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He has thereafter invited our attention to S. 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Subsection (2) there of reads as under:-

"Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.)) Mr. Ravel has argued that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is a special law which prescribes the period of limitation for initiating proceedings under that Act. Therefore, according to him, the terms of sub-section (2) of S. 29 are satisfied. He has further argued that if the terms of sub-see. (2) of S. 29 are satisfied, then, S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the present proceedings and this court has jurisdiction to condone delay. The argument which Mr. Raval has raised has over-simplified the problem which we are required to answer. It cannot be gainsaid -that in relation to Limitation Act, 1963, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is a special law. The schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any limitation f3r initiating proceedings under the Contempt o Courts Act, 1971. S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 fills up the lacuna and prescribes a period of limitation. He has further argued that no provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 expressly excludes the application of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963. This argument which Mr. Raval has raised cannot be controverter and yet, we are unable to accede to the argument which he has raised. It is not mere express exclusion of Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which repels the applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Thus, apart from the express exclusion of Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive), which a special or local law may provide, it is also necessary to find out whether sub-section (2) of S. 29 is otherwise inherently applicable to a special or local law, in the instant case, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. If it is inherently not applicable, then, merely by virtue of the fact that a special law or local law does not exclude application of Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of Limitation Act, 1963, it cannot be applied.

(b) the High Court, to which it is subordinate."

S. 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act. 197r provides: -

"Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt's of itself."

It appears to us that whereas in the case of a criminal contempt, the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General has been given a statutory right to make a motion to the court for taking action against the contemner, no such statutory right has been conferred upon any one in respect of the civil contempt. However, in the case of a civil contempt, ordinarily a person who is aggrieved by such act of contempt brings it to the notice of the court. Such a person, in our opinion, is nothing more than a relator. He cannot be elevated to the status of a petitioner or an applicant who has a right to institute an action and seek decision of the court- in his favour. Therefore, the word 'Application' used in subsection (2) of S. 29 does not have any reference to the information which a person supplies to the court in regard to an act of civil contempt. He may call it an application or petition. He may call himself an applicant or a petitioner. But in substance and in reality, he is neither an applicant nor a petitioner nor is it an application nor petition properly so-called. The only status which he enjoys in such a case is that of an informant of relator and the status which the application or petition made by him enjoys is that of an information. Secondly, as we shall presently show, what S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides is not the period of limitation, as it is ordinarily understood. But it is a condition precedent to the exercise of Court's Power under that Act. R is wrong to say that it is a period of limitation in the context of which S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be attracted or can be resorted to.

11. Now, let us turn to S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It does not refer to the institution of any proceedings for contempt. The very fact that it does not refer- to the institution of any proceedings goes to suggest that no application or petition can be instituted in the true sense of the term for the purpose of taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. What See. 20 contemplates is initiation of proceedings for contempt. Such initiation may be on its own motion by the court or may be otherwise, that is to say on the information supplied by someone, in case of civil contempt; in the case of criminal contempt on the motion of the Advocate General or on the motion of someone else with the consent of the Advocate General in writing. Court can initiate proceedings. Initiation of proceedings, for civil contempt as well as for criminal contempt can be done by a court on its own motion in addition to what we have stated earlier. When the court takes action or takes the first step in that direction, it does not institute proceedings. Proceedings are instituted by a litigant and not by the court. A Court merely initiates proceedings. We, therefore, find that S. 20 is such that it does not contemplate institution of a petition or an application by a private individual for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It merely contemplates initiation of proceedings by a court on its own motion or otherwise. The fetter which S. 20 places on the jurisdiction of the court is that the court shall not initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiration of a period of one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. Since there is no application or petition before the court in such proceedings, the question of condoning delay does not arise. Delay can be condoned in a case where a person who has a right to institute action has approached the court after the expiry of the period of limitation. S. 20 does not contemplate such situation. When the Court initiates contempt proceedings on its own motion, the question of condoning delay does not arise. To illustrate, if the court initiates proceedings after the expiry of the one-year from the date on which the alleged contempt was committed, who has to pray for condoning delay? Who has to bring on record the circumstances under which delay was caused in initiating the proceedings or in other words, does the court condone delay caused by it in initiating proceedings against the alleged contemner under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? To say that the, court can condone its own delay is something which is beyond our comprehension so far as Section 20 is concerned. If the court has to condone its own delay, after trotting out reasons, the court shall be the prosecutor and the Judge in its own cause. That is not what S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act contemplates.

17. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a complete- code and excludes provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Bearing in mind this decision of the Supreme Court, we will examine the scheme of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and shall find out whether it is a complete code and whether it excludes the application of the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act.

18. It is necessary to note what difference the Parliament has made by repealing the earlier Contempt of Courts Act and enacting the present one. Whereas the contempt of court remained a live issue under the repealed Act until the contempt was purged, under the present Act, it remains a live issue only for a year from the date of its alleged commission and then becomes dead. Section 20 clearly brings out the Parliament's intention that the court ought not to react to stale cases of contempt. The principle which has been incorporated in See. 20 is that time is the healer of all wounds. S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 asks the High Court not to be oversensitive and pounce upon the napping contemner after what he did has been lost merely. This is, therefore, the basic change which the Parliament has introduced in the present statute.