into force of the new Central Excise Tariff from 1-3-1986 it was not necessary for them to file a fresh classification list as there was no structural change in the product.

41. During the course of arguments, the ld. counsel also submitted that the dispute arose with the issue of Trade Notice No. 23/89 dated 14-2-1989. This argument of the ld. counsel appears to be fallacious in as much as the Show Cause Notice in the instant case was issued on 5-4-1988. It was also argued that any amendment in the classification list can be prospective only and cannot be retrospective. This argument was adduced by the ld. counsel on the ground that they had submitted their classification list sometimes in 1983 which was approved by the department and therefore any amendment in this classification list can be only from the date the case was adjudicated or at the most from the date of issue of the Show Cause Notice. This argument of the ld. counsel is not relevant to the present proceedings in as much as no classification lists were submitted by the appellant when there were major structural changes in the Central Excise Tariff effective from 1-3-1986 and no classification list consequent upon the changes was submitted by the appellants. The ld. counsel also argued that the department was fully aware of the nature of the product namely texturised taspa yarn and mere absence of classification list, therefore, was not sufficient ground to hold that there was suppression of facts. On an examination of this plea, we find that Rule 173-B of Central Excise Rules provides that when there is a structural change in the Tariff, new classification list shall be submitted by the assessees. As in this case, no classification list consequent upon the major changes in the Central Excise Tariff was submitted, therefore, it was a major lapse on the part of the appellants.

43. The department had argued that with the introduction of new Central Excise Tariff effective from 1-3-1986, there was wholesale change in the description of goods and their classification etc., the appellants were required to file revised classification list as required under Rule 173-B(4)(c) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and that the appellants if they thought that they were eligible for an exemption, they should have claimed that exemption by filing the requisite classification list as required under the law; that the appellant did neither submit the revised classification list as required under the Central Excise Rules nor did they claim the exemption under the Notification and therefore the department had rightly invoked the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act ibid. On careful examination of the submissions of both sides and the case law referred to by the appellants, we find that there has been a suppression of facts in as such as revised classification was not submitted when the structure of the Central Excise Tariff underwent a complete change with effect from 1-3-1986. We also observe that there has been a suppression in as much as the appellants did not claim exemption when the new Notification in 1986 was issued. On the question whether these things were done with the intention to evade payment of duty, the only answer could be in the affirmative. No evidence has been brought on record to show that the appellant had a bona fide belief and were ignorant to that extent. The appellant company being a substantially large company cannot take the plea that they were not conversant with the Central Excise Rules and were not required to submit revised classification list and claim exemption under the relevant exemption notification. On the question whether there was an intention to evade payment of duty, we can only say that intention can be there to evade payment of duty because no mitigating circumstances have been brought out to explain bona fide belief. Their entire belief is based on the classification list approved in 1983 which is not at all relevant to the present proceedings. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the proviso to Section 11A of the CESA, 1944 was correctly invoked by the department and is legally maintainable.