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6. Shri O.P. Goel, Senior Advocate, learned Counsel for the Management Corporation, submitted that the Labour Court, without properly considering the pleas raised and the evidence led by the Management Corporation, has recorded a wrong finding that the workmen were the direct employees of the Management Corporation and their services were wrongly terminated by it, in violation of the provision of Section 25F of the Act. Learned Counsel submitted that while coming to the said conclusion, the Labour Court has totally ignored the documentary as well as the oral evidence led by the Management Corporation. In this regard, he submitted that the Labour Court has completely ignored the facts that the Dhand Buffer Godown, where the workmen were engaged as Security Guards through the labour contractor-respondent No. 3, was not a prohibited Centre as in the notification dated 29.11.1985 (Annexure P-1) issued by the appropriate Government, Dhand Depot does not figure in the list of prohibited Centers. According to the learned Counsel, the Labour Court has also totally ignored the fact that The Management Corporation duly got itself registered with the Labour Department under Section 7 of the CLRA Act vide Certificate of Registration dated 4.7.1988 (Annexure P-2). The said registration permits the Management Corporation to engage contract labour for their deployment at the non-prohibited Centre. Learned Counsel for the Management Corporation further submitted that the Labour Court has also ignored the fact that respondent No. 3, the labour contractor, was also having a licence under Section 12 of the CLRA Act to provide contract labour services to an establishment, which was not a prohibited establishment establishment for employment of contract labour. He further submitted that the Labour Court has totally misinterpreted the agreement dated 3.1.1986 (Annexure P-4) entered into between the Management Corporation and respondent No. 3 for supplying Security Guards for deployment at the non-prohibited Centers of the Management Corporation. The terms and conditions of the said agreement provide that the payment on account of such supply of security guards will be made to the Security Services. The Security Guards will be employees of the Security Services and they will not be entitled to any benefit of the Corporation and the Security Services will be their principal employer. It was also agreed that the Security Guards, as provided by the Security Services, will be posted in depot and they will obey the instructions of the Depot In-charge. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Labour Court has completely ignored the appointment letters issued by respondent No. 3 to the workmen, vide which they were also directed to report for duty to Assistant Manager (Depot). In the said appointment letters, it was categorically stated that respondent No. 3 reserves the right to terminate the services of the Security Guards at any time without giving any notice or reason. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Labour Court has also completely ignored the statement made by the workmen in their cross-examination, where they admitted that the Management Corporation has never issued any appointment letter to them. He further submitted that the Labour Court has also totally ignored the statement of Shri Mohan Lal Jindal, who has categorically stated that the workman were employed by respondent No. 3 in pursuance of the agreement dated 3.1.986 (Annexure P-4) and thereafter, they were deputed to work as Security Guards at Buffer Godown, Dhand (Kurukshetra). The said witness was not cross-examined by counsel for the workmen on the said point. Learned Counsel submitted that the Labour Court, while ignoring the documentary evidence as well as the oral evidence led by the Management Corporation, has recorded the aforesaid finding merely on the basis of conjectures and the wrong inference drawn on account of non-production of the record pertaining to the contract employment and the fact that the presence of the workmen was marked in the log book maintained by the management Corporation. Learned Counsel submitted that the timings of opening and closing of Godown are required to be maintained in the Log Book, therefore, it was signed by the Security Guard at his duty. Merely by signing of their arrival and departure in the Duty Register will not confer upon the workmen the status of permanent employee of the Management Corporation. Learned Counsel submitted that the Labour Court has completely ignored a decision of the Division bench of this Court in Gian Singh v. Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, Punjab Region, Chandigarh , which provides that in absence of a notification by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, prohibiting the employment of the contract labour in particular Godowns or Depots, the Food Corporation of India can employ contract labour and the persons so employed would remain the employees of the contractor and not of the Corporation. Learned Counsel submitted that the Awards made by the Labour Court are liable to be quashed, as on the face of the record of the case, the Labour Court has recorded the finding while refusing to admit the admissible and material evidence and while recording the finding merely on the basis of conjectures.

We have gone through the decisions of this Court in V.S.T. Industries case (supra), G.B. Pant University's case (supra) and Mohammed Aslam's case (supra). All of them relate to statutory liability to maintain the canteen by the principal employer in the factory/establishment. That is why in those cases, as in The Saraspur Mills' case (supra), the contract labourer working in the canteen were treated as workers of the principal employer. These cases stand on a different footing and it is not possible to deduce from them the broad principle of law that on the contract labour system being abolished under Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the CLRA Act the contract labourer working in the establishment of the principal employer has to be absorbed as regular employees of the establishment.

103. An analysis of the case discussed above, shows that they fall in three classes; (i) where contract labourer is engaged in or in connection with the work of an establishment and employment of contract labour is prohibited either because the Industrial adjudicator/court ordered abolition of contract labour or because the appropriate government issued notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, no automatic absorption of the contract labourer working in the establishment was ordered; (ii) where the contract was found to be sham and nominal rather a camouflage in which case the contract labourer working the establishment of the principal employer was held, in tact and in reality, the employees of the principal employer himself. Indeed, such cases do not relate to abolition of contract labour but present instances wherein the court pierced the veil and declared the correct position as a fact at the stage after employment of contract labour stood prohibited; (iii) where in discharge of a statutory obligation of maintaining canteen in an establishment the principal employer availed the services of a contractor and the courts have held that the contract labourer would indeed be the employees of the principal employer.

In my opinion, the aforesaid observations do not advance the case of the workmen. If an industrial establishment is permitted to employ contract labourer through a contractor, engaging of such contract labour must be bonafide. In case it is found that engaging of contract labour was not bonafide and it was a mere camouflage then in those cases, the contract labour employed by the principal employer is to be treated as employee of the principal employer, who can be directed to regularise service of the contract labour in the concerned establishment. This is not the case of the workmen here. It is not the case of the workmen either in the pleading or during the course of arguments that their engagement through contract labour was not bonafide and it was a mere camouflage. Rather their case is that they were directly employed by the Management Corporation. Therefore, no benefit can be given to the workmen on the basis of the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court.