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2. As regards the first issue, viz., whether succession is to be traced from the last male holder or his maternal grandfather, appellant's contention is that when a person succeeds to an obstructed heritage, that person is not, whether a male or female, a full owner. There is, however, no warrant for it in the Mitakshara. The general rule of Hindu law is that when a male heir succeeds a male owner, the former is as much full owner as the latter, the principle being, as stated by Manu in chapter IX, verse 187, that to the nearest sapinda the inheritance belongs. The only recognized exception to it is that when a female, such as a widow or daughter, succeeds a male owner, her succession is a case of interposition between him and his next sapinda, on the authority of Catyayana, who directs that, upon the death of such female, the last male owner's (and not her own) heirs shall take the heritage. This text is referred to, and the history of the introduction in the Mitakshara of widow and daughter among heirs is explained in the decision of this Court in Muttu Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dora Singha Tevar I.L.R., 3 Mad., 330, 331. As for obstructed and unobstructed heritage (sapratibanda and apratibanda), the distinction is material only to the extent that, in the one case, the nearer male heir excludes the more remote, whilst in the other, the doctrine of representation excludes this rule of preference. It is founded upon the theory that the spiritual benefit derived from three lineal male descendants, such as son, grandson and great-grandson, is the same, though among collateral male heirs, the quantum of such benefit varies in proportion to the remoteness of the male heir from the deceased male owner. Hence it is that the text of Yajnavalcya, cited in Mitakshara, chapter II, Section 1, verses 2 and 3, premises the death of a male owner without male issue, and enumerates his heirs in the order in which they are entitled to succeed, adding that on failure of the first in the order in which they are enumerated, the next in order is the proper heir. Thus the rule that to the nearest sapinda the inheritance belongs applies alike whether the heritage is obstructed or unobstructed, with this difference, viz., that when the last full owner leaves sons, grandsons and great-grandsons, their sapinda relationship confers equal spiritual benefit on him, though their blood relationship is not the same, and that they are all co-heirs within the meaning of the rule. The decision of the Subordinate Judge on the first issue is, therefore, correct.

3. The third issue is whether, upon the death of Kattama Natchiyar, the zamindari devolved upon Dora Singha Tevar and appellant as joint family property, and whether, upon the death of the former, it devolves upon the latter by right of survivorship. It is suggested for appellant, first, that it is joint family property; and, secondly, that his right of survivorship excludes respondent from succession. The right of survivorship, as recognized by the Mitakshara, presupposes two things, viz., a subsisting coparcenary in respect of the property in litigation, and the death of the last male owner without male issue. In the case before us, respondent is Dora Singha Tevar's son, and even assuming that the estate was common both to appellant and Dora Singha Tevar, no right of survivorship can arise in appellant's favour. Again, coparcenary presupposes a common descent from the same paternal ancestor and community of interest in the property in dispute, and as daughters are transferred by marriage to the gotras or the families of their husbands, neither can they nor their sons be said to be coparceners so as to constitute a joint Hindu family in the true sense of the expression. Further, to what extent an impartible estate can be treated as joint family property, though it vests in one of its members by the custom of primogeniture, and to what extent a right of survivorship can be deduced from impartibility was considered by this Court in Naraganti Achammagaru v. Venkatachalapati Nayanivaru I.L.R., 4 Mad., 252, 267, and the decision in that case rests on the view that, before succession can pass from one line of descent to another, the former must be extinct, and that the proper heir is not necessarily the coparcener nearest in blood to the original owner, but the nearest coparcener of the senior line. Again, how far it is joint family property as between father and son for the purpose of invalidating a mining lease granted by the former was considered in Beresford v. Ramasubba I.L.R., 13 Mad., 197 and it was held in that case, on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council in Sartaj Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari I.L.R., 10 All., 283 that, even as between real coparceners, an impartible estate devolving in accordance with the custom of primogeniture is not joint family property for all purposes. The right of survivorship on which appellant insists was properly held by the Subordinate Judge not to subsist.

10. The istimrar zamindar was Gouri Vallabha Tevar, who died in 1829. Thereupon, his brother Mutta Vaduga Tevar took possession, and he and his descendants retained the same till 1864, when Kattama Natchiyar, daughter of the istimrar zamindar, recovered the same under the decree of the Privy Council,following on the judgment of their Lordships in Kattama Natchiyar v. The Rajah of Shivagunga 9 M.I.A., 543. Kattama Natchiyar died in 1877, when a contest arose as to the right of succession between her son, the present plaintiff, and Dora Singha Tevar, the son of her elder sister (deceased) Vellai Natchiyar, which resulted in favour of the latter, on the ground that the estate taken by Kattama Natchiyar as a daughter was a limited estate, and that on her death it devolved not on her own heir, but on her father's heir, and that Dora Singha Tevar, as senior grandson, was that heir--Muttu Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dora Singha Tevar L.R., 8 I.A., 99. Dora Singha Tevar succeeded, therefore, and held the zamindari till 1883, when he died.

13. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that Dora Singha Tevar's possession was as manager of the estate by reason of its impartibility, and that the estate having been the joint family property of himself and plaintiff, the latter is entitled to the same by right of survivorship.

14. As was observed in the Naraganti case I.L.R. 4 Mad., 250 at page 267 of the report:--"The impartibility of the subject does not necessitate the denial of the right of survivorship,and there are not wanting in the admitted rules which govern the enjoyment of such property and the succession to it, indicia of co-ownership and consequent survivorship." But can the plaintiff be held to have been a co-owner of the zamindari with Dora Singha Tevar? For it is only in case of co-ownership that there can be a right of survivorship. As pointed out by the Subordinate Judge, plaintiff and Dora Singha Tevar are the sons of different fathers and consequently members of different Hindu families, and therefore not coparceners within the meaning of the Hindu law. The claim by right of survivorship has, therefore, been rightly rejected; and as the last male owner from whom the right of succession is to be traced is Dora Singha Tevar, the Subordinate Judge is right in holding that the son, the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the person entitled to succeed to the zamindari.