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Permitted increases are specified in Sections 8(2), 9, 10, 10A, 10-AA, 10-C, 10-CC and 10-D. Under Section 10 it is in terms provided that where a landlord is required to pay to a local authority in respect of any premises any rate, cess or tax imposed or levied for the purposes of such authority he shall be entitled to make an increase in the rent of the premises by an amount not exceeding the increase paid by him by way of such rate, cess or tax over the amount paid in the period of assessment which included the date of the coming into operation of this Act or the date on which the premises were first let, whichever is later, and such increase in rent shall not be deemed to be an increase for the purposes of Section 7. Section 10A is for increase in Tent on account of payment of increased rates etc. after 31st March 1949 not permitted in certain areas. Section 10-AA deals with increase in rent on account of pay-merit of increased rates etc. permitted after certain date in certain areas. Sections 10-C and 10-D are for permitted increases included on account of repairs and Section 10-CC is increase for Tent of premises used for Cinema in Saurashtra and Kutch areas and former Baroda territory. And finally, Section 10-E is for increase in rent on account of payment of increased ground rent, N. A. assessment or any other tax imposed by the State Government and the landlord is entitled to make an increase in the rent of the premises by an amount not exceeding the increase paid by him by way of such ground-rent, N. A. assessment or tax, as the case may be. The amount of such increase in rent to be recovered from the tenant shall bear the same proportion as the rent payable by him in respect of his premises bears to the total amount of rent recoverable for the whole of the premises, if let, and any such increase is not to be deemed to be an increase for the purpose of Section 7. These control provisions make it in terms clear that what is legally recoverable is not contractual rent. The contractual rent may be in excess of the standard rent in some cases, and because of the bar of Section 7 only the standard rent and permitted increases are legally recoverable in such cases, and if only arrears of such standard rent or permitted increases are for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof, then the question of gross default under See. 12 (3) (a) arises. Therefore, in the entire context of setting of this relevant scheme, and looking to the intrinsic evidence furnished by Section 12(3)(a), the term "rent", payable by month, in the first condition could only have the wider meaning of realisable contractual or standard rent and permitted increases lawfully recoverable under the Act and it could never have the narrower meaning of mere contractual rent as is assumed by the learned single judge. If we now turn to the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Education Cess Act, 1962, hereinafter referred to as "the Cess Act", it would be amply clear that the education cess to the extent of one half, if it has been actually paid by the landlord is ordinarily recoverable from the tenant under Section 19(1) in absence of an agreement to the effect that the landlord was alone to bear this tax. Section 2(iv) of this Act defines education cess to be a surcharge or tax on lands and buildings which is levied under the Act. Section 3(b) enacts that for the purpose of providing for the cost of promoting education in the State, there shall be levied and collected in accordance with the provisions of the Act an education cess which shall consist of-4b) a tax on lands and buildings in urban areas Rajkot is an urban area. Under Section 12(1) rates have been prescribed for this particular tax on lands and buildings with effect from April 1, 1970. Under Section 14(1) where the actual occupier of any land or building is the owner thereof, tax is leviable primarily on such occupier and under SectiQn 14(2)(a) in any other case, the said tax shall be leviable primarily if the land or building is let, upon the lessor. Therefore, the primary liability for this education cess is of the landlord, Under Section 12(2)(a) when the building in question has been let to a tenant, Section 17 provides for such education cess tax to be first charge on land and building on which it is leviable notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding any rights arising out of any contract or otherwise. Under Section 18 on the failure to recover any sum due on account of tax from the person primarily liable therefore, this tax can be recovered from the occupier of any part of the land or building in respect of which the tax is due. Such portion thereof as bears to the total amount of the tax due the same ratio which the rent annually payable by such occupier bears to the aggregate amount of the annual letting value thereof. Section 19 which is material runs as under:-

6. There could be no dispute that under Section 28(1), the Court provided under the Rent Act only has jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit Qr proceeding between a landlord or tenant relating to the recovery of rent and to deal with claims and questions arising out of the Rent Act. That is why the Court empowered under See. 28 (1) is a special forum contemplated under Section 21 of the Cess Act. In Khemchand Dayalji v. Mahomedbhai Chandbhai, AIR 1970 SC 102, even in the context of distress for the rent, it is held that this Court under Section 28(1) can issue a distress warrant. At page 103 it is also pointed out by express terms that the tenant also had undertaken to pay municipal taxes and charges as part of the rent and it could not be argued that it was not rent recoverable by issue of a distress warrant. Therefore, whatever formed part of the rent, whether under the terms of the tenancy, or by way of lawfully recoverable standard rent or permitted increases under this rent control measure, can be recovered through the Court created under Section 28(1) and even distress warrant for such rent can be available and it is this right and remedy which is contemplated under Section 21 of the Cess Act in respect of this education cess amount recoverable by the landlord from the tenant as if it was rent payable by the tenant to such landlord.,

(iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof.

