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On a close scrutiny of the above provision, it can be seen that dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation is the pivotal point to be established for attracting the criminal misconduct enumerated in the Section. From the above discussion, it is discernible that the prosecution has to specifically allege and prove the dishonest and fraudulent intention of the appellant in order to attract all the offences involved in this case. In otherwords, without alleging and proving the dishonest or fraudulent intention of the appellant, the prosecution cannot succeed in this case. In this backdrop, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that without condoning delay in filing the final report by invoking power under Section 473 Cr.P.C., the trial court wrongly took cognizance of all the offences, including those under Sections 465 and 471 IPC, and evidence was allowed to be let in, causing substantial prejudice to the appellant. It is forcefully submitted by the learned counsel that if the accused is tried for offences barred by limitation along with other offences which are not so barred, then the whole trial will be vitiated. Further, it is argued that without charging the accused and proving his guilt under Sections 465 and 471 IPC, the alleged dishonest or fraudulent intention of the appellant, which is a concomitant for finding him guilty under Sections 409 and 477A IPC and Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act cannot be proved by the prosecution. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the offences under Sections 409 and 477A IPC and Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act are not cognate offences of Sections 465 and 471 IPC. According to the learned counsel, without taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC, it is not possible to maintain a charge and prove other offences, viz., those under Sections 409 and 477A IPC and Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. It is pertinent to note that either dishonesty or fraud is an essential ingredient in each of the offence charged on the appellant. Same set of evidence touching upon dishonesty and/or fraud adduced in this case was used to convict the appellant for all the offences, including the time barred ones under Sections 465 and 471 IPC. It is true that evidence in this case relating to all the offences is so mixed up that it cannot be separated. Stated differently, the evidence adduced by the prosecution cannot be put in definite compartments so as to apply one set of it to the offences barred by limitation and the other to the offences not so barred. Hence the composite trial of the accused for offences barred and not barred by limitation certainly had caused prejudice to the accused. All the more, it goes to the root of the legality of the trial. Hence I find that the contention of the appellant that he suffered prejudice on conviction on account of adduction of evidence against him, even in respect of time barred offences, is sustainable.

15. A question may arise whether the exercise of power under Section 473 Cr.P.C. must precede the act of taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. On a reading of Section 473 Cr.P.C. it is evident that it confers power on the court for taking cognizance of an offence, even after expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. The Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt and another (AIR 2000 SC 297) considered the scope and ambit of the power of the court to take cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of limitation. It is evident from the above Section itself that the court is bestowed with a wide discretion; of course, it must be exercised with great care and circumspection to meet the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in the above decision held that it must be exercised by a speaking order. Following quotation from the decision will be useful for our purpose:

16. If one reads Section 473 Cr.P.C. carefully, it can be seen that condonation of delay by the court should precede the taking of cognizance. In other words, after taking cognizance of an offence, which is barred under Section 468 Cr.P.C., the court cannot retrace its steps and condone the delay at a post cognizance stage. In the instant case, there is no dispute that there was no speaking order by the trial Judge under Section 473 Cr.P.C. condoning delay in taking cognizance for offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC. As mentioned earlier, the trial Judge is not legally competent to condone the delay in taking cognizance in respect of offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC after taking cognizance of all the offences, including the above mentioned offences. The learned trial Judge before taking cognizance must have applied his mind as required under Section 473 Cr.P.C. and should have condoned the delay in respect of offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC. It is also indisputable that there should have been a speaking order for condoning delay before taking cognizance. Non-compliance of the mandatory requirements certainly makes the cognizance bad in law. An option available for the trial Judge was to leave alone the offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC and take cognizance for other offences which were not barred by the provisions of Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. But that will surely affect the strength of the prosecution case in view of the fact situation in this case. As stated above, the learned trial Judge without any application of judicial mind took cognizance of all the offences, including the time barred ones, and permitted the prosecution to adduce evidence on all the charges, causing serious prejudice to the appellant, because the essential ingredients for attracting the barred offences and other offences are identical.

17. Now the question for determination is whether non-exercise of power under Section 473 Cr.P.C. vitiates the process of taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that non-exercise of power by the court under Section 473 Cr.P.C. vitiates the entire trial rendering the same non est, notwithstanding that no limitation is prescribed for some of the charged offences. In order to support this contention, a decision of the Andra Pradesh High Court in Ch.Narender Reddy v. State of A.P. (2000 Cri.L.J. 4068) is relied on. The facts in that case are different from those in this case. It is true that the pre-requisites for attracting offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC are similar to those offences for which no period of limitation is prescribed by law. But, non-exercise of power under Section 473 Cr.P.C. by the learned trial Judge coupled with the absence of a speaking order condoning the delay before taking cognizance seriously affected the substratum of the prosecution case. Considering the facts in this case, I am of the view that the evidence adduced, especially relating to the dishonest or fraudulent intention of the appellant, are common to all the offences. The contention raised by the appellant that he was put to prejudice by allowing the prosecution to lead evidence in respect of time barred offences in the same trial with other offences and the same was used against him even in respect of other offences, thereby causing prejudice to him is to be accepted. Therefore, I am of the view that the prosecution case is not legally sustainable in view of the bar of limitation in taking cognizance of some of the offences and also for the reason that the trial court did not exercise its power under Section 473 Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance.