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The issue came up for consideration before a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Indu Tiwari vs. Ram Bahadur Chaudhari and others, AIR 1981 Allahabad 309 wherein it was observed :

"It is well settled that the matter of contempt is always an issue between the court and the contemner. No right vests in a private party to get any person punished for contempt. He can only inform the Court of the contempt committed by any person and thereafter it is for the Court to deal with the contemner. The party which informs the Court about the alleged contempt can only assist the Court in coming to the conclusion whether any contempt has been committed or not. As opposed to this, if a person obtains in interim injunction or a final decree for injunction, he gets a right to enforce it. The provision for enforcement of an interim injunction is contained in Order XXXIX Rule2-A, Civil P.C. and the provision for enforcement of a decree for injunction is contained in Order XXI, Rule 32, Civil P.C. According to the said provision, a person who disobeys an injunction order can be put into prison and his property can also be attached. The attachment can continue for one year and if the party against whom the order or decree is passed refused to comply, the property can even be sold.The orders passed in proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A as well as the orders passed in execution proceedings under Order XXI. Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure are appealable orders. Further the proceedings under Order Order XXXIX Rule 2-A as well as execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 32 are elaborate proceedings in which the parties can adduce their evidence and they can examine and cross-examine the witnesses. As opposed to this this, the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are of summary nature. In my opinion, a person who has got an effective alternative remedy of the nature specified under Order XXXIX, Rule 2-A or under Order XXI, Rule 32, Civil P.C.should not be permitted to skip over that remedy and take resort to initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. The least that can be said is that it would not be a proper exercise of discretion on the part of this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act when such an effective and alternative remedy is available to any person. I am fortified in taking this view by the observations made in Ram Rup Pandey v. R.K. Bhargava, (AIR 1971 All 231) and Calcutta Medical Stores v. Stadmed Private Ltd., ((1977) 81 Cal WN 209). Relying on these two decisions I myself took the same view recently in Abdul Sattar v. Hira Lal (Civil Misc. Contempt Case No. 96 of 1979 decided on 20-2-1981)."

Again in the case of of S.G. Pagaree vs. Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India, New Delhi and others, reported in 1987 Vol. I AWC 506, it has been observed in paragraph 9 as under :

"The contempt petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on facts for the reasons given above, but before taking leave of the matter I would like to observe that the petitioner had effective alternative remedy of the nature specified under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the CPC and should not be permitted to skip over that remedy and take resort to initiate the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. In Smt. Indu Tewari v. Ram Bahadur Choudhary, 1981 AWC 521 it has been held that under such circumstances it would not be a proper exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act when such an effective and alternative remedy is available to any person. Same view has been taken in Anis Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P., 1985 AWC 25."

In the case of Savitri Devi (Smt.) v. Civil Judge (Junior Division), Gorakhpur and others, reported in 2003 Vol. I ARC 545, while considering the scope of Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 C.P.C. vis-a-vis Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it has been held as under :

"Thus, it is evident from the above discussion that the proceedings are analogous to the proceedings under the Act, 1972. The only distinction is that as the Legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted a special provision enacting the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, it would prevail over the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Though the High Court, by virtue of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, 1972 can initiate the contempt proceeding even for disobedience of the injunction order granted by the Civil Court, but the exercise of such power is discretionary and generally does not require to be exercised in view of the special power conferred upon the Civil Court itself as held by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Dr. Bimal Chandra Sen v. Mrs. Kamla Mathur, 1983 Cri.L.J. 494."
In the case of Food Corporation of India Vs. Sukh Deo Prasad 2009(3) SC 2330 and Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power exercised by a Court under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and such powers are to be exercised with great caution and responsibility and in case a final order order the decree lies in execution and not in an action of contempt or disobedience and in case of breach of temporary injunction, the remedy is available under Order XXXIX Rule 2A which is punitive nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under 1971 Act.