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6. It is submitted that starting in 2018, the respondents began defaulting on repayment obligations under the Loan Agreement. As a result, on 15.11.2018, the petitioner issued a loan recall and arbitration invocation notice, and initiated arbitration proceedings by unilaterally appointing an Arbitrator. The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted in January 2019. Although respondents challenged the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator by moving an application under Sections 12 and 13 of the A&C Act, the objection was dismissed by the arbitrator.

21. At last it is submitted that the present application is well within the limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. Moreover it is submitted that the present invocation of arbitration is based on a separate and distinct cause of action. The earlier invocation related to the entire outstanding financial facilities, whereas post-termination of the earlier arbitration, the petitioner exercised its rights under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The secured asset was sold on 07.10.2021, and the remaining outstanding dues after such sale gave rise to the current dispute. Consequently, a fresh notice invoking arbitration was issued on 15.01.2024, and the present Section 11 petition followed. Therefore, this invocation is based on a fresh dispute and a distinct cause of action, and is not time- barred.

28. Even in HPCL Biofuels (supra), the Court clarified that a second invocation is barred only if the earlier application was based on the same cause of action and withdrawn without liberty. However, if a fresh cause of action arises subsequently, the arbitration clause can be re-invoked. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under -

"52. One important aspect that needs to be kept in mind while applying the principles of Order 23 Rule 1 to applications under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 is that it will act as a bar to only those applications which are filed subsequent to the withdrawal of a previous Section 11(6) application filed on the basis of the same cause of action. The extension of the aforesaid principle cannot be construed to mean that it bars invocation of the same arbitration clause on more than one occasion. It is possible that certain claims or disputes may arise between the parties after a tribunal has already been appointed in furtherance of an application under Section 11(6). In such a scenario, a party cannot be precluded from invoking the arbitration clause only on the ground that it had previously invoked the same arbitration clause. If the cause of action for invoking subsequent arbitration has arisen after the invocation of the first arbitration, then the application for appointment of arbitrator cannot be rejected on the ground of multiplicity alone."

34. The judgment in ANTRIX Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Devas Multimedia Pvt. Ltd. (supra), as relied upon by respondent no. 4, is clearly distinguishable on facts. In ANTRIX, the issue pertained to repeated invocation of arbitration on the same cause of action. In contrast, the central contention of the petitioner in the present case is that a fresh and independent cause of action has arisen, thereby justifying a second invocation of the arbitration clause.