but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or lodging house. In Karani Properties Ltd. v. Miss Augustine, AIR 1957 SC 309, in the context of a similar Rent Control measure of West Bengal where the definition of 'premises' was equally wide, after considering various English decisions it had been held that the term rent was comprehensive enough to include all payments agreed to be paid to the landlord for the use and occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishings, electric installations and other amenities agreed between the parties to be provided by and at the cost of the landlord Therefore, all that was included in the term "rent" was within the purview of the Act and the Rent Controller and the other authorities had the power to control the entire rent in this widest sense. That is why it was further held that while determining the standard rent all constituents which made up the total sum shown in the agreement as a monthly rent can be taken into account including the municipal taxes, electric charges as also Government duty which had been increased on the consumption of electric power and the cost of providing other amenities and services. Therefore, the aforesaid settled legal position is to treat the rent in the context of such rent control measure not only as a merely realisable contractual rent but in the more comprehensive sense so that all such permitted increases and the standard rent which is made lawfully recoverable under such control measure form part of the term 'rent' and that is the context in which Section 12(3)(a) has used the term 'rent' in the first condition required to be fulfilled. Therefore, we agree with the aforesaid view which is taken by Bal J., of the Maharashtra High Court in Sint. Muktabai Gangadhar v. Sint. Muktabai Laxman, (1969) 711 Bom LR 752, where also the education cess was treated as a part of the rent and the' view taken by J. M. Sheth J. in Vanlila Vadilal v. Mahendra Kumar, 16 Guj LR 71=(AIR 1975 Guj 163), where the education, cess levied under the Cess Act was held to be forming a part of the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord even when the cess became payable not by virtue of an agreement between landlord and tenant but as a result of the permitted increases under the statutory right conferred under Section 19(1) of the Cess Act.

9. Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Sompura sought to make a futile distinction on the ground that this right to recover this sum by way of education cess under Section 19(1) was an independent right which accrued only when the payment was first made by the landlord to the local authority and, therefore, it could not be treated as permitted increases for the purpose of the Rent Act. If it was not permitted increases. Section 7 would have barred such recovery and that is why the Legislature had to enact Section 19(3) that the recovery of this amount from the tenant under Section 19(1) was not to be deemed an increase for the purpose of Section 7 of the Rent Act or any corresponding law. Equally, there is no substance in the contention that Section 21 created a fiction only for recovery of said amount by proceeding in a Civil Court when the fiction is that the recovery shall be in the same way as rent payable by tenant to the landlord and which could only be under Section 28 of the Rent Act or by distress warrant as a remedy for the same also from the same Court as per the settled legal position. Even Section 22 could never be urged because as earlier explained this provision has been introduced so that no difficulty may arise of the vicious cycle by treating this cess as a part of the rent so as to be included in the annual letting value on the footing of realisable rent which had been experienced in the aforesaid decision in the Bombay Municipal Corporation case where the cess was levied under S. 140 of the Corporation Act and was treated as a permitted increase by the Supreme Court under Section 10-AA of the Rent Act. So far as the Gujarat Cess Act is concerned, specific provision is made for treating it as permitted increases under Section 19(3) and so this comprehensive scheme under Sections 21 and 22 has been enacted which on the contrary clinches the issue of this being permitted increase which always forms part of the rent as per the settled legal position. Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Sompura pressed in aid the decision by the learned Single judge in Nathusing v. Raval Markandrai, 1973 Ren CJ 276 (Guj), where Section 10 was interpreted by construing the phrase "over amount paid7 as emphasising the fact that there must be existing liability of payment of rate, cess or tax during the prescribed period which liability may have been increased subsequently. The word 'increase' is very suggestive of the fact that the legislature provided for passing on the burden of an increase in the existing liability of the landlord in respect of the rate, cess or tax of the tenant, Where, therefore, there was no liability on the landlord to pay any rate, cess or tax, no question of increase in the liability arises and if there is no increase, the question of liability c6utemplated by Section 10 of the Act in respect of the said cess is not applicable. It is not necessary for us to consider the correctness of this view but the fact remains that the legislature has contemplated this contingency while conferring right of recovery under Section 19 that no such recovery shall be made in respect of any tenement the tax on which by the terms of the tenancy, the landlord would agree to pay for his occupier. It is only when the landlord had to pay this additional tax in the shape of education cess and there was no such agreement as indicated by Section 19(2)(b), that the proviso (b) with this specific right of recovery by passing on the burden to the tenant had been enacted and that is why it was made a permitted increase. Finally, it was argued that this construction would make Section 12(3)(a) otiose. The very proviso (b) furnishes a complete answer. If the landlords wanted to exercise this right under, Section 12(3)(a) without any such restriction of fulfilling the first condition of the rent being payable by the month, they should enter into such agreement of tenancy under which the liability to pay education cess would be borne by the landlords and in which event no such question would arise of recovery of this permitted increase. Therefore, Section 12(3)(a) could never be said to be otiose in the circumstances of the case. Therefore, no ground whatever has been made out which would justify a different view being taken from one which is taken by J. M, Sheth J. in Vanlila Vadilal v. Mahendrakumar 16 Cuj LR 71 = (AIR 1975 Guj 163), and which view was also taken in the Maharashtra State on the similar scheme of legislation. We would, therefore, answer the question referred by holding that even in the absence of a contract between the landlord and tenant as regards payment of education cess, the education cess would form part of the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord so as to enable the Court to decide under Section 12(3)(a) that the said rent was not payable by the month and, therefore, in the facts of the, present case Section 12(3)(a) would not be attracted and the case would fall into any other case under Section 12(3)(b). It is on this footing that the matter shall go back to the learned Single judge for further disposal. The Reference is accordingly disposed firmed by the of with no order.