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6. Dr. Kulkarni appearing on behalf of the petitioner-workman, submitted that in not allowing the petitioner to be defended by Talreja, at the domestic inquiry, who was an officer-bearer of an union of which the petitioner was a member, principles of natural justice were violated in the conduct of the domestic inquiry and that is how the third respondent committed unfair labour practice covered by Item 1(f) of the Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The submission of the learned Counsel is that under Section 22(ii) of the MRTU and PULP Act, the petitioner had a right to be represented by a member of an unrecognized union at the domestic inquiry, the said union not functioning in the Undertaking of the company notwithstanding.

7. Controverting these arguments Mr. Rele, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the third respondent-company, submitted that under Section 22(ii) of the MRTU and PULP Act, the petitioner had no right to be represented by Talreja at the domestic inquiry as he was an outsider vis-a-vis the understating of the third respondent and the said Talreja was not even a member of an unrecognised union functioning in the undertaking of the company. The submission of the learned Counsel is that the correct interpretation of the provisions of Section 22(ii) of the MRTU and PULP Act is that at the domestic inquiry, a workman should be represented only by an office-bearer, member of the officer staff and member of any union (other than the recognised union) who may be authorised by or under the rules made in this behalf by the State Government and by nobody else and since Talreja was neither an office-bearer or a member of unrecognised union operating in the undertaking of the third respondent and was not authorised by or under any rules made in that behalf by the State Government, he was rightly not allowed to represent the petitioner at the domestic inquiry. Thus, Mr. Rele submitted that neither the judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Judge nor the one passed by the learned Member of the Industrial Court suffer from error apparent on the face of the record and this Court while exercising supervisory writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution need not interfere with those judgments and orders.

(i) to meet and discuss with an employer or any person appointed by him in that behalf, the grievances of any individual member relating to his discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service and suspension;
(iii) to appear on behalf of any of its members employed in the undertaking in any domestic or departmental inquiry held by the employer."

Thus Section 22 of the MRTU and PULP Act gives rights to an unrecognised union viz. (1) to meet and discuss with an employer or any person appointed by him in that behalf the grievance of any individual member relating to his discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service and suspension and (ii) to appear on behalf of any of its members employed in the undertaking in any domestic or departmental inquiry. These are the rights given to an unrecognised union, but that is not say that a particular employee of an undertaking has no right to be defended by a person of his choice at the domestic inquiry. As rightly tended by Mr. Rele such a right of an employee could be had from the provisions of the certified or Model Standing Orders and admittedly in this case, as per the certified Standing Orders, the petitioner could be represented by a co-workmen at the domestic inquiry. But that, however is not to say that he could be represented as the domestic inquiry by a co-workmen and co-workmen alone and nobody else. A co-workmen may be as incompetent as the delinquent workman himself and in that case if the delinquent workmen is not permitted to be represented by a competent person at the domestic inquiry, the interests of justice may suffer. Of course it is not the case of the petitioner here that the third respondent was represented by a person much more qualified and competent than any of his co-workmen and, therefore, he should be allowed to be represented by Talreja who was according to him, as complement as the representative of the Company. But as was held by a Division Bench of this Court inn Ghatge Patil Transport Pvt. Ltd. v. B. K. Etale and others (1984-II-LLJ-121) apart from the provisions of law (Standing orders in our case) if it one of the basic principles of natural justice that the inquiry should be fair and impartial. And for the purpose of the domestic inquiry to be fair and impartial, it is very much necessary that the delinquent workman be allowed to be represented by a person of his choice and if an employee is refused such a fair opportunity of putting forward his case by a representative of his choice, even if the representative is an outsider, it could be well said that the principles of natural justice were violated. There is nothing in Section 22 of the MRTU and PULP Act to deny such a basic and fundamental right to a workman. Section 22 of only provides for the rights of an unrecognised union. The Inquiry Officer in our case therefore, violated the principles of natural justice in not allowing the petitioner to be defended by Talreja. If he was allowed to be defended by Talreja, no prejudice would have been caused to the third respondent.

9. Now, it is a general unfair labour practice on the part of an employer to discharge or dismiss an employee in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic inquiry under Item 1(f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. Thus, in not allowing the petitioner to be defended by Talreja at the domestic inquiry and dismissing him on the report of the Inquiry Officer, the third respondent committed unfair labour practice covered by Item 1(f) of the Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. The learned Labour Judge and the learned Member of the Industrial Court were, therefore, not correct in coming to the conclusion that in not allowing the petitioner to be defended by Talreja at the domestic inquiry, principles of natural justice were not violated and the third respondent is not commit any unfair labour practice. The imagined judgments and orders passed by the learned Judge of the Labour Court and the learned Member of the Industrial Court, therefore, suffer from this grave legal error which is apparent on the face of the record.