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3. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 on several grounds. One of the grounds was that the sale-deed obtained by the plaintiff from defendant No. 2 was bogus, sham, colourable, fictitious and without consideration, and the same was executed to defeat his claim. He also denied that the plaintiff was ever in possession of this plot of land or had constructed any building thereon. He contended that the possession of the plot continued with defendants Nos. 2 and 3. He further contended that he had filed Regular Darkhast No. 511 of 1954 in January 1955 and in that Darkhast he had got the suit plot attached on 18th January 1955. He had also obtained an injunction against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 restraining them from entering into any transaction of sale of the suit plot privately. According to him, therefore, the sale being effected by defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff while the attachment in Regular Darkhast No. 511 of 1954 was subsisting, the same was void. He also claimed for compensatory costs. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were proceeded against ex parte.

4. The learned trail Judge found that the sale deed dated 20th February 1955 executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff was bogus, sham, colourable and fictitious document executed with a view to defeat the claim of defendant No. 1 against defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and that the sale-deed was without consideration. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not acquire any title under the sale-deed. The learned Judge also found that the sale-deed was void on the ground that it was executed while the attachment on the suit plot was subsisting on the date of the sale-deed, in the execution proceedings being Regular Darkhast No. 511 of 1954. The plaintiff then went in appeal to the District Court, and the learned Assistant Judge who heard the appeal came to the conclusion that though the suit plot was attached in Regular Darkhast No. 511 of 1954 and on the date of the sale-deed viz. 20th February 1955 the attachment was subsisting, still the same came to an end later on when the same Darkhast came to be disposed of on 4th July 1956. He was, therefore, of the view that the attachment having come to an end, it could not render the transaction of sale void, though on the date of the sale-deed the attachment was subsisting. According to him, therefore, the sale in favour of the plaintiff being perfectly valid, defendant No. 1 could not acquire any title at the auction sale. As regards the contention of defendant No. 1 that the sale was bogus, sham, colourable, fictitious and without consideration, he found against defendant No. 1. Being aggrieved by this judgment and decree, defendant No. 1 has come to this Court in second appeal.

5. The only important point that falls for determination in this appeal is whether the sale dated 20th February 1955 evidence by the sale-deed, Ex. 45, is void being hit by Section 64, C.P.C. For the purposes of confederating this question, a few facts which are not in dispute are these. Defendant No. 1 had obtained a money decree against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in Regular Civil Suit No. 312 of 1950. In execution of this decree, he filed Regular Darkhast No. 511 of 1954. In this Darkhast, the plot of land in dispute was attached on 18th January 1955 as partly satisfied. It is material to note here that while disposing of the Darkhast ultimately came to be disposed of on the 4th July 1956 as partly satisfied. It is material to note here that while disposing of the Darkhast the Court did not direct the attachment to continue. Thereafter, defendant No.1 filed second Darkhast being Regular Darkhast No. 171 of 1958 on 28th March 1958, but the same was also disposed of on 24th July 1959. It is common ground that in this Darkhast no fresh attachment was levied on the suit plot on land in dispute. Thereafter , defendant No. 1 filed third Darkhast being Darkhast No. 630 of 1959 on 29th December 1959. In this Darkhast, fresh attachment was levied on the suit plot on 18th July 1960. In due course, the plot of land was put up for sale and was purchased by defendant No. 1 himself on 29th April 1961. While the first Darkhast was pending and attachment of the plot of land in dispute was subsisting, on 20th February 1955 the plaintiff purchased this plot from sale-deed, Ex. 45. A few days before the execution of this sale-deed, on 17th January 1955 defendant No. 1 had applied for injunction against defendant land privately. This injunction was served both on defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on 18th January 1955. On 25th June 1961 after the suit plot came to be purchased by defendant No. 1 the plaintiff applied under Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. for raising the attachment, but the application was dismissed on 5th October 1961. He, therefore, filed the present suit on 4th September 1962.

"Where an attachment has been made any private transfer or delivery of the property attachment or of any interest therein and any payment to the judgment-debtor of any debt, dividend or other monies contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section, claims enforceable under an attachment include claims for the ratable distribution of assets."

It is material to note that Section 64 C.P.C. therefore contemplates only one attachment and no other. Once an attachment is made, if there is any transfer or delivery of attachment property contrary to such attachment, such a transfer would be void as against all claims enforceable under that attachment. The word "attachment" occurs thrice in this provision. Where it occurs first, it is "an attachment". where it comes for the second time it is "such attachment" and where we read it for the third time, it is "the attachment". Obviously, therefore, the attachment, during the subsistence of which the transfer is effected or delivery of property is made must be the same attachment under which all claims of the attaching creditor are enforceable. If, therefore, at the time of enforcement of the claim the attachment under which the claim is enforced is different from any earlier attachment then obviously the attaching creditor cannot take advantage of the earlier attachment, particularly when such an attachment has already ceased to exist for one reason or the other. In the instant case, therefore, as we have already pointed out the first attachment came to an end on 4th July 1956 when the first Darkhast was disposed of. It was precisely for this reason or the other. In the instant case, therefore as we have already pointed out the first attachment came to an end on 4th July 1956 when the first Darkhast was disposed of. It was precisely for this reason that defendant No. 1 had to this reason that defendant in Regular Darkhast No. 630 of 1959 when the first Darkhast was disposed of. It was precisely for this reason that defendant No. 1 had to this reason that defendant No. 1 had to levy fresh attachment in Regular Darkhasts No. 630 of 1959 which was filed on 29th December 1959, without there being any attachment levied on the suit plot. Not only this, but defendant No. 1 enforced his claim by bringing the suit plot to sale and purchased it himself in pursuance of the subsequent attachment and not the first attachment. That being so, on the reading of Section 64 C.P.C. itself, we are inclined to take the view that the first attachment which came to an end on 4th July 1956 cannot be availed of by defendant No. 1 even though during the subsistence of that attachment the plaintiff purchased the suit plot from defendant No.2 on 20th February 1955. We are fortified in this view by several decisions of different High Courts. However, we are not pointed out any decision of our High Court bearing on the point. Before we deal with several decisions of while to refer to a decision of our High Court to which our attention is drawn by the learned Counsel for the appellant.