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7. Elaborate argument was advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner with regard to the power of the Labour Court under Section 11 -A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), Section 11 -A of the Act is as follows:

11-A: Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen: Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:
The learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent refers to a recent decision of a Division Bench of the Court in Management of Binny v. Additional Labour Court, Madras (1979)2 L.L.J. 280, where the order of the tribunal modifying the punishment under Section 11-A, after finding that the dismissal was based on a properly conducted enquiry, as one of reinstatement without continuity of service and backwages, was upheld by this Court. In that case the court found that the charges levelled against the workman was one of theft of certain articles and the charge has been duly found proved by the Labour Court. The Labour Court, however, set aside the order of dismissal passed by the management and ordered reinstatement of the workmen on the ground that the workman concerned has put in 11 years of service without any blemish and, therefore, he may be reinstated without continuity of service and without back wages. The said order was upheld by this Court on the ground that Section 11 -A confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court to set aside the order of dismissal and to direct reinstatement of the workman on such conditions and terms as the Labour Court deemed fit, and that the Labour Court has not exercised its discretion arbitrarily in that case. According to the learned Judges the workman was not found guilty of a similar misconduct or any other misconduct during his 11 years of service under the management and that important factor has weighed very much with the Labour Court in the course of exercising its discretion under Section 11 -A. We do not understand the said decision as saying that the number of years of service should be taken as a relevant criterion for modifying the punishment or showing leniency in the matter of punishment. The Labour Court as well as the learned Judges in that case has referred to the fact that the past conduct of the workman during the 11 years of his service has been without any blemish, and, therefore, the Labour Court's discretion can be exercised to show some leniency. As a matter of fact in that case that past conduct of the workman has been taken to be a relevant factor. If that is the principle laid down in that case then we do not see how that decision will help the 2nd respondent in this case. His past conduct has been found by the Labour Court to be blame-worthy and the Labour Court specifically says that if his past conduct were to be taken into account, the punishment imposed by the management cannot be interfered with. If past conduct is a relevant criterion in finding out whether the punishment is proportionate to the charges, then the Labour Court in this case is not justified in setting aside the order of dismissal and ordering reinstatement ignoring the past conduct of the 2nd respondent which had been taken into account by the management while imposition of the penalty. We are not in a position to say that in this case, the Labour Court has exercised its discretion judicially. The Labour Court has ignored the serious nature of the charges and proceeded to direct reinstatement without continuity of service and back wages, without considering the question as to whether reinstatement is expedient and proper in the circumstances of the case. As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. I.T.C. Workmen (1969)2 L.L.J. 755 the expression "misconduct" covers a large area of human conduct, a distinction should be made between technical misconduct which leaves no trial of in discipline and misconduct resulting in damage of employer's property and serious misconduct such as acts of violence against the management or other employees or riotous or disorderly behaviours to grave in discipline. Therefore, it is not possible to treat all cases of misconduct alike. The nature and the quantum of punishment have, therefore, to depend on the nature of the charges. In this case the charge proved, is one of gross indiscipline and with reference to such a charge, the order of dismissal cannot be taken to be unjustified as has been held by the Labour Court.
It is clear that the power under Section 11-A of the Act has to be exercised judicially and the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is expected to interfere with the decision of the management under Section 11-A only if it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. In our case, the Labour Court after considering the nature of the proved charges, unblemished service for a period of 19 years thought that lesser punishment would be sufficient; accordingly modified the punishment of dismissal into reinstatement with 50 percent back wages.
Here again it is stated that the discretion conferred under Section 11-A of the Act has to be exercised judicially and judiciously and there should be sufficient indication in the order itself. In our case, the Labour Court has adduced sufficient reasons for modifying the punishment. The following passage in Dharmapuri District Co-operative Sugar Mills, Palacode v. Labour Court (1997)1 L.L.N. 391 is very much relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner:
An analysis of the above judgments the position that emerges is that the court should not entertain a misplaced sympathy towards a workman and should not prejudice the issue from the angle of rehabilitation. The question of rehabilitation and reformation could arise in a case of minor delinquency or misconduct. Where the charges are grave in nature, can the Labour Court exercising power under Section 11-A of the Act, impose on a management a workman whose presence is likely to affect the morale and discipline of the entire factory? Should the management be embarrassed by the reinstatement of such a workman by denying the managerial function to which a management is entitled to, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. In our opinion, the acceptance of such a proposition would only lead to interfering with the managerial function to the extent of destroying the discipline and control in the entire factory. We are clearly of the opinion that Section 11-A of the Act is not intended to embarrass the management to such extent. Section 11-A of the Act was introduced to obviate the difficulty felt by the Labour Courts, Tribunals, etc., in modifying the judgments of discharge or dismissal on flimsy grounds solely with a view to render justice to the parties. The Labour Courts and Tribunals cannot mechanically use the words "the punishment being disproportionate to the charges". As observed by the Supreme Court of India unless the Labour Court finds the punishment to be highly disproportionate to the charges, the Labour Court should not interfere. One other aspect of the case may also be noticed before dealing with the judgments cited by Sri N.G.R. Prasad. On the facts of this case, the Labour Court had set aside the domestic enquiry and proceed to take evidence. On the evidence the Labour Court has rendered certain findings, to which we have already made a reference. Having found the second respondent guilty of the charges, while exercising the function of imposing a punishment, the Labour Court is in fact in the position of management and the sentiments expressed by the management, when they terminated the services of the second respondent have to be kept in mind and we do not think that different principles will apply to the Labour Court while determining the punishment to be awarded to the guilty worker